United States of America v.  Clifton Lamount Williams

PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 03-4127 
CLIFTON LAMOUNT WILLIAMS,
Defendant-Appellant. 
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh.
Terrence W. Boyle, Chief District Judge.
(CR-02-154)
Argued: January 23, 2004
Decided: April 15, 2004
Before WILLIAMS, TRAXLER, and KING, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Traxler wrote the opinion, in
which Judge Williams and Judge King joined.
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Jeanette Doran Brooks, Office of the Federal Public
Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Christine Witcover
Dean, Assistant United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellee. ON BRIEF: Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public
Defender, Stephen C. Gordon, Assistant Federal Public Defender,
Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Frank D. Whitney, United
States Attorney, Anne M. Hayes, Assistant United States Attorney,
Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

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OPINION
TRAXLER, Circuit Judge:
Clifton Williams appeals his conviction on one count of conspiracy
to transfer a machinegun, and one count of knowingly possessing and
transferring a machinegun. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 371 (West 2000); 18
U.S.C.A. § 922(o) (West 2000). He contends that, as matter of law,
possession of a frame or receiver does not constitute possession of a
machinegun, and he also argues that the firearm statute at issue is
unconstitutionally vague. We conclude that his arguments are without
merit and affirm.
I.
The facts in this case are uncontroverted. The Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms ("ATF"), working with a paid, confidential
informant, set up the purchase of a modified Norinco Mak 90 Sporter
— a weapon the government contends is a machinegun — from a
man, known as "Hilberto," and another individual. The informant,
wearing a wire, went to the parking lot of a Wal-Mart shopping center
in Garner, North Carolina, where he met with Hilberto. An ATF
agent, Michael Fannelly, surveilled the scene while the informant
spoke with Hilberto. Several minutes after the informant arrived in
the parking lot, Clifton Williams arrived. Williams spoke with the
informant and opened the trunk of Hilberto’s car to show the infor-
mant the gun. Williams then moved the gun and some ammunition to
the informant’s car and the informant paid Williams $500 for the fire-
arm. ATF agents later recovered the firearm and three magazines each
loaded with 30 rounds of ammunition from the informant’s car.
The following day, the informant telephoned Williams and com-
plained that the gun was too slow, saying, "I pulled the little thing,
and only one taco is spit outside." Supp. J.A. 231. Williams
responded, "You gotta open it up, man. . . . [T]ake the pin out of it
. . . When you push the trigger it’ll just spit them out . . . [T]ake the
little sliding leverage out. Then the bolt will automatically stay open."
Supp. J.A. 231-32.
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This transaction led to Williams’s arrest and subsequent indictment
for conspiracy to transfer a machinegun and for transferring a
machinegun.1 At trial, Richard Vasquez, a firearms enforcement offi-
cer with the ATF, testified as an expert in the classification of
machineguns. Vasquez stated that the markings on the receiver the
informant purchased from Williams indicated that it was a
machinegun receiver manufactured in China and illegally imported
into the United States. Vasquez further testified that a large pinhole
at the bottom of the receiver, which was plugged with a large pin,
showed the weapon was a machinegun, because that is where the
machinegun sear would be mounted. On cross-examination, Agent
Vasquez stated that the receiver was not a part, but rather the founda-
tion of a machinegun.
After closing arguments, the district court judge instructed the jury
as to the definition of the term "machinegun," quoting directly from
the relevant portion of the statute. The jury subsequently convicted
Williams on both counts and the district court sentenced Williams to
thirty-three months imprisonment. This appeal followed.
II.
Williams contends that possession or transfer of a frame or receiver
of a machinegun alone does not, as a matter of law, constitute posses-
sion or transfer of a machinegun itself under the statute. We review
questions of statutory interpretation de novo, Holland v. Pardee Coal
Co., 269 F.3d 424, 430 (4th Cir. 2001), "begin[ning] with the lan-
guage of the statute." Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438,
450 (2002). We must first "determine whether the language at issue
has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular
dispute in the case." Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340
(1997). "Our inquiry must cease if the statutory language is unambig-
uous and the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent." Id. (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).
1John Doe, a/k/a "Hilberto," was also indicted. Hilberto was a fugitive
during trial. After the trial, the government determined that Hilberto’s
true name was Ernesto Del Rosier. He later was caught and pleaded
guilty to the charges in the indictment.
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Section 922(o) provides that "[i]t shall be unlawful for any person
to transfer or possess a machinegun." 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(o). Although
section 922(o) does not contain a definition of the term "ma-
chinegun," 18 U.S.C.A. § 921(a)(23) specifies that the term "ma-
chinegun" has the same definition as that provided in 26 U.S.C.A.
§ 5845(b). See 18 U.S.C.A. § 921(a)(23) (West 2000 & Supp. 2003).
Section 5845 states:
The term "machinegun" means any weapon which shoots,
is designed to shoot, or can be readily restored to shoot,
automatically more than one shot, without manual reload-
ing, by a single function of the trigger. The term shall also
include the frame or receiver of any such weapon, any part
designed and intended solely and exclusively, or combina-
tion of parts designed and intended, for use in converting a
weapon into a machinegun, and any combination of parts
from which a machinegun can be assembled if such parts are
in the possession or under the control of a person.
26 U.S.C.A. § 5845(b) (West 2002).
Williams asserts that under this definition the receiver he trans-
ferred did not constitute a machinegun because "a frame or receiver"
alone is not a machinegun. Rather, Williams argues, a frame or
receiver is only a machinegun when it is among "a combination of
parts from which a machinegun can be assembled if such parts are in
the possession or under the control of a person." Specifically, Wil-
liams contends that the phrase "from which a machinegun can be
assembled" in the last sentence of section 5845(b) modifies not only
the term "combination of parts," but also the preceding terms within
the same sentence, including "frame or receiver." Thus, Williams rea-
sons,
in order for something which is less than a complete
machinegun to constitute a machinegun under § 5845(b),
that part or parts must be capable of being assembled to
create a working machinegun and must be, in addition, one
of the following: (1) a frame or receiver of a machinegun;
(2) any part designed and intended solely and exclusively,
or [any] combination of parts designed and intended, for use
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in converting a weapon into a machinegun [;] (3) any com-
bination of parts.
Appellant’s Brief at 17-18.
The plain language of the statute reads otherwise. The word "and"
used in the last sentence of section 5845 reflects a purpose to include
three separate and individually sufficient categories of weapons
within the definition of a machinegun: (1) a frame or receiver; (2)
conversion parts; and (3) combination parts from which a machinegun
can be assembled.2 Contrary to Williams’s strained and unworkable
reading of the last sentence, the phrase "from which a machinegun
can be assembled if such parts are in the possession or under the con-
trol of a person" modifies only the third distinct category of "a combi-
nation of parts."3
2Our reading of the word "and" in section 5845(b) as incorporating
three separate and individually sufficient categories of "machineguns"
within one sentence is further bolstered by a reading of section 5845(a),
where "and" is used in a similar manner to include eight separate and suf-
ficient definitions of "firearm" in one sentence. See 26 U.S.C.A.
§ 5845(a).
3Because we find that the plain language of the statute mandates an
interpretation that includes three distinct categories of weapons within
the definition of machinegun, we need not consider the legislative history
of section 5845(b). We note, however, that the legislative history clearly
indicates an intent to expand the definition of machinegun to create three
new distinct categories:
The second sentence [of § 5845(b)] is new. It provides three new
categories as included within the term "machinegun": (1) the
frame or receiver of a machinegun, (2) any combination of parts
designed and intended for use in converting a weapon other than
a machinegun into a machinegun; for example, so-called conver-
sion kits, and (3) any combination of parts from which a
machinegun can be assembled if such parts are in the possession
of a person.
See United States v. Palmieri, 21 F.3d 1265, 1271-72 (3d Cir.
1994)(quoting S. Rep. No. 1501, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 45-46 (1968)),
vacated on other grounds by 513 U.S. 957 (1994).
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Under Williams’s reading of the statute, a "frame or receiver" is
only a specific "part" of a machinegun - a "part" from which a
machinegun can be assembled if you have other parts as well. Under
this interpretation, the words "frame or receiver" would be surplusage
since they would necessarily be included in the broader term "parts."
Such a reading, therefore, is inconsistent with the principle that a
court is obliged to "give effect, if possible, to every word Congress
used." Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979). In inter-
preting section 5845(b), we must assume that Congress chose to use
the term "frame or receiver" as something separate and distinct from
a mere "part." As the district court correctly concluded, the "frame or
receiver" is not "part" of the weapon, it is the weapon.
Our conclusion that the statutory language in section 5845(b) man-
dates an interpretation that envisions three separate and individually
sufficient categories of machinegun is supported by case law from
other circuits. See, e.g., Palmieri, 21 F.3d at 1271 ("[T]he plain lan-
guage of the statute itself . . . provides that machinegun ‘shall also
include’ items A, items B and items C. This language . . . includes
three new categories within the definition of machinegun." (emphasis
in original)); Thompson/Center Arms Co. v. United States, 924 F.2d
1041, 1046-47 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (finding that 1968 amendments to
machinegun definition provided three new categories); United States
v. Bradley, 892 F.2d 634, 636 (7th Cir. 1990) (concluding that
machinegun definition contains three distinct categories).
III.
Williams also contends that the firearm statute at issue relies upon
an unconstitutionally vague definition of machinegun. We review the
constitutionality of a federal statute de novo. United States v. Sun, 278
F.3d 302, 308 (4th Cir. 2002).
"[V]agueness challenges to statutes which do not involve First
Amendment freedoms must be examined in the light of the facts of
the case at hand." United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550 (1975).
Because the First Amendment is not implicated in this case, Wil-
liams’s challenge to Section 5845(b) is reviewed only as the statute
was applied to him. Sun, 278 F.3d at 309.
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Due process requires that a criminal statute provide adequate notice
to a person of ordinary intelligence that the contemplated conduct is
illegal. See id. Williams contends that section 5845(b) is impermiss-
ibly vague as applied to him because the definition of machinegun
does not provide notice as to "possession of what weapon" will vio-
late the statute. In other words, the crux of Williams’s argument is
that the language in section 5845 violates due process by not specify-
ing the proscribed firearms more clearly. We disagree.
The statutory definition of "machinegun" provides a person of ordi-
nary intelligence clear notice that it is unlawful to transfer a
machinegun frame or receiver. As we have already noted, the lan-
guage of the statute plainly specifies three distinct and individually
sufficient categories of machineguns. The first of the three listed cate-
gories clearly states that a "frame or receiver" is a proscribed
machinegun. Examining the facts of this case, we note that it is undis-
puted that the firearm Williams possessed and later transferred was
such a receiver. "One to whose conduct a statute clearly applies may
not successfully challenge it for vagueness." Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S.
733 (1974). Accordingly, we hold that the statute was not unconstitu-
tionally vague as applied to Williams’s behavior.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we find that the district court committed
no error. We therefore affirm.
AFFIRMED
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