Gay Mercer Hayslett v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 863 F.2d 1162, 1167 4th Cir. 1988 . Summary judgment…

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 03-2029
GAY MERCER HAYSLETT,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
ARLINGTON COUNTY, VIRGINIA,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Gerald Bruce Lee, District
Judge. (CA-02-1433-A)
Submitted: April 30, 2004 Decided: July 22, 2004
Before LUTTIG, MICHAEL, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Marni E. Byrum, Arlington, Virginia, for Appellant. James E.
Fagan, III, OFFICE OF THE COUNTY ATTORNEY, Arlington, Virginia, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).

-- 1 of 3 --

- 2 -
PER CURIAM:
Gay Mercer Hayslett, an African-American female, filed
suit against her employer, the Arlington County Police Department
(“Employer”), alleging that Employer violated her rights under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(2000), by (1) discriminating against her based on her race in its
decisions to promote and train, and (2) retaliating against her for
filing discrimination claims. The court entered summary judgment
against Hayslett and dismissed the action. Hayslett now appeals
that order. We affirm.
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo.
Higgins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 863 F.2d 1162, 1167 (4th
Cir. 1988). Summary judgment is appropriate only if there are no
material facts in dispute and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 322 (1986). We must view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
In light of this standard, we have carefully reviewed the
formal briefs and materials submitted by the parties and find no
reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s
order granting Employer’s motion for summary judgment. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

-- 2 of 3 --

- 3 -
adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

-- 3 of 3 --