Forrest Slaughter v. JO ANNE B. BARNHART, Commissioner of Social Security

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-1661
FORREST SLAUGHTER,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
JO ANNE B. BARNHART, Commissioner of Social
Security,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, at Bluefield. David A. Faber, Chief
District Judge. (CA-03-58-1)
Submitted: September 15, 2004 Decided: February 23, 2005
Before NIEMEYER, LUTTIG, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
David S. Bary, WOLFE, WILLIAMS & RUTHERFORD, Norton, Virginia, for
Appellant. Donna L. Calvert, Regional Chief Counsel, Eric P.
Kressman, Supervisory Attorney, Teri C. Smith, Assistant Regional
Counsel, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania; Kasey Warner, United States Attorney, Fred B.
Westfall, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, Charleston, West
Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).

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PER CURIAM:
Forrest Slaughter appeals the district court’s order
rejecting the recommendation of a magistrate judge and granting
summary judgment for the Government after concluding substantial
evidence supports the administrative law judge’s (ALJ) denial of
Social Security benefits. We affirm.
Judicial review of a final decision regarding disability
benefits under the Social Security Act is limited to determining
whether the findings of the Commissioner are supported by
substantial evidence and whether the correct law was applied.
Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990). Supported
by substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
Id. This evidence may be more than a scintilla but less than a
preponderance. See Shively v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 987, 989 (4th Cir.
1984). It is not within the province of the reviewing court to
assess the weight of the evidence or to substitute its judgment for
that of the Commissioner if his decision is supported by
substantial evidence. Id. It is the duty of the ALJ, not the
courts, to make findings of fact and to resolve conflicts in the
evidence. Id.
A claimant bears the burden of proving a disability
entitling him to benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5) (2000); Hall v.
Harris, 658 F.2d 260, 264 (4th Cir. 1981). Disability is defined

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as: “[the] inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity
by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has
lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not
less than 12 months . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (2000).
The applicable regulations establish a five step
sequential evaluation process to determine if a claimant is
disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (2004). If an individual is found
not disabled at any step, the inquiry ends. Under this process,
the ALJ must determine: (1) whether the claimant is currently
engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) if not, whether he has
a severe impairment; (3) if so, whether the impairment meets or
equals medical criteria warranting a finding of disability without
considering vocational factors; and (4) if not, whether the
impairment prevents him from performing his past relevant work.
Id.; Hall, 658 F.2d at 264. The claimant establishes a prima facie
case of disability by satisfying either step (3) or (4). The
burden then shifts to the Commissioner for the fifth and final
inquiry: whether the claimant is able to perform other work
considering his remaining physical and mental capacities and his
vocational capabilities to adjust to a new job. Hall, 658 F.2d at
264-65. The ALJ found Slaughter met the first two steps of this
inquiry, but failed to meet either step three or four.

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We conclude substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s
finding that Slaughter failed to demonstrate he is mentally
retarded under 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 12.00(A)
(2004). We further conclude the ALJ did not err when it found
Slaughter’s impairments do not prevent him from performing his past
work as a floor cleaner or foam cutter. Accordingly, we affirm the
decision of the district court. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in
the materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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