Shannon Ream v. COMMONWEALTH OF PENNYSLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, POLK CENTER On Appeal…

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 17-3670
_____________
SHANNON REAM,
Appellant
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNYSLVANIA DEPARTMENT
OF HUMAN SERVICES, POLK CENTER
_____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
District Court No. 1-16-cv-00173
Trial Judge: The Honorable Barbara Jacobs Rothstein
_____________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
September 24, 2018
Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, McKEE and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges
(Filed: September 26, 2018)
_____________________
OPINION∗
_______________________
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does
not constitute binding precedent.

-- 1 of 3 --

2
SMITH, Chief Judge.
Shannon Ream appeals the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of
the Pennsylvania Department of Human Services, Polk Center. For the reasons that
follow, we will affirm.
Because we write solely for the parties, we need not delve into the factual or
procedural history of this appeal. Suffice it to say that Ream claimed that the Polk Center
engaged in post-employment retaliation against her on two occasions, in 2012 and 2014.
In a thoughtful opinion, the District Court explained that the Polk Center was entitled to
summary judgment because there was no evidence that the 2012 incident qualified as an
adverse employment action, and because there was no evidence that the 2014 incident
resulted in any damage to Ream.
On appeal, Ream has not responded to the evidentiary deficiencies identified by
the District Court. Instead, she has apparently cut-and-pasted nearly the entirety of the
summary judgment brief she filed in the District Court, without the courtesy of tailoring
her arguments to conform to the appellate context. For instance, in her opening brief,
before Appellees filed any responsive brief, Ream variously and perplexingly refers to
Appellee’s “assertion[s],” “reasoning,” and “argu[ments],” as well as “case[s] cited by
the Appellee,” without explaining that these references are responsive to a brief that the
Polk Center had previously filed in the District Court, not to any brief before this Court.
See, e.g., Ream Br. 12, 14, 16.

-- 2 of 3 --

3
In light of Ream’s haphazard approach to briefing, the Polk Center suggests that
we should deem Ream to have completely waived her claims at this stage. There is some
appeal to such an approach, inasmuch as Ream has failed to provide this Court with any
direct response to the issues identified in the District Court’s opinion. But given that our
review of the District Court’s grant of summary judgment is de novo, see Viera v. Life
Ins. Co. of N. Am., 642 F.3d 407, 413 (3d Cir. 2011), and because we can discern, buried
within Ream’s cut-and-pasted brief, at least a colorable claim that there exist triable
issues of material fact, we decline to deem her claims to be waived entirely.
Upon review, however, we have little to add to the District Court’s analysis.
Indeed, Ream has not identified a single flaw in the District Court’s cogent reasoning.
We will therefore affirm the order granting summary judgment for substantially the
reasons set forth in the District Court’s summary judgment opinion. Counsel is cautioned
to take greater care in future briefs filed with this Court.1
1 We recognize that, at times, an argument presented to the District Court will be
reiterated on appeal, and that the judicious use of cutting-and-pasting may be both
efficient and appropriate. Here, however, Counsel’s approach of importing a trial
brief wholesale without modifying it to respond to the deficiencies raised by the
District Court was entirely inappropriate.

-- 3 of 3 --