Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. SEAFARERS INTERNATIONAL UNION, No. 03-2057 Defendant-Appellant

PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
 EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
SEAFARERS INTERNATIONAL UNION, No. 03-2057 Defendant-Appellant,
and
PAUL HALL CENTER FOR MARITIME
TRAINING AND EDUCATION,
Defendant. 
 EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
PAUL HALL CENTER FOR MARITIME No. 03-2058 TRAINING AND EDUCATION,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
SEAFARERS INTERNATIONAL UNION,
Defendant. 
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.
Marvin J. Garbis, Senior District Judge.
(CA-02-3192-MJG)
Argued: October 29, 2004
Decided: January 7, 2005

-- 1 of 14 --

Before WILKINSON, MICHAEL, and KING, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed and remanded by published opinion. Judge Wilkinson wrote
the opinion, in which Judge Michael and Judge King joined.
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Anthony Walter Kraus, MILES & STOCKBRIDGE,
P.C., Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellants. Eric Stefan Dreiband,
UNITED STATES EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION, Appellate Services, Washington, D.C., for Appellee.
ON BRIEF: Kathleen Pontone, Christian Levine Simpson, MILES &
STOCKBRIDGE, P.C., Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant Paul Hall
Center for Maritime Training and Education; Theresa M. Connolly,
PIPER RUDNICK, L.L.P., Reston, Virginia, Paul A. Mallos, PIPER
RUDNICK, L.L.P., Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant Seafarers
International Union. Carolyn L. Wheeler, Acting Associate General
Counsel, Vincent J. Blackwood, Assistant General Counsel, Paul D.
Ramshaw, Attorney, UNITED STATES EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Washington, D.C., for Appellee.
OPINION
WILKINSON, Circuit Judge:
In this interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2000), we
have been asked to determine the validity of a 1996 regulation pro-
mulgated by appellee, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion ("EEOC"). This rule extended the strictures of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") to apprenticeship pro-
grams. We find that the regulation is a permissible implementation of
the EEOC’s power under the ADEA. The rule does not contravene the
announced intent of Congress and it reasonably reflects the agency’s
mandate under that statute. We thus affirm the denial of defendants’
2 EEOC v. SEAFARERS INTERNATIONAL UNION

-- 2 of 14 --

motions to dismiss and remand the case for further proceedings con-
sistent with our decision.
I.
Appellant Paul Hall Center for Maritime Training and Education
("the center") operates a seafaring apprenticeship program in Mary-
land. Appellant Seafarers International Union ("the union") represents
workers in the maritime industry. At least one officer of the union
also sits on a management board of the center. The union refers to the
program workers who might benefit from its training. Accepted appli-
cants receive financial support from a labor-management trust that the
union maintains with participating shipper-employers. All graduates
of the program become eligible for union membership. The union also
places many workers who complete the apprenticeship with cooperat-
ing shipper-employers.
Several individuals aged 40 or older unsuccessfully applied for
admission to the program. They complained to the EEOC that they
had been turned away because of their age. After an investigation, the
EEOC sued the center and the union in district court. The agency
referred to its 1996 regulation extending the age discrimination prohi-
bitions of the ADEA to "[a]ll apprenticeship programs."1 29 C.F.R.
§ 1625.21 (2004). The EEOC alleged that appellants had violated this
regulation. The center had accepted applications only from those aged
17 to 35 and the union had been complicit in this illegal policy. On
behalf of the rebuffed applicants, the EEOC sought damages and
injunctive relief forbidding the center and the union from maintaining
the age restriction in their program.
1In its entirety, the regulation provides that "[a]ll apprenticeship pro-
grams, including those apprenticeship programs created or maintained by
joint labor-management organizations, are subject to the prohibitions of
sec. 4 of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as
amended, 29 U.S.C. 623. Age limitations in apprenticeship programs are
valid only if excepted under sec. 4(f)(1) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. 623(f)(1),
or exempted by the Commission under sec. 9 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. 628,
in accordance with the procedures set forth in 29 CFR 1627.15." The
prohibitions of 29 U.S.C. § 623 (2000) include, inter alia, the require-
ment that the regulated entity be an employer and engaged in an employ-
ment relationship. See id. § 623(a)(1).
3 EEOC v. SEAFARERS INTERNATIONAL UNION

-- 3 of 14 --

Appellants disputed the EEOC’s claims. They protested that the
1996 agency regulation was an improper interpretation of the ADEA.
In addition, the union claimed that, even if the regulation were
upheld, its participation in the program was too attenuated to support
liability. Appellants moved the district court to dismiss the case on
these bases. The lower court denied the motions in an order dated
April 30, 2003. It found that dismissing the union as a defendant was
inappropriate at such an early stage. See Streeter v. Joint Indus. Bd.
of Elec. Indus., 767 F. Supp. 520, 527 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). The district
court also noted that the validity of the 1996 regulation posed a sub-
stantial legal question unresolved by existing law. Since resolution of
this question would materially advance the termination of the litiga-
tion, the judge below invited an application for certification of an
interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2000). The district
court granted certification on August 1, 2003. The judge amended his
April 30 order to reflect the certification. We agreed to hear an inter-
locutory appeal from that order.
II.
A.
When a circuit court certifies an interlocutory appeal under
§ 1292(b), it assumes jurisdiction of the certified order, not merely the
controlling issue of law on which certification was granted. See
§ 1292(b) (referring to "such order"); see also In re Cinematronics,
Inc., 916 F.2d 1444, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1990). In addressing the mat-
ters on which the district court ruled in the appealed order, we employ
the usual appellate standard governing motions to dismiss. We thus
consider questions of law de novo and construe the evidence in the
light most favorable to the non-movant. Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari,
7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993).
B.
Congress has vested in the EEOC the power to "issue such rules
and regulations as it may consider necessary or appropriate for carry-
ing out [the ADEA]." 29 U.S.C. § 628 (2000); see Pub. L. No. 98-
532, 98 Stat. 2705 (1984). The agency thus promulgated the 1996 reg-
ulation pursuant to explicit congressional delegation.
4 EEOC v. SEAFARERS INTERNATIONAL UNION

-- 4 of 14 --

When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute that
it administers, it employs the deferential standard of review articu-
lated in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837 (1984). See NISH v. Cohen, 247 F.3d 197, 201-02 (4th Cir.
2001). Appellants, however, urge us to apply the more probing
inquiry of Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944), in assessing
the EEOC’s interpretation of the ADEA. They advance a host of argu-
ments to this end, all of which are unavailing.
First, the center and the union argue that the validity of the 1996
regulation involves only pure questions of statutory construction.
These are the peculiar province of courts, they argue, and are
excepted from Chevron deference. The Supreme Court has arguably
indicated a willingness to entertain arguments of this sort. See, e.g.,
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 (1987). But if there is a
narrow exception of the kind appellants seek, courts have limited it
to issues that are quintessentially legal and fail to implicate the agen-
cy’s expertise in any meaningful manner. See, e.g., Patel v. Ashcroft,
294 F.3d 465, 467 (3d Cir. 2002) (according lessened deference for
question of whether a crime is an "aggravated felony" for deportation
purposes). Whether the ADEA covers apprenticeships is not a ques-
tion of this sort. Indeed, it involves a multitude of issues that fall
squarely within the agency’s special competence. See 61 Fed. Reg.
15,374 (Apr. 8, 1996) (discussing the policy justification for the 1996
regulation). For this reason, our application of Chevron remains
appropriate. See Cohen, 247 F.3d at 202 n.2; Virginia v. Browner, 80
F.3d 869, 878 (4th Cir. 1996).
Second, appellants suggest that the agency’s inconsistent position
on the issue of apprenticeships over time undermines the case for def-
erence to its current interpretation. Compare 29 C.F.R. § 1625.13
(1995), with 29 C.F.R. § 1625.21 (2004) (exemption from ADEA for
"bona fide" apprenticeships removed by extension of the Act’s stric-
tures to all apprenticeships). Of course, the fact that an agency has
adopted a certain construction of its organic statute may increase the
difficulty of arguing that a varying exposition is also valid. But Chev-
ron itself recognized that congressional delegation to administrative
bodies may reflect the need to alter policy in response to changing
conditions. See 467 U.S. at 863-64. Respecting this premise, we see
no need to subject a change in regulatory direction to the more prob-
5 EEOC v. SEAFARERS INTERNATIONAL UNION

-- 5 of 14 --

ing standards of Skidmore. The Chevron inquiry requires only an
organic statute and an agency interpretation to determine whether
congressional direction has been respected. Any agency vacillation,
though potentially relevant to the outcome of court review, does not
require rejection of the Chevron standard. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500
U.S. 173, 186-87 (1991); Malcomb v. Island Creek Coal Co., 15 F.3d
364, 369 (4th Cir. 1994).
Third, appellants claim that the application of the ADEA to appren-
ticeships is a "fundamental issue" concerning the administrative juris-
diction of the EEOC. Their premise is that Chevron deference should
be abandoned when an agency has expansively interpreted a statutory
provision defining the bounds of its power. See N. Ill. Steel Supply
Co. v. Sec’y of Labor, 294 F.3d 844, 847 (7th Cir. 2002). But the
Supreme Court has never held that Chevron should not apply to inter-
pretations of statutory provisions that delimit agencies’ jurisdiction.
Indeed, many provisions in administrative statutes define the author-
ity of the administering agency in the manner that the center and the
union describe. Yet several decisions have accorded Chevron defer-
ence to agency interpretations of these provisions. See, e.g., Commod-
ity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 844-47 (1986)
(applying Chevron to the CFTC’s extension of its jurisdiction to
common-law counterclaims). We thus see no reason to depart from
the usual standard of review here.
Congress has delegated administration of the ADEA to the EEOC.
See 29 U.S.C. § 628 (2000). Under this authority, the agency promul-
gated the challenged regulation after public notice and comment. See
60 Fed. Reg. 51,762 (Oct. 3, 1995). For the foregoing reasons we
review the EEOC’s interpretation of the ADEA under the deferential
standard of Chevron. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218,
226-27 (2001).
III.
A.
We begin by addressing the issue on which the parties sought certi-
fication: whether the EEOC exceeded its authority under the ADEA
in promulgating its 1996 regulation. The familiar first step of Chevron
6 EEOC v. SEAFARERS INTERNATIONAL UNION

-- 6 of 14 --

requires us to apply the "traditional tools of statutory construction" to
determine if Congress has prohibited the agency’s interpretation. 467
U.S. at 843. The foremost of these tools is always the plain text of the
statute. See MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S.
218, 224-25 (1994); Allen v. United States, 173 F.3d 533, 536 (4th
Cir. 1999).
The ADEA makes it "unlawful for an employer" to refuse to hire
any individual "because of such individual’s age." 29 U.S.C.
§ 623(a)(1) (2000). In addition to "employer[s]," the statute also
explicitly applies to "employment agenc[ies]" and "labor organiza-
tion[s]." § 623(b)-(c). Appellants argue that the specification of these
three categories implies the preclusion of apprenticeship programs
from coverage.
It is true that Congress need not list exhaustively all entities that
it intends to exempt from legislation. Rather, in coverage provisions
of administrative statutes, it is often the case that "expressio unius est
exclusio alterius." See Mich. Citizens for an Indep. Press v. Thorn-
burgh, 868 F.2d 1285, 1292-93 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (endorsing the appli-
cation of this maxim in reviewing agency interpretations), aff’d by an
equally divided Court, 493 U.S. 38 (1989). But it is equally true that
Congress can employ general terms in defining the reaches of its
laws. And these definitional provisions often support a continuum of
permissible administrative constructions. See INS v. Fed. Labor Rela-
tions Auth., 4 F.3d 268, 272 (4th Cir. 1993). Indeed, for this reason,
"inferences from congressional silence," in the context of administra-
tive law, are often "treacherous." Castro v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 360
F.3d 721, 729 (7th Cir. 2004) (quoting Alto Dairy v. Veneman, 336
F.3d 560, 566 (7th Cir. 2003)).
Such is the case with the coverage sections of the ADEA. The stat-
utory reference to "employer[s]" who refuse to hire an individual "be-
cause of such individual’s age" supports a flexible application of the
ADEA’s strictures, sufficient to cover a variety of workplace relation-
ships. § 623(a)(1); see also § 630(b) (providing ADEA’s broad defini-
tion of "employer" as "a person engaged in an industry affecting
commerce"). The most common of these may, as appellants intimate,
involve salaried or wage-earning workers subject to the managerial
direction of a supervisor. But we have already indicated that the com-
7 EEOC v. SEAFARERS INTERNATIONAL UNION

-- 7 of 14 --

mercial relationships subsumed by the language of § 623(a)(1) may
extend beyond this typicality. See Mangram v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
108 F.3d 61, 62-63 (4th Cir. 1997). Our construction of this provision
focuses on the control that the hiring party exercises over the hired
individual. Id. (citing Garrett v. Phillips Mills, Inc., 721 F.2d 979,
982 (4th Cir. 1983)). A similar test for employment under § 623(a)(1)
has been adopted by our sister circuits. See Barnhart v. New York Life
Ins. Co., 141 F.3d 1310, 1312-13 (9th Cir. 1998); Speen v. Crown
Clothing Corp., 102 F.3d 625, 631 (1st Cir. 1996); Deal v. State Farm
County Mut. Ins. Co., 5 F.3d 117, 118-19 (5th Cir. 1993); Daughtrey
v. Honeywell, Inc., 3 F.3d 1488, 1495-96 (11th Cir. 1993); Frankel
v. Bally, Inc., 987 F.2d 86, 89-90 (2d Cir. 1993).
While the particular application of such tests in the peculiar factual
context of these cases sometimes supports a finding of an employ-
ment relationship, see Daughtrey, 3 F.3d at 1496, and sometimes does
not, see Mangram, 108 F.3d at 63-64; Deal, 5 F.3d at 119, all the for-
mulations of these tests emphasize that they are heavily fact-
dependent. And the question before us here is only whether Congress
intended to place apprenticeships generally beyond the reach of the
statutory provision that these tests apply, § 623(a)(1). We do not think
that it did. Indeed, a broad exemption of apprenticeships from the
employment relationship as defined by § 623(a)(1) would be inconsis-
tent with the narrow inquiry into the particulars of each case that our
circuit and others have consistently pursued. Formation of an appren-
ticeship program can create commercial ties between the hirer and the
trainee that fall within the employment relationships as construed by
this precedent. In fact, such ties may be the reason for the formation
of the apprenticeship relationship in the first place. At the least, an
examination of the ADEA’s coverage provisions in light of existing
expositions by federal courts reveals no congressional intention to
create a flat exemption for apprenticeships from the statute’s provi-
sions. The text of the ADEA thus does not foreclose the EEOC’s
1996 regulation.
We also think it significant that the safe harbor provisions of the
statute, which exempt from regulation various categories of commer-
cial activity, contain no mention of apprenticeships nor any indication
that Congress meant to preserve age discrimination therein. See
§ 623(f); see also Int’l Union, United Auto. v. Johnson Controls, Inc.,
8 EEOC v. SEAFARERS INTERNATIONAL UNION

-- 8 of 14 --

499 U.S. 187, 201 (1991). For example, the safe harbor provisions
permit an otherwise prohibited action whenever "age is a bona fide
occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal opera-
tion of the particular business." § 623(f)(1). These provisions also
exempt a "bona fide seniority system that is not intended to evade the
purposes of [the ADEA]." § 623(f)(2). The absence of apprenticeships
from this part of the statute only reinforces our conclusion that the
text of the ADEA evinces no prohibition of the 1996 rule at issue.
Courts also apply canons of statutory construction at step one of
the Chevron inquiry. See Defenders of Wildlife v. Browner, 191 F.3d
1159, 1165 (9th Cir. 1999). One of these canons recognizes that Con-
gress sometimes chooses to model legislation on its own previous
enactments. When this occurs, the rule of in pari materia construction
counsels examination of the congressional intent expressed in a pro-
genitor statute to clarify the meaning of any derivative sections in
later legislation. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S.
111, 121 (1985). Invoking this canon, and emphasizing that the Court
has already recognized that the coverage provisions of the ADEA
were modeled closely on those of Title VII, see Lorillard v. Pons, 434
U.S. 575, 584 (1978), appellants draw our attention to the latter stat-
ute. The center and the union maintain that, even if the four corners
of the ADEA provide them no support, an examination of the ADEA
in light of Title VII reveals a congressional intent to preclude the
EEOC’s 1996 regulation. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)-(d) (2000).
The center and the union note, for instance, that both Title VII and
the ADEA proscribe discrimination by "employer[s]," "employment
agenc[ies]," and "labor organization[s]." Compare § 2000e-2 (a)-(c),
with § 623(a)-(c). In a contiguous section, Title VII, although not the
ADEA, also explicitly prohibits discrimination in admission or
employment by "any employer, labor organization, or joint labor-
management committee controlling apprenticeship . . . ." § 2000e-
2(d). Relying on the rule that a statute should not be interpreted to
render any of its terms redundant, see Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Rus-
sell, 473 U.S. 134, 142 (1985), the center and the union claim that
Title VII’s explicit reference to apprenticeships in § 2000e-2(d)
implies that the remaining coverage provisions do not independently
reach that business practice. To conclude otherwise, they assert,
would reduce Title VII’s explicit mention of apprenticeships to sur-
9 EEOC v. SEAFARERS INTERNATIONAL UNION

-- 9 of 14 --

plusage, only echoing a meaning already subsumed by the preceding
terms. Thus the reference to "employer[s]" who "fail . . . to hire any
individual," in § 2000e-2(a) of Title VII, does not cover apprentice-
ship programs. It would follow, the center and the union argue, that
§ 623(a) of the ADEA, like its template from Title VII, cannot extend
to apprenticeships. Appellants submit that the EEOC’s 1996 rule,
expressing the opposite conclusion, is invalid.
Contrary to the center and the union’s assertion, however, a close
examination of Title VII does not imperil the EEOC’s regulation.
Indeed, appellants’ argument contains an erroneous premise that
undermines their conclusion to this end. Their premise is that a capa-
cious interpretation of § 2000e-2(a) of Title VII as encompassing
apprenticeships would render the explicit inclusion of that employ-
ment practice in section § 2000e-2(d) redundant. But there is a simple
reconciliation of the two provisions that affords the former the appro-
priate breadth and avoids rendering the latter superfluous. Under this
construction, the language of § 2000e-2(a) requires the application of
the Act to a class of typical economic relationships subsumed by the
common understanding of employment as between a company and a
salaried or wage-earning worker. But § 2000e-2(a) also permits, with-
out requiring, extension of the statute’s discrimination prohibitions to
an additional set of less customary workplace associations. Such a
broad delegation to an administering agency, requiring some interpre-
tations and permitting others, would hardly represent a novel course
of legislative action. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531
U.S. 457, 474 (2001). Indeed, it is implicit in the very model of
agency administration underlying Chevron.
This understanding of Title VII’s reach, far from disturbing our
conclusion that the 1996 regulation at issue validly construed the
ADEA, actually reinforces it. For if § 2000e-2(a) of Title VII is broad
enough to permit, but not require, application of that Act’s strictures
to apprenticeships, then omission of an analogue to § 2000e-2(d) in
the ADEA, contrary to appellants’ suggestion, does nothing to fore-
close just such an extension of that statute’s prohibitions. It only
restores to regulatory discretion the full range of permissible mean-
ings subsumed by the terms "employer" and "individual" in § 2000e-
2(a). And this range, we have shown, supports the 1996 rule that the
center and the union have challenged here.
10 EEOC v. SEAFARERS INTERNATIONAL UNION

-- 10 of 14 --

Moreover, we believe that our reconciliation of the ADEA with its
Title VII model best reflects an important axiom of Chevron review
— that agencies should remain free to administer their organic stat-
utes to meet the regulatory needs of changing conditions. See Chev-
ron, 467 U.S. at 863-64; Yanez-Popp v. INS, 998 F.2d 231, 235 (4th
Cir. 1993). The EEOC invoked this basis for deference when it found
that "dislocations in the American economy" have recently made age
discrimination in apprenticeships a more significant obstacle to
employment for older workers than it had been before. 61 Fed. Reg.
at 15,376. Appellants’ proffered construction of Title VII, with its
limiting consequences for the ADEA, would bind the EEOC to a
much narrower mandate and frustrate realization of this ground for
Chevron deference here.
A comparison of the text and structure of the two statutes reveals
no congressional intention to sanction age discrimination in appren-
ticeships under the ADEA. Applying the preliminary analysis that
Chevron requires, we find no reason to disturb the EEOC’s 1996 reg-
ulation at step one of our review.
B.
We therefore progress to step two of the Chevron inquiry and ask
whether the agency’s rule is a permissible interpretation of its organic
statute. 467 U.S. at 844; NISH v. Cohen, 247 F.3d 197, 202 (4th Cir.
2001); Virginia v. Browner, 80 F.3d 869, 878 (4th Cir. 1996). A rea-
sonable construction at this step is one that "harmonizes with the plain
language of the statute, its origin, and its purpose." Bankers Life &
Cas. Co. v. United States, 142 F.3d 973, 981 (7th Cir. 1998) (quoting
Bell Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Comm’r, 40 F.3d 224, 227 (7th Cir.
1994)). The 1996 regulation satisfies this standard.
We begin with the statute’s language. The ADEA is replete with
references to different kinds of entities engaged in business in the
commercial sphere. And the statutory proscriptions for these actors’
behavior with respect to age are wide-ranging. For instance, the Act
regulates employers and unions not merely in their decisions to hire
and fire and bestow membership respectively, but also from "limit[-
ing], segregat[ing], or classify[ing]" their employees and members in
an age-discriminatory manner. See § 623 (a)(1), (c). Such broad pro-
11 EEOC v. SEAFARERS INTERNATIONAL UNION

-- 11 of 14 --

hibitions evince an attempt on the part of Congress to ensure seamless
continuity of coverage under the ADEA for economic entities in the
labor market. Viewed in light of this aim, the EEOC’s extension of
the Act’s strictures to apprenticeships — one of the few spheres of
commerce which it has heretofore left largely undisturbed — is sensi-
ble.
The ADEA grew out of the concern, expressed by the Secretary of
Labor in a report that Congress directed him to prepare, that "the dis-
advantaged position of older workers in our society" was causing "in-
dividual and social losses readily apparent in unemployment,
inadequate incomes, and isolation of older persons from the main-
stream of activity . . . ." See Report of the Secretary of Labor, The
Older American Worker: Age Discrimination in Employment 97
(1965). The statute thus evinces a concern with age discrimination in
the sphere of employment generally. Apprenticeships are the entry
point to the workforce for a significant number of our citizens. See
generally The National Registered Apprenticeship System: Programs
and Apprentices, Fiscal Year 2003, Office of Apprenticeship
Training, Employer and Labor Services (OATELS), Department of
Labor (2004), available at http://www.doleta.gov/atels_bat/pdf/
statsheet03.pdf. The EEOC could permissibly conclude that Congress,
in an attempt to combat age discrimination in the workplace, did not
intend to broadly sanction such discrimination at the doorstep.
It thus did not run against the statutory grain for the EEOC to
determine that rapid changes in the American economy and global
markets made age restrictions in training programs a greater burden
on older workers than they had borne heretofore. Congress declared
in the ADEA that its aim is "to promote employment of older persons
based on their ability rather than age . . . ." § 621(b). The belief that
age and aptitude are not correlated, which underlies this proclamation,
pervades the entire statute. Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized
as much. W. Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 422 (1985)
(acknowledging the ADEA command that "employers are to evaluate
employees . . . on their merits and not their age"). The stereotype
underlying age restrictions in apprenticeships, meanwhile, is that
older people are unable to learn the skills of a trade as efficiently as
their younger counterparts. Such barriers to entry may also demean
the contributions to the human capital of younger workers that their
12 EEOC v. SEAFARERS INTERNATIONAL UNION

-- 12 of 14 --

more mature peers can impart. On both accounts, the kind of age dis-
crimination that is alleged here contravenes the reason the statute was
enacted. By respecting this purpose, while not contravening clear stat-
utory language, the 1996 regulation represents a permissible interpre-
tation of the Act.2
IV.
Throughout this appeal, and in the proceedings before the district
court, the center and the union repeatedly assailed the wisdom of the
EEOC’s position. They maintained that age-barriers to entry are a
hallmark of apprenticeships and complained that the EEOC’s regula-
tion effectively guts that employment practice by erasing its defining
characteristic. They objected to the decrease in job opportunities for
the young that the 1996 rule may cause and protested that "[i]nitial
occupational training . . . involves substantial costs, yielding a greater
return in the long run from candidates with longer anticipated work-
ing lives." They alleged that the agency failed to adequately consider
these ill consequences.
Appellants’ arguments may have force. To vindicate them, how-
ever, would involve a judicial foray into policies far removed from
2The parties have argued to us numerous grounds for liability, and
defenses thereto, that do not depend on the validity of the challenged reg-
ulation, yet whose resolution here may be altered by our validation of
that rule. For instance, the EEOC alleges that the union violates the
ADEA by conditioning its membership on completion of the apprentice-
ship program. See § 623(c)(1)-(2). The agency also asserts that the center
violates the ADEA when, in its capacity as employer under § 623(a), it
interferes with the access of older persons to employment with other
employers. Appellants resist these claims generally, and the union, for its
part, argues that the relationship it maintains with the program is too
attenuated to support liability under any legal theory. We decline to fur-
ther address such matters. We are wary of overreaching on interlocutory
proceedings, see Rowland v. Perry, 41 F.3d 167, 175 (4th Cir. 1994), and
believe that the district court, applying our opinion, the Act, and other
relevant federal law, is the best forum for continued exposition of these
claims if the parties see fit to preserve them on remand. See generally
Herman v. United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners of Am., 60 F.3d 1375
(9th Cir. 1995).
13 EEOC v. SEAFARERS INTERNATIONAL UNION

-- 13 of 14 --

our mandate under law. In the final analysis, their treatment is for the
legislative and executive branches and beyond the province of this
court. Congress has already entrusted enforcement of this statute to
the EEOC. See 29 U.S.C. § 628 (2000); Pub. L. No. 98-532, 98 Stat.
2705 (1984). Pursuant to this delegation, the agency promulgated a
rule, after public comment, that brought age discrimination in appren-
ticeships within the purview of the Act. We are not authorized to
judge the wisdom of this step. We are empowered only to ensure that
the agency did not contravene the expressed intent of Congress, nor
unreasonably apply its mandate, in reaching the interpretation that this
rule reflects. We find that it did neither. We therefore affirm the dis-
trict court’s denial of defendants’ motions to dismiss and remand the
case for further proceedings consistent with this decision.
AFFIRMED AND REMANDED
14 EEOC v. SEAFARERS INTERNATIONAL UNION

-- 14 of 14 --