United States of America v.  William Jerome Blount

PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 03-4332 
WILLIAM JEROME BLOUNT,
Defendant-Appellant. 
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk.
Henry E. Hudson, District Judge.
(CR-02-193)
Argued: February 24, 2004
Decided: April 12, 2004
Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Niemeyer wrote the opinion,
in which Judge Wilkinson and Judge Duncan joined.
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Christian Lee Connell, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellant.
Stephen Westley Haynie, Assistant United States Attorney, Norfolk,
Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Paul J. McNulty, United States
Attorney, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee.

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OPINION
NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge:
William Blount was convicted of obstructing the due administra-
tion of justice by threats and force during the courtroom sentencing
of his mother, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503, and of assaulting,
impeding, or intimidating a deputy United States Marshal and a court
security officer while engaged in their official duties, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1). The district court sentenced Blount to 46
months’ imprisonment and ordered him to pay restitution of $3,506
for the medical expenses incurred by an injured court security officer.
On appeal, Blount challenges two evidentiary rulings made by the
district court during trial and an eight-level enhancement found by the
district court during sentencing because the offense involved causing
physical injury in order to obstruct justice. For the reasons that fol-
low, we affirm.
I
Following a seven-year investigation for income tax fraud, Emma
Blount, who was in the business of preparing income tax returns and
who was the mother of William Blount (the defendant in this case),
was indicted in a multi-count indictment for preparing false income
tax returns. Mrs. Blount pleaded guilty to one count pursuant to a plea
agreement in which the government agreed to grant her son Blount,
among others, immunity from prosecution. On October 7, 2002, Mrs.
Blount appeared for sentencing before United States District Judge
Jerome B. Friedman in the Eastern District of Virginia, and Blount
was in the courtroom with other family members. The Sentencing
Guidelines called for a sentence of Mrs. Blount in excess of the five-
year maximum sentence for the count to which she pleaded guilty,
and it appeared probable to the parties that the district court would
sentence her to five years’ imprisonment. During allocution, Mrs.
Blount stood next to her counsel behind the defense table and urged
Judge Friedman not to sentence her to five years because of her poor
health condition (hypertension and high blood pressure). She
acknowledged to Judge Friedman that she had done wrong, but she
claimed that in light of her health, a 60-month sentence would amount
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to a death sentence. She stated that she did not believe that her crimes
merited a death sentence.
Blount, who was sitting in the public benches behind the well of
the court, became agitated and began to make increasingly loud
threats, shouting repeatedly to the judge, "Ya’ll better hope she don’t
die; ya’ll better hope she don’t die." These outbursts brought the pro-
ceedings to a standstill. Court Security Officer Orlando Johnson
directed Blount in a polite but forceful manner, "Sir, stand up and get
out." As Blount continued to shout his warnings and to threaten, "I’ll
get you" or "You’ll be sorry," Officer Johnson and Deputy United
States Marshal Nick Proffitt moved to escort Blount from the court-
room. As the security officers led Blount toward the exit, Blount
backpedaled, continuing to face the front of the courtroom and to
shout, "My business ain’t no front. BLT Landscaping [a target of the
tax fraud investigation] ain’t no front. I’m a football player." By the
time Blount reached the exit, he was in such an agitated state that the
security officers retrieved their handcuffs to restrain him.
While Blount was still at the exit to the courtroom, Mrs. Blount
fainted and collapsed face down on the floor at the defense table. As
several people called out that Mrs. Blount had fallen, Blount broke
free from the security officers and rushed toward the front of the
courtroom. Believing that Blount was charging the bench, Officer
Johnson and Deputy Marshal Proffitt raced after him, reaching him
near the podium and tackling him only after he had passed by his
mother on the way to the bench area, knocking the podium on top of
his mother. Judge Friedman pressed the panic button at the bench and
hastened from the courtroom with his law clerk. The security officers
wrestled Blount to the ground in the well of the courtroom in front
of counsel’s tables and handcuffed him there. During the fracas, Offi-
cer Johnson struck his chin on the podium, suffering a fractured tooth
and a laceration under his lip that required seven stitches at a nearby
hospital.
For his outburst and conduct, Blount was indicted in three counts
for (1) obstructing the due administration of justice by threats and
force directed against the court; (2) forcibly interfering with a court
security officer and inflicting bodily injury; and (3) forcibly interfer-
ing with a U.S. Marshal, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503, 111(b),
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and 111(a)(1), respectively. The jury convicted Blount on Counts 1
and 3 and on a lesser included offense of Count 2 for simply forcibly
interfering with a court security officer, finding that Blount did not
cause injury to Officer Johnson. At sentencing, the district court
increased Blount’s offense level by eight levels under U.S.S.G.
§ 2J1.2(b)(1) (providing for an eight-level enhancement when "the
offense involved causing or threatening to cause physical injury to a
person . . . in order to obstruct the administration of justice"). In
reaching this conclusion, the court stated:
In this case, it is true that the jury found the defendant
guilty of the lesser included offense [of Count 2] . . . indi-
cat[ing] they did not find that he caused bodily injury.
However, when you look at that language in context of
the instructions, it means a willful and intentional infliction
of injury upon Officer Johnson.
In this case, the Court is of the opinion that the miscon-
duct of the defendant set in action by his rushing toward the
bench when his mother collapsed and the contact he had
with the marshals, flailing his arms, pushing people, that
certainly was conduct in which one could foresee could
cause injury to a court security officer.
This Court believes that in this instance, a negligent type
of standard governs. The actions of the defendant, an unbro-
ken chain of circumstances, were reasonably calculated to
cause injury to court security officers attempting to protect
the judge and the judicial process.
And I, therefore, believe by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that he did cause physical injury to Officer Johnson.
The Court believes the eight-level enhancement is appropri-
ate, and the defendant’s objection [to the enhancement] is
overruled.
From the judgment of conviction, Blount appealed, challenging the
sentencing enhancement, as well as two evidentiary rulings made dur-
ing trial.
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II
In his most substantial argument, Blount contends that the district
court misconstrued U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2(b)(1) (providing in relevant part
for an eight-level enhancement if the offense "involved causing . . .
physical injury to a person . . . in order to obstruct the administration
of justice") by ignoring the requirement that the injury must have
been caused "in order to" obstruct the administration of justice and
by applying a "negligence — proximate cause — analysis." Properly
read, according to Blount, the guideline requires the government to
prove that "the defendant must have intended to cause injury." Blount
maintains that Officer Johnson sustained his injuries inadvertently
while trying to tackle Blount and that "there was absolutely no evi-
dence at trial to suggest that Blount intended to injure [Officer] John-
son in order to obstruct the administration of justice."
In applying U.S.S.G. 2J1.2(b)(1), the district judge borrowed a cau-
sation analysis from tort law, imputing to Blount any injury foresee-
able and resulting from "an unbroken chain of circumstances." In
concluding that this standard was satisfied by the facts in this case,
the court observed:
The question is whether or not but for the misconduct of
[Blount] would Mr. Johnson have sustained his injury?
Don’t we have an unbroken chain of circumstances sparked
by [Blount’s] misconduct that directly resulted in Officer
Johnson’s being injured?
* * *
The actions of the defendant, an unbroken chain of circum-
stances, were reasonably calculated to cause injury to court
security officers attempting to protect the judge and the judi-
cial process. And I, therefore, believe by a preponderance of
the evidence that he did cause physical injury to Officer
Johnson.
We review the district court’s legal interpretations de novo and its
factual findings for clear error. See United States v. Dawkins, 202
F.3d 711, 714 (4th Cir. 2000).
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The relevant portion of § 2J1.2 of the Sentencing Guidelines pro-
vides:
If the offense involved causing or threatening to cause phys-
ical injury to a person, or property damage, in order to
obstruct the administration of justice, increase by 8 levels.
U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2(b)(1). The district court did not reach the question
of whether Blount "threatened to cause" physical injury in order to
obstruct the administration of justice because it concluded that Blount
actually "caused" physical injury to Officer Johnson in order to
obstruct the administration of justice. Blount focuses on the language
of this guideline — causing physical injury to obstruct justice — to
contend that there is no evidence to indicate that Blount intended to
injure Officer Johnson: "He must intend to cause the injury as a
means to obstruct justice." (Emphasis added).
In giving the language of U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2(b)(1) a natural reading,
we agree with Blount that its requirements include an element of
intent. The guideline requirements are not satisfied by showing sim-
ply that the defendant caused physical injury, a showing that would
not necessarily need to include intent. Rather, under the guidelines as
written, the defendant must cause physical injury for the purpose of
obstructing justice. This purpose of obstructing justice not only
imposes an intent requirement on "causing physical injury," but it also
narrows that intent such that the injury must be caused to obstruct jus-
tice, not for some other purpose. While causing physical injury must
stem from the specific intent to obstruct justice, the intent to cause
physical injury can be general — an intent that anticipates some
unparticularized form of physical injury — so long as the defendant
had the specific purpose of obstructing justice. Thus, in order for
§ 2J1.2(b)(1) to apply, the government must show that Blount caused
physical injury with the specific intent to obstruct justice and a gen-
eral intent to cause physical injury of an unparticularized nature.
Drawing on principles common to criminal and civil law to define
this general intent, we conclude that the defendant must have a state
of mind — while focused on the purpose of obstructing justice — in
which he knows that his conduct will cause physical injury, or he
desires to cause physical injury, or he believes that physical injury is
substantially certain to result from his conduct. Cf., e.g., Model Penal
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Code § 2.02(2)(a) (stating that a defendant acts purposely if "it is his
conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such
a result" and, if the conduct involves attendant circumstances, "he is
aware of the existence of such circumstances or he believes or hopes
that they exist"); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 8A (defining intent
as the actor’s desire "to cause [the] consequences of his act" or his
belief that "the consequences are substantially certain to result from
it").
Up until this point, the analysis apparently supports Blount’s posi-
tion. But Blount argues further that, to be subject to the enhancement
in § 2J1.2(b)(1), the government must also prove that the defendant
had a specific intent to cause the consequences that actually resulted.
On this further point, we find Blount’s argument unsupported by the
text of the guideline. The language of the guideline does not require
that the physical injury that actually resulted be the injury that the
defendant specifically intended when undertaking his conduct. Absent
a specific intent requirement, we read § 2J1.2(b)(1) to require proof
of only general intent of the type defined by the common law. Apply-
ing this understanding of general intent in the context of
§ 2J1.2(b)(1), we summarize that in order to impose the offense-level
enhancement, the government must show that the defendant’s
obstruction of justice resulting in physical injury be accompanied by
(1) the defendant’s knowledge that physical injury will result from the
obstructive conduct, or (2) the defendant’s desire to cause physical
injury to obstruct justice, although not necessarily the same injury that
was actually caused, or (3) the defendant’s belief that, in obstructing
justice, physical injury is substantially certain to result from his con-
duct. The actual consequences of his actions are looked at only to
determine whether they fall within the scope of the general intent, not
to define that scope. Cf. generally Clark & Marshall, A Treatise on
the Law of Crimes §§ 5.02-5.04 (Melvin F. Wingersky ed., 6th ed.
1958); Prosser & Keeton on Torts 33-39 (5th ed. 1984).
The district court did not focus particularly on intent but rather on
an analog in principles of causation. The court found that Blount
caused physical injury in order to obstruct justice because physical
injury resulted from an "unbroken causation chain of circumstances"
emanating from his deliberate and violent conduct. In other words,
Blount deliberately initiated a violent charge to the front of the court-
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room not simply to speak his mind — as he had already done and
continued to do — but now, out of anger that his mother had col-
lapsed, to disrupt the proceedings through some unparticularized form
of violent conduct aimed at causing physical injury. Consistent with
Blount’s earlier announcement that he was a football player, his
actions were those of one who intended to act physically by tackling,
punching, or otherwise striking court personnel. The district court
implicitly found that the injury to Officer Johnson lay within the
scope of intent inferred from Blount’s conduct, and we agree with this
conclusion, even though our analysis is tailored to address the focus
of Blount’s argument that he lacked the requisite intent.
To begin with, Blount disrupted the judicial proceedings by "point-
ing and gesturing at Judge Friedman" and repeatedly shouting "You
better hope she don’t die, you better hope she don’t die. You don’t
know what the f—- you’re doing." He followed up these threats by
declaring, "I’ll get you" or "You’ll be sorry." Mrs. Blount’s fainting
then triggered an emotion in Blount that elevated his threatening talk
to fulfillment in violence, and he bolted from the security officers and
charged the bench. At that point, the nature of Blount’s unculminated
actions could only be violent, and from these actions and the overall
circumstances, a court could infer that Blount held an intent in which
he desired that any of several court officials would sustain physical
injury or believed that physical injury was substantially certain to fol-
low. Indeed, the record shows that several witnesses perceived that
Blount’s conduct was aimed at harming Judge Friedman. Officer
Johnson and Deputy Marshal Proffitt testified that, during the initial
stage of the disruption, Blount was directing his shouted warnings
"toward Judge Friedman." And when Blount actually charged for-
ward, the Assistant U.S. Attorney felt "that [Blount] was trying to get
to the front of the courtroom to attack either myself or the judge."
Officer Johnson shared this view, testifying as follows:
A. My concentration was to stop [Blount] at all means.
Q. Why did you want to stop him at all means?
A. Based on his verbal comments and with Judge Fried-
man still on the bench, I had to stop him.
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Q. Where did you think he was going?
A. Toward the bench. Earlier due to the judge’s decisions
not being in favor of Ms. Blount, I felt that he was
going toward Judge Friedman.
Judge Friedman himself clearly felt physically threatened, as did his
law clerk. The law clerk testified that she feared that Blount "was run-
ning forward toward the judge and towards us in the front. The
podium had fallen over. I didn’t know what was going to happen
next." Judge Friedman pressed the panic button underneath the bench
to summon additional U.S. Marshals and hastened with his law clerk
out of the courtroom, instructing her to call 911 as they went.
Although Blount testified during trial that he was running to aid his
fallen mother and not to injure anyone in the courtroom, the evidence
contradicts his assertions. The witnesses uniformly testified that
Blount did not go to his mother but was charging the bench; he came
forward "until he was actually past his mother in front of the defense
table." The Assistant United States Attorney testified that after secur-
ity officers grabbed Blount, he continued forward and "was com-
pletely in front of [his mother]. He had passed her. He was past her
at the point that he was taken to the ground." And the security officers
testified that they wrestled Blount to the floor and handcuffed him in
front of the podium in the well of the court. Moreover, during this
period, Blount was asked "repeatedly, at least five or six times . . . ,
‘What is your mother’s condition, and what type of medication is she
on?’" Not only did Blount refuse to answer, but "[h]e was continuing
to shout about [other things] . . . [a]nd he was completely nonrespon-
sive in terms of providing . . . whatever medical information he might
have possessed as her son in order to help her with her medical situa-
tion." In rejecting Blount’s explanation for his conduct given during
trial, the district court’s findings to sustain a § 2J1.2(b)(1) enhance-
ment were amply supported by evidence and therefore were not
clearly erroneous.
In sum, the conduct on which the district court rested the sentenc-
ing enhancement revealed that Blount held a general intent to cause
unspecified physical injury, a consequence that actually occurred with
the injury to Officer Johnson. While Blount certainly can argue that
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he did not specifically intend to injure Officer Johnson in the manner
in which the officer was injured, his argument that he did not intend
to cause any physical injury to obstruct justice falls flat in face of the
evidence. Indeed, one would conclude that after Blount’s mother
fainted, Blount initiated a course of violent conduct directed to
obstruct justice by tackling someone, hitting someone, or otherwise
injuring court personnel to disrupt the proceedings. While he may not
have identified for himself or manifested to the world the specific
injury that he intended, any physical injury within the scope of his
general intent to cause physical injury rendered him liable to the
enhancement.*
Moreover, § 2J1.2(b)(1) provides for enhancement not only for
physical injury caused to obstruct justice, but also for threats to cause
physical injury to obstruct justice. See U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2(b)(1) (provid-
ing for the enhancement when "the offense involved . . . threatening
to cause physical injury"). While the district court did not rely on the
threat of injury, having found actual injury, if we were to disregard
Officer Johnson’s injury, the same evidence supporting Blount’s
intent to cause physical injury in order to obstruct justice would sup-
port application of § 2J1.2(b)(1) for threatening to cause physical
injury.
At bottom, we conclude that the district court properly applied
§ 2J1.2(b)(1) to the circumstances of this case to enhance Blount’s
offense level. See also United States v. Cunningham, 54 F.3d 295,
302 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2(b) "mandates calcu-
*Indeed, the scope of intent borrowed from the common law could be
applied to this case with yet a broader result. Under the principle of
"transferred intent," an actor who intends to harm A and in fact harms
B is nonetheless held to intend to harm B. See Clark & Marshall, The
Law of Crimes § 5.04; Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 8A, 8A illus.
1, 13; Prosser & Keeton on Torts 37-39. Even though our conclusion in
this case does not require application of this principle, its application
would be consistent with the Sentencing Commission’s purpose of
enhancing those obstructions of justice that are committed with violence
and cause physical injury. Indeed, when bodily injury actually "re-
sult[s]," the guideline notes that an upward departure "may be war-
ranted." U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2, cmt. 4 (emphasis added).
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lating the sentence using a higher offense level any time an offense
among those to which § 2J1.2 is applicable involves real or threatened
physical injury"); United States v. Duarte, 28 F.3d 47, 48 (7th Cir.
1994) (holding that the "function of section 2J1.2(b)(1) . . . is to dis-
tinguish threats of physical injury or property damage from lesser
threats, rather than to introduce refined distinctions within the broad
category of obstruction of justice" (citations omitted)).
III
Blount also contends that the district court abused its discretion
under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) in making two evidentiary rul-
ings admitting evidence during trial.
First, Blount contends that the testimony of the district court’s dep-
uty clerk relating to an incident in the Clerk’s office before trial
should not have been admitted under Rule 404(b). Before trial in this
case, Blount and Mrs. Blount were in the Clerk’s office to obtain per-
mission for Mrs. Blount to go to Norfolk, Virginia, to see her doctors.
As the deputy clerk tried to explain her limited authority, stating that
she would need to get permission from others, Blount became agi-
tated and angry, yelling at the deputy clerk that if his mother "didn’t
get to go see her doctors, she was going to die." The encounter esca-
lated to the point that the deputy clerk called a court security officer,
who escorted Blount from the building. The court admitted this evi-
dence under Rule 404(b) to allow the government to prove that the
defendant’s similar conduct in the courtroom was no accident and that
Blount held an intent that carried a general disregard for the court and
its personnel in the handling of his mother’s tax fraud case.
Although Rule 404(b) prohibits the admission of general character
evidence to prove that action on a particular occasion was in confor-
mity with a general character trait, Rule 404(b) is still a rule of inclu-
sion providing explicitly for the admission of the type of evidence
offered by the government. It authorizes the admission of evidence to
prove "motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident." Fed. R. Evid. 404(b); see
also United States v. Queen, 132 F.3d 991, 994 (4th Cir. 1997);
United States v. Aramony, 88 F.3d 1369, 1377 (4th Cir. 1996); United
States v. Russell, 971 F.2d 1098, 1106 (4th Cir. 1992); United States
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v. Rawle, 845 F.2d 1244, 1247 (4th Cir. 1988). We are unable to con-
clude that the district court abused its discretion in admitting the evi-
dence of the incident in the Clerk’s office.
Second, Blount contends that under Rule 404(b), evidence about
his mother’s plea agreement should not have been admitted. The dis-
trict court permitted the government to question Blount on cross
examination about his mother’s plea agreement, which had given
Blount immunity in the underlying tax fraud case, and how the agree-
ment affected him. Blount testified in response to these questions that
his mother negotiated the plea agreement to protect the family
(including Blount) from prosecution in the tax fraud case "because
she loves us."
This inquiry into the plea agreement negotiated by Blount’s mother
did not attempt to elicit evidence of prior acts covered by Rule
404(b). Rather, the plea agreement evidence was directly relevant to
Blount’s intent and motives in this case. When Blount charged the
court during his mother’s sentencing, witnesses testified that he was
shouting, "[A]ll [my] mother ever did was try and help people. . . .
[S]he took the deal just to protect us, just to save us." Because ques-
tioning Blount about his motive for charging the court related not
only to the intent element but also to the context of the crimes for
which he was charged, the government was only pursuing evidence
relevant to the issues in this case and not offering evidence of prior
acts under Rule 404(b). We reject Blount’s argument that the district
court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district
court.
AFFIRMED
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