Anthony Mammana v. Federal Bureau of Prisons

PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 18-2937
ANTHONY MAMMANA,
Appellant
v.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS; LIEUTENANT
BARBEN; MEDICAL ASSISTANT TAYLOR; JOHN
DOES (1-10)
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(M.D. Pa. No.: 4-17-cv-00645)
District Judge: Honorable Matthew W. Brann
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
July 11, 2019
Before: SHWARTZ, KRAUSE, and FUENTES, Circuit
Judges
(Opinion filed August 14, 2019)

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________________
OPINION OF THE COURT
________________
FUENTES, Circuit Judge
The Eighth Amendment is an area of the law that is
often fact-intensive and can require balancing the rights of
incarcerated citizens with the administrative judgment of
prison officials. This appeal, however, is straightforward.
Former inmate Anthony Mammana raises a challenge under
the Eighth Amendment to his confinement in a chilled room
with constant lighting, no bedding, and only paper-like
clothing. The District Court dismissed Mammana’s Amended
Complaint, reasoning that Mammana had alleged only
“uncomfortable” conditions. Because Mammana has
adequately alleged a sufficiently serious deprivation under the
Eighth Amendment, we will vacate and remand for further
proceedings.
I. Background
Because the District Court dismissed Mammana’s
Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), we accept all well-pleaded allegations as
true. Those allegations may be summarized as follows:
A. The Yellow Room
Plaintiff-appellant Anthony Mammana was an inmate
confined at Allenwood Low Federal Correctional Institution,
serving a seven-year sentence. During the fifth year of his
sentence, Mammana began to feel “extreme illness after each

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meal” and visited the medical ward at Allenwood.1 A
physician assistant checked Mammana’s blood sugar level, and
told Mammana “to return the following day after eating.”2
Over the next several days, Mammana continued to feel ill after
eating and, each time, returned to the medical ward. After his
“fifth or sixth visit,” the physician assistant referred Mammana
to Allenwood’s psychologist on the belief that Mammana’s
illness could be psychological in nature.3
The psychologist, however, could not determine the
cause of Mammana’s discomfort and called the medical ward
to advise them that Mammana would be returning there.
However, Medical Assistant Taylor said she would refuse to
re-admit Mammana to the medical ward if he returned, despite
having never examined Mammana. Nonetheless, Mammana
was escorted back to the medical ward, and after taking his
blood pressure, Taylor “filed a false report,” accusing him of
“harassment, stalking, and interference with the performance
of duties.”4 As a result of Taylor’s report, Mammana was
transferred to the “hole,” or administrative segregation.5
However, upon learning the identity of his cellmate—
who was known for “his deviate sexual behavior forced onto
cellmates”—Mammana refused his assigned cell in
administrative segregation.6 Defendant-appellee Lieutenant
1 JA 41.
2 Id.
3 JA 42.
4 JA 43.
5 Id.
6 Id.

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Barben then directed Mammana to be placed into a cell known
as the “Yellow Room,” which was regarded by inmates as a
“mental and physical abuse room.”7
In the Yellow Room, Mammana was stripped of his
clothing and given only “paper like” coverings instead.8 The
Yellow Room was lit by a “bright light” that “was turned on
for 24 hours a day” and was kept “uncomfortably cold.”9
Mammana was provided no bedding or toilet paper and only
an “extremely thin mattress” to sleep on.10 Consequently, he
“could hardly sleep and would wake up frequently shivering
when he did fall asleep.”11 During that time, Mammana
continued to feel ill, yet his requests for medical treatment were
refused.
Mammana remained in the Yellow Room for four days.
After he was released from the Yellow Room, a disciplinary
hearing was held regarding Taylor’s report; the hearing board
eventually concluded “there was no basis” for her report and
the “charges” against Mammana were “expunged.”12
Mammana remained in administrative segregation for four
months after leaving the Yellow Room.
B. Proceedings in the District Court
7 Id.
8 JA 44.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id.

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Mammana filed suit in the District Court. In his
Amended Complaint, he set forth counts for malicious
prosecution against the Federal Bureau of Prisons and Taylor,
violation of due process against the Bureau, Taylor, and
Barben, and cruel and unusual punishment in violation of his
Eighth Amendment rights against the Bureau and Barben.
Defendants moved to dismiss or for summary judgment, and
Mammana withdrew all claims against the Bureau and Taylor.
Parsing the Eighth Amendment claim, a magistrate judge
recommended dismissal of Mammana’s claims for constant
lighting, lack of exercise, and deprivation of food; he
recommended that Mammana’s claim regarding the
deprivation of warmth survive both dismissal and summary
judgment.
Mammana objected to the magistrate’s report and
recommendation, and the District Court granted the motion to
dismiss in its entirety, reasoning that Mammana had alleged
only that the conditions of his confinement were
“uncomfortabl[e].”13 Mammana timely appealed the dismissal
of his Eighth Amendment claim.
13 Mammana v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 4:17-cv-00645,
2018 WL 4051703, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 24, 2018) (alteration
in original).

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II. Legal Standard14
Our review of the grant of a motion to dismiss under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is plenary.15 “To
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.’”16 A claim is facially
plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.”17 In assessing the factual
content of the complaint, we disregard those allegations that
“are no more than conclusions,” but “assume the[] veracity” of
all “well-pleaded factual allegations.”18
III. Discussion
On appeal, Mammana contends that the District Court
erred in dismissing his claim under the Eighth Amendment on
the ground that the conditions of his confinement were merely
uncomfortable. Because he has alleged not just merely
uncomfortable conditions, but the deprivation of a specific
human need, we agree with Mammana regarding this issue and
14 The District Court had subject-matter jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1331. We have jurisdiction to review the District
Court’s final judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
15 Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 786 n.2, 790
(3d Cir. 2016).
16 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
17 Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
18 Id. at 679.

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will vacate the dismissal of his claim under the Eighth
Amendment.
A. Applicable Law
The Eighth Amendment provides, “Excessive bail shall
not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted.”19 The Amendment’s
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment applies to both an
inmate’s formal sentence and to “deprivations that were not
specifically part of the sentence, but were suffered during
imprisonment.”20 However, because that prohibition is
directed only toward “punishment,”21 it applies only to
deprivations that constitute an “unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain,”22 including “those that are ‘totally without
penological justification.’”23
Wantonness, however, “does not have a fixed meaning
but must be determined with ‘due regard for differences in the
kind of conduct against which an Eighth Amendment objection
is lodged.’”24 In challenges to prison conditions, such as the
19 U.S. Const. amend. VIII.
20 Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991) (citing Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976)).
21 Id. at 300.
22 Id. at 297 (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104) (emphasis in
original).
23 Id. at 308 (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346
(1981)).
24 Id. at 302 (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320
(1986)).

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one here, “a prison official violates the Eighth Amendment
only when two requirements are met.”25
First, “the deprivation alleged must be, objectively,
‘sufficiently serious,’”26 resulting in “the denial of ‘the
minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.’”27 Although
the Eighth Amendment “does not mandate comfortable
prisons,”28 “prison officials must ensure that inmates receive
adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care.”29 In a
challenge to those conditions, “the inmate must show that he is
incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of
serious harm.”30 However, “[t]he proof necessary to show that
there was a substantial risk of harm is less demanding than the
proof needed to show that there was a probable risk of harm.”31
Second, “a prison official must have a ‘sufficiently
culpable state of mind.’”32 “In prison-conditions cases that
state of mind is one of ‘deliberate indifference’ to inmate health
or safety . . . .”33 In that context, deliberate indifference
requires that the
25 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).
26 Id. (quoting Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298).
27 Id. (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347).
28 Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 349.
29 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832.
30 Id. at 834 (citing Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35
(1993)).
31 Chavarriaga v. N.J. Dep’t of Corr., 806 F.3d 210, 227 (3d
Cir. 2015).
32 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (quoting Wilson, 501 U.S. at 297).
33 Id. (quoting Wilson, 501 U.S. at 302-03).

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prison official must both know of and disregard
an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.
The . . . element of deliberate indifference is
subjective, not objective . . . meaning that the
official must actually be aware of the existence
of the excessive risk; it is not sufficient that the
official should have been aware.34
In other words, “the official must both be aware of facts from
which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of
serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.”35
It is under this law that we analyze Mammana’s
allegations.
B. Analysis
The sole issue in this appeal is whether Mammana’s
allegations regarding the conditions of his confinement satisfy
the first prong under the Eighth Amendment—an objective
deprivation of sufficient seriousness. We conclude that
Mammana has adequately alleged an excessive risk to inmate
34 Woloszyn v. County of Lawrence, 396 F.3d 314, 321 (3d Cir.
2005)
(omissions in original) (quoting Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256
F.3d 120, 133 (3d Cir. 2001)).
35 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.

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health and safety from the extreme and protracted deprivation
of warmth and the ability to sleep presented in this case.36
Mammana alleges that, for a continuous period over
several days, he was denied clothing and bedding and
subjected to low cell temperatures while his cell was constantly
lit. “Conditions . . . alone or in combination[] may deprive
inmates of the minimal civilized measure of life’s
necessities.”37 As the Supreme Court has observed, “[s]ome
conditions of confinement may establish an Eighth
Amendment violation ‘in combination’ when each would not
do so alone, but only when they have a mutually enforcing
effect that produces the deprivation of a single, identifiable
human need such as food, warmth, or exercise.”38
Mammana has alleged such “mutually enforcing”
conditions.39 Mammana alleges that he was deprived of his
clothing, provided only “paper like” coverings instead,40
denied bedding, and exposed to low cell temperatures and
constant bright lighting for four days. The Supreme Court has
explained that “a low cell temperature at night combined with
a failure to issue blankets” could constitute an unconstitutional
36 Mammana also argued in the District Court and on appeal
that he was deprived of exercise and adequate meals. The
Amended Complaint, however, contains no allegations
regarding either of those claims, and they were properly
dismissed.
37 Rhodes, 452 U.S at 347.
38 Wilson, 501 U.S. at 304 (emphasis omitted).
39 Id.
40 JA 44.

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deprivation.41 Likewise, we have noted that denying a prisoner
appropriate clothing with “no legitimate penological reason”
may offend the Eighth Amendment.42 Mammana also claims
that, as a result of these conditions, he could “hardly sleep,”
and when he did fall asleep he would “wake up frequently
shivering,”43 all of which caused him “to suffer physical and
psychological harm.”44 “[S]leep is critical to human existence,
and conditions that prevent sleep have been held to violate the
Eighth Amendment.”45 Additionally, bright, constant
41 Wilson, 501 U.S. at 304; accord Gaston v. Coughlin, 249
F.3d 156, 164 (2d Cir. 2001) (“We have held that an Eighth
Amendment claim may be established by proof that the inmate
was subjected for a prolonged period to bitter cold.”).
42 Chavarriaga, 806 F.3d at 229. In Chavarriaga, we
concluded, inter alia, that forcing a female inmate to walk
“naked in plain view of male prison personnel and inmates to
reach a shower” was “a malicious act intended to humiliate her
for no legitimate penological reason” and constituted a
deprivation under the Eighth Amendment. We also concluded,
however, that a claim under the Eighth Amendment could not
be premised on the “mere[]” deprivation of clothing, especially
where the inmate “was sheltered from the elements.” Id. at 229
(citing Williams v. Delo, 49 F.3d 442, 443-47 (8th Cir. 1995)).
That statement is consequently inapplicable to this case, as
Mammana has alleged exposure to the elements—namely, the
low temperatures of the Yellow Room.
43 JA 44.
44 JA 47.
45 Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d 119, 126 (2d Cir. 2013); accord
Harper v. Showers, 174 F.3d 716, 720 (5th Cir. 1999) (“[S]leep
undoubtedly counts as one of life’s basic needs.”).

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illumination that causes “grave sleeping problems and other
mental and psychological problems” can establish an Eighth
Amendment deprivation.46 Together, Mammana’s alleged
deprivations and exposure reflect more than the denial of a
“comfortable prison[],”47 but rather the denial of “the minimal
civilized measure of life’s necessities,”48 in particular, warmth
and sufficient sleep.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate and remand
for further proceedings.
46 Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1090-91 (9th Cir. 1996)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
47 Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298 (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 349).
48 Id. (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347).

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