United States of America v.  Christopher Walters

FILED: April 13, 2004
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 02-4926(L)
(CR-02-155)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
CHRISTOPHER WALTERS,
Defendant - Appellee.
O R D E R
The court amends its opinion filed February 20, 2004, as
follows:
On page 11, line 8 of footnote 6: the phrase “it also
necessarily describes the actor” is amended to read “it also
indicates that the offender was tried as an adult.”
For the Court - By Direction
/s/ Patricia S. Connor
Clerk

-- 1 of 12 --

PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 02-4926 
CHRISTOPHER WALTERS,
Defendant-Appellee. 
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 03-4015 
DEON MONTIEAL CRUDUP,
Defendant-Appellant. 
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 03-4090 
DEANDRE AVION DAVIS,
Defendant-Appellee. 
No. 02-4926: Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond. Richard L. Williams,
Senior District Judge. (CR-02-155) No. 03-4015: Appeal from the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at
Newport News. Henry Coke Morgan, Jr., District Judge. (CR-02-54)
No. 03-4090: Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond. Robert E. Payne, District
Judge. (CR-01-328)

-- 2 of 12 --

Argued: October 31, 2003
Decided: February 20, 2004
Before NIEMEYER, WILLIAMS, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part; vacated and remanded in part by published opinion.
Judge Duncan wrote the opinion, in which Judge Niemeyer and Judge
Williams joined.
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Michael James Elston, Assistant United States Attorney,
Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant United States. Paul Geoffrey Gill,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees
Walters and Davis. ON BRIEF: Paul J. McNulty, United States
Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant United States. Frank W.
Dunham, Jr., Federal Public Defender, Richmond, Virginia, for
Appellees Walters and Davis; Jennifer T. Stanton, JENNIFER T.
STANTON, P.C., Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellant Crudup.
OPINION
DUNCAN, Circuit Judge:
Each of the three defendants in these consolidated appeals, Christo-
pher Walters, DeAndre Avion Davis and Deon Montieal Crudup, was
charged with possession of a firearm after having been convicted of
a crime punishable by more than one year of imprisonment in viola-
tion of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2000). In each instance, the predicate
conviction was a juvenile adjudication in Virginia state court. Based
on this fact, the indictments of Walters and Davis were dismissed by
the respective district courts. The district court denied Crudup’s
motion to dismiss, however, and he was subsequently convicted of
three counts of possession of a firearm in violation of § 922(g)(1).
2 UNITED STATES v. WALTERS

-- 3 of 12 --

Because we find that a juvenile adjudication is not a conviction under
Virginia law, such an adjudication cannot serve as the underlying
conviction for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Accordingly, we
affirm the dismissals of the indictments of Walters and Davis, reverse
the denial of Crudup’s motion to dismiss, vacate Crudup’s conviction,
and dismiss as moot Crudup’s other assignments of error.
I.
Federal firearms law prohibits the possession of a firearm in or
affecting interstate commerce by anyone "who has been convicted in
any court of . . . a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year." 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Walters, Davis and
Crudup were indicted under this provision. In each instance, the
defendant committed the predicate offense when he was a minor, and
was adjudicated delinquent in a Virginia Juvenile and Domestic Rela-
tions Court.1
With respect to each underlying offense, the defendant was neither
prosecuted as an adult nor sentenced in state circuit court. Each defen-
dant moved to dismiss his indictment on the ground that an adjudica-
tion of juvenile delinquency did not qualify under § 922(g)(1) as a
conviction of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceed-
ing one year.
The district court granted Walter’s motion to dismiss the indict-
ment following an analysis of both federal and state law. The court
noted that under the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act ("FJDA"),
prosecution of a minor results in an adjudication of status rather than
a criminal conviction. The court further rejected the argument that
Virginia law treats juvenile adjudications as convictions, pointing out
that the statutory language on which the government relied distin-
guishes a person convicted of a felony from one found guilty as a
1Specifically, Walters was found guilty of distribution of cocaine and
possession with intent to distribute on three occasions in 1996; Davis
was found guilty of unauthorized use of an automobile and grand larceny
in 1998 and 1999; Crudup was found guilty of possession of cocaine in
2000.
3 UNITED STATES v. WALTERS

-- 4 of 12 --

juvenile. United States v. Walters, 225 F. Supp. 2d 684 (E.D. Va.
2002).
The district court granted Davis’ motion to dismiss, but focused
entirely on state law. United States v. Davis, 234 F. Supp. 2d 601, 603
& n.2, 604-06 (E.D. Va. 2002). Although the court acknowledged that
a particular amendment to Virginia’s juvenile code made the Govern-
ment’s position more persuasive than it would have been under the
prior provision, the court nevertheless found that various provisions
of Virginia law, including the Virginia analog to § 922(g), Va. Code
Ann. § 18.2-308.2(A) (Michie 2003), continued the distinction
between delinquency adjudications and criminal convictions. Davis,
234 F. Supp. 2d at 604-06. As a result, the court found Davis’ juve-
nile adjudication did not qualify as a predicate conviction under
§ 922(g)(1).
In addressing Crudup’s motion to dismiss, however, the district
court reached the opposite conclusion. The court found that a juvenile
adjudication is a conviction for purposes of § 922(g)(1) because such
an adjudication could be an underlying offense for Virginia’s "felon
in possession of a firearm" statute. See Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-
308.2(A)(ii). The court also determined that the offense of simple
possession of cocaine, which formed the basis of Crudup’s adjudica-
tion, is one that would have carried a sentence of up to ten years had
Crudup been tried as an adult. United States v. Crudup, 225 F. Supp.
2d 688 (E.D. Va. 2002).
The United States filed timely notices of appeal from the district
courts’ decisions in Walters and Davis. Crudup filed a timely notice
of appeal of the criminal judgment entered against him.
This appeal presents an issue of statutory construction which, as a
pure question of law, we review de novo. See Holland v. Parsee Coal
Co., 269 F.3d 424, 430 (4th Cir. 2001).
II.
Before deciding whether juvenile adjudications serve as predicate
convictions for purposes of § 922(g)(1), we must first determine
whether federal or state law controls our analysis.
4 UNITED STATES v. WALTERS

-- 5 of 12 --

Defendants Walters, Davis and Crudup argue that we should look
to the federal criminal code for guidance in determining whether a
conviction encompasses a juvenile adjudication. The defendants con-
tend that there is a long-recognized distinction between a finding of
"juvenile delinquency" and a "conviction" of a crime. Based on the
principle that "Congress acts with knowledge of existing law, and that
absent a clear manifestation of contrary intent, a newly-enacted or
revised statute is presumed to be harmonious with existing law and
its judicial construction," United States v. Langley, 62 F.3d 602, 605
(4th Cir. 1995) (internal quotations omitted)(quoting Estate of Wood
v. C.I.R., 909 F.2d 1155, 1160 (8th Cir. 1990)), the defendants con-
tend that we should presume that the provisions of the federal fire-
arms law continue these well-established distinctions.
Federal law defines "juvenile delinquency" as a violation of law by
a minor that "would have been a crime if committed by an adult." 18
U.S.C. § 5031 (2003). A juvenile is not "convicted" under federal
law; a court adjudicates whether he or she is a juvenile delinquent. If
so, the juvenile is subject to a disposition hearing at which the options
are restitution, probation or commitment to official detention for a
limited period of time. See 18 U.S.C. § 5037 (2003). The Walters
court concluded that the "FJDA demonstrated Congress’s perspective
that juvenile delinquency adjudications are distinct from criminal con-
victions." 225 F. Supp. 2d at 685-86.
The court further found the definition of "violent felony" in
§ 924(e)(2)(B), which parallels the language of § 922(g)(1), to be par-
ticularly compelling. Section 924(e)(2)(B) defines the term "violent
felony" to include
any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding
one year, or any act of juvenile delinquency involving the
use or carrying of a firearm, knife, or destructive device that
would be punishable by imprisonment for such term if com-
mitted by an adult . . . .
Section 924(e)(2)(C) goes on to provide that "the term ‘conviction’
includes a finding that a person has committed an act of juvenile
delinquency involving a violent felony." As the Walters court pointed
out, § 924(e)(2) clarifies that the term "conviction" will include an
5 UNITED STATES v. WALTERS

-- 6 of 12 --

adjudication of juvenile delinquency only if that act of juvenile delin-
quency involved a "violent felony." If the term "conviction" were
interpreted to always include adjudications of juvenile delinquency,
§ 924(e)(2)(C) would not be necessary.
The Government argues in response that a specific provision of the
federal statute requires a determination of the status of a Virginia
juvenile adjudication under Virginia law, and we agree. In 1986,
§ 921 was amended to provide that "[w]hat constitutes a conviction
of [a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one
year] shall be determined in accordance with the law of the jurisdic-
tion in which the proceedings were held." Firearms Owners’ Produc-
tion Act, Pub. L. No. 99-308, § 101, 100 Stat. 449, (1986) (codified
as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) (2003)).
We had occasion to interpret § 921(a)(20) in the context of deter-
mining whether the prosecution and conviction of a juvenile as an
adult constituted a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(e)(1). See United States v. Lender, 985 F.2d 151 (4th Cir.
1993). We found then, as we do now, that the language of
§ 921(a)(20) is clear in its indication of Congress’s intent to incorpo-
rate state law. By stating that what constitutes a conviction is to be
determined by the laws of the jurisdiction in which the proceeding
was held, "Congress has eschewed a uniform definition in favor of
letting states decide" what constitutes a crime punishable by impris-
onment for more than one year. Id. at 156.
We turn, therefore, to a determination of whether a juvenile adjudi-
cation is a conviction under Virginia law.
III.
The clearest general statement of Virginia law on whether an adju-
dication of juvenile delinquency qualifies as a "conviction" for pur-
poses of § 922(g)(1) is Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-308 (Michie 2003).
Under that provision,
Except as otherwise provided by law for a juvenile found
6 UNITED STATES v. WALTERS

-- 7 of 12 --

guilty of a felony in circuit court whose case is disposed of
in the same manner as an adult criminal case, a finding of
guilty on a petition charging delinquency under the provi-
sions of this law shall not operate to impose any of the civil
disabilities ordinarily imposed by conviction for a crime,
nor shall any such finding operate to disqualify the child for
employment by any state or local government agency.2
2Prior to 1977, the predecessor provision to section 16.1-308 explicitly
removed juvenile adjudications from consideration as convictions for
purposes of collateral consequences under Virginia law. Under the prior
language,
no adjudication or judgment upon the status of any child under
the provisions of this law shall operate to impose any of the dis-
abilities ordinarily imposed by conviction of a crime, nor shall
any such child be denominated a criminal by reason of any such
adjudication, nor shall such adjudication be denominated a con-
viction.
Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-179 (repealed 1977); see Kiracofe v. Common-
wealth, 97 S.E.2d 14, 21 (Va. 1957).
It could certainly be argued, as the Government does, that the removal
of unequivocal language that no "such [juvenile] adjudication [shall] be
denominated a conviction" suggests that the Virginia legislature intended
to blur, if not eliminate, the distinction between the two. However, a
more compelling explanation is that the language of section 16.1-308
simply recognizes that a juvenile may be tried as an adult; in that circum-
stance, the distinction between a juvenile adjudication and a conviction
need not be made. As noted by the court in Davis and explained in a con-
temporaneous survey
[t]he revision espouses as its dominant theme that ‘the welfare
of the child and the family is the paramount concern of the state,’
and as its major objective, ‘to divert from the juvenile justice
system, to the extent possible . . . those children who can be
cared for or treated through alternative programs.’ To meet this
objective the revised system eschews prior law, which treated all
juveniles alike, and instead places juveniles into one of three cat-
egories: children in need of services; abused or neglected chil-
dren; or delinquents.
See Twenty-Second Annual Survey of Developments in Virginia Law,
1976-1977, 63 Va. L. Rev. 1350, 1425 (1977) (footnotes omitted).
7 UNITED STATES v. WALTERS

-- 8 of 12 --

Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-308 (emphasis added). Although the language
does not explicitly state that a juvenile adjudication shall not be
denominated a conviction, as did its predecessor provision, it does
distinguish juveniles adjudicated as delinquent from those tried as
adults. Only a minor found guilty of a felony in circuit court as an
adult suffers the subsequent disabilities that a conviction would other-
wise entail.
Indeed, as the court in Davis noted, the fact that Virginia law
allows a minor charged with criminal violations to be tried either as
a juvenile or as an adult pursuant to the restrictions of Va. Code Ann.
§ 16.1-269.1 (Michie 2003) is significant.3 Davis, 234 F. Supp. 2d at
605. A minor tried as a juvenile and adjudicated delinquent not only
does not suffer the otherwise applicable civil disabilities, he or she
faces qualitatively different consequences as well. See Va. Code Ann.
§ 16.1-278.8 (Michie 2003) (listing sanctions applicable following an
adjudication as a juvenile delinquent). If juvenile adjudications and
criminal convictions were equivalent concepts under Virginia law,
there would be no reason to provide for the prosecution of juvenile
offenders as adults.4
Because recognition of a different status for a juvenile tried as an adult
is consonant as with the plain language of section 16.1-308, and distinc-
tions between juvenile adjudications and criminal convictions continue
to pervade Virginia law, we are unpersuaded by the Government’s inter-
pretation of the amendments to section 16.1-308.
3Virginia defines a "child," "juvenile," or "minor" as "a person less
than 18 years of age." Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-228 (Michie 2003).
4We considered the distinction in status between a minor treated as a
juvenile and one tried as an adult in United States v. Lender, infra. The
issue in that case was whether the conviction of a 17-year old as an adult
(because the age of juvenile delinquency in North Carolina, the state in
question, was 16) could be a predicate conviction for purposes of deter-
mining armed career criminal status under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(i).
Because the defendant was prosecuted as an adult under state law, we
readily concluded that the conviction in question was not for a juvenile
offense, but for an adult crime punishable by imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year — a violent felony as defined by the first part of
§ 924(e)(2)(B). Id. Although Lender does not control our analysis, it is
certainly consistent with it. The distinction between a minor treated as a
juvenile and one prosecuted as an adult is well recognized in state law.
8 UNITED STATES v. WALTERS

-- 9 of 12 --

The Government acknowledges that "[j]uvenile adjudications of
delinquency, of course, are not the same as adult convictions." [Br.
at 20.] The Government goes on to argue, however, that despite this
admitted non-equivalence, "the key issue is not whether something is
labeled as a conviction but whether it has the effect of a conviction
with respect to the state’s firearms laws." [Br. at 21.] This argument
fails for three reasons.
First, the Government’s argument misidentifies the question to be
answered by reference to state law. As noted above, § 922(g)(1)
applies to a defendant who has been convicted of a crime "punishable
by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year," and § 921(a)(20)
requires the determination of what constitutes such a conviction to be
based on "the law of the jurisdiction in which the proceedings were
held." Nowhere does the federal firearm law limit its applicability to
the parameters of the state firearm law. Rather, it directs the federal
courts to accept the state’s assessment of whether the predicate
offense, whatever it may be, is treated as a crime.
Second, the Virginia firearm statute does not support the result the
Government seeks. In fact, that statute incorporates the very juvenile
adjudication/conviction dichotomy the Government contends is irrele-
vant. Section 18.2-308.2(A) of the Virginia Code, which, like 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), generally prohibits felons from possessing, trans-
porting or concealing firearms, applies to
(i) any person who has been convicted of a felony or (ii) any
person under the age of twenty-nine who was found guilty
as a juvenile fourteen years of age or older at the time of the
offense of a delinquent act which would be a felony if com-
mitted by an adult, whether such conviction or adjudication
occurred under the laws of this Commonwealth, or any other
state . . . .
Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-308.2(A). Virginia courts have held that the
judicial function is to apply the "plain, obvious, and rational meaning
of a statute, and that unless there is ambiguity there is no need for
interpretation . . . ." Gilliam v. Commonwealth, 465 S.E.2d 592, 594
(Va. Ct. App. 1996) (internal quotations omitted). Here, the plain lan-
guage of the statutory provision on which the Government relies
9 UNITED STATES v. WALTERS

-- 10 of 12 --

treats the conviction of a felony as distinct from an adjudication as a
juvenile. By writing the statute in the disjunctive, the Virginia legisla-
ture has given it the effect of excluding a person who has been adjudi-
cated delinquent from the category of persons convicted of felonies.
See Hedrick v. Commonwealth, 513 S.E.2d 634, 640 (Va. 1999)
("[T]he use of the disjunctive word ‘or,’ rather than the conjunctive
‘and,’ signifies the availability of alternative choices."); Garcia v.
Commonwealth, 578 S.E.2d 97, 100 (Va. Ct. App. 2003) ("[T]he use
of a disjunctive in a statute indicates alternatives and requires that
those alternatives be treated separately.")
Finally, although the Government argues that the Virginia firearms
statute imposes a collateral effect on juvenile delinquents similar to
that imposed on adult felons, even this effect recognizes a distinction
between juvenile adjudications and convictions. A person who is con-
victed of a felony is permanently barred from possessing a firearm,
whereas a person adjudicated as a juvenile is barred from possessing
a firearm only until the age of twenty-nine. See Va. Code Ann.
§ 18.2-308.2.
In support of its position regarding the status of juvenile adjudica-
tions, the Government also cites specific Virginia statutes that treat
such adjudications as felony convictions for purposes of the imposi-
tion of collateral consequences.5 These examples, however, do not
support its position regarding the status of juvenile adjudications. The
specific statutes, to the contrary, support the argument that adjudica-
tions and convictions are viewed as distinct. If adjudications were
considered synonymous with criminal convictions, the Virginia
Assembly would not have had to specifically so provide in the stat-
utes in question.
That an adjudication is treated as a conviction in specific circum-
5See, e.g., Va. Code Ann. §§ 17.1-805(B), 19.2-295.1 (Michie
2003)(juvenile adjudication results in additional criminal history points
and may be considered for purposes of jury sentencing); id. § 63.2-1719
("convictions" include juvenile adjudications for purposes of licensing
child welfare agencies, and foster and adoptive homes); id. § 63.2-1724
("convictions" include juvenile adjudications for purposes of statute gov-
erning licensing of day-care centers).
10 UNITED STATES v. WALTERS

-- 11 of 12 --

stances implies that it is not so treated as a general rule. Accordingly,
we are persuaded that Virginia does not consider a juvenile adjudica-
tion to be a conviction. Consequently, a juvenile adjudication cannot
be the underlying conviction which subjects a person to penalty under
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).6
IV.
In light of the foregoing, we affirm the district courts’ rulings in
United States v. Walters, No. 02-4926 and United States v. Davis, No.
03-4090. In United States v. Crudup, No. 03-4015, we vacate the dis-
trict court’s judgment of conviction, reverse the order denying Crud-
up’s motion to dismiss the indictment and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED AND
REMANDED IN PART
6When questioned at oral argument about the "punishable by a term of
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year" language of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1), the Government argued that the phrase merely describes the
"crime" which will support a predicate conviction, and contributes noth-
ing to the analysis of whether a juvenile adjudication qualifies as a con-
viction of a crime. We find this argument to be strained. Although the
phrase "punishable by a term of imprisonment" does describe the crime,
it also indicates that the offender was tried as an adult. As is true
under the FJDA, Virginia terms a custodial disposition of a juvenile
adjudication to be a "confinement to a detention home," rather than
imprisonment. See, e.g.,Va. Code Ann. §§ 16.1-278.7, 16.1-284.1,
16.1-285.1 (Michie 2003). However, because the foregoing discussion
disposes of the issue on appeal, we need not address this question here.
11 UNITED STATES v. WALTERS

-- 12 of 12 --