Donald Jacobs v. State of Maryland Department of Natural Resources

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 03-1625
DONALD JACOBS; NORMA JACOBS,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
versus
STATE OF MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL
RESOURCES; JOHN W. RHOADES; MICHAEL G. SEWELL,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Alexander Harvey II, Senior District
Judge. (CA-02-1450-1-AH)
Submitted: January 30, 2004 Decided: February 20, 2004
Before WILLIAMS, MICHAEL, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Neal M. Janey, Sr., THE JANEY LAW FIRM, P.C., Baltimore, Maryland,
for Appellants. J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General, Paul J.
Cucuzzella, Joseph P. Gill, Assistant Attorneys General, Annapolis,
Maryland, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).

-- 1 of 3 --

- 2 -
PER CURIAM:
Donald and Norma Jacobs appeal the district court’s order
awarding summary judgment in favor of Defendants Lieutenant Michael
G. Sewell and Colonel John W. Rhoades. Donald Jacobs, an officer
with the Maryland Department of Natural Resources, was tried and
acquitted for the alleged theft of two hundred dollars from a
larger sum of money that had been seized during an arrest in which
he participated. After his acquittal, Jacobs brought several state
claims and Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (2000). The district court dismissed Jacobs’ state claims
without prejudice and granted Sewell and Rhoades’ motion for
summary judgment as to the federal claims. On appeal, Jacobs
claims the district court erred in finding Sewell and Rhoades were
entitled to qualified immunity and granting their motion for
summary judgment.
We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary
judgment. Higgins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 863 F.2d 1162,
1167 (4th Cir. 1988).
Jacobs contends that the district court erred in granting
Sewell and Rhoades qualified immunity. Qualified immunity protects
government officials performing discretionary functions from
liability for civil damages where “their conduct does not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a

-- 2 of 3 --

* Jacobs does not challenge the dismissal of the action as to
Defendant Maryland Department of Natural Resources, nor does he
challenge the dismissal without prejudice of his state law claims.
- 3 -
reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
The district court correctly ruled that neither Sewell
nor Rhoades violated any clearly established Fifth Amendment right
because their use of Jacobs’ compelled statements was limited to
the criminal investigation. See Wiley v. Mayor of Baltimore, 48
F.3d 773, 777 (4th Cir. 1995); see also Chavez v. Martinez, 538
U.S. __, 123 S.Ct. 1994, 2000, 2007 (2003). As to Jacobs’ claim
that Rhoades and Sewell violated his Fourth Amendment rights based
on Jacobs’ arrest, these Defendants neither arrested Jacobs nor
made the decision to have him arrested. Therefore, Sewell and
Rhoades are entitled to qualified immunity because their conduct
did not violate a clearly established constitutional right.
Because we conclude that Rhoades and Sewell were entitled to
qualified immunity, we need not reach the merits of Jacobs’
claims. * Cf. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 199-205 (2001).
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
are adequately presented in the materials before the court and oral
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

-- 3 of 3 --