in Re: Christian Dior Womack v. Womack, 646 F. App’x 258, 259 3d Cir. 2016 . Also, we have denied several mandamus…

CLD-231 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 17-1853
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IN RE: CHRISTIAN DIOR WOMACK,
Petitioner
____________________________________
On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(Related to E.D. Pa. Crim. No. 2:13-cr-00206-001)
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P.
May 11, 2017
Before: SHWARTZ, NYGAARD and FISHER, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: May 16, 2017)
_________
OPINION*
_________
PER CURIAM
Christian Dior Womack, a.k.a. Gucci Prada, pleaded guilty to charges of sex
trafficking of a minor and sex trafficking by force. We affirmed his judgment of
sentence. United States v. Womack, 646 F. App’x 258, 259 (3d Cir. 2016). Also, we
have denied several mandamus petitions that he has filed. See, e.g., In re Womack, 639
F. App’x 70 (3d Cir. 2016) (per curiam). More than once, he has presented claims about
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

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what he perceives as improprieties in the counsel appointment process in his criminal
case.
In September 2016, in the District Court criminal case, Womack presented a
variation of his argument about the appointment of his counsel in a document that he
entitled “petition for ancillary hearing pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).” In March, he
filed a motion for the District Court to issue a scheduling order relating to his “petition
for an ancillary hearing . . .” under Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Both
applications remain pending.
Womack now presents a petition for a writ of mandamus, complaining of the
District Court’s delay in ruling on his filings and requesting that we order the District
Court to rule. We will deny the petition because mandamus relief is not warranted.
Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy. See Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Court, 426 U.S.
394, 402 (1976). A petitioner must ordinarily have no other means to obtain the desired
relief, and he must show a clear and indisputable right to issuance of the writ. In re Sch.
Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d 764, 772 (3d Cir. 1992). An appellate court may issue a writ of
mandamus when an undue delay in adjudication is “tantamount to a failure to exercise
jurisdiction.” Madden v. Myers, 102 F.3d 74, 79 (3d Cir. 1996). However, as a general
rule, “matters of docket control” are within the discretion of the District Court. In re Fine
Paper Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 817 (3d Cir. 1982).
Although there has been some delay in ruling on Womack’s new applications for
relief in the District Court, under the circumstances of the case, we are not concerned by
it. We do not believe that the delay is tantamount to a failure to exercise jurisdiction.

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And we are sure that the District Court will rule on Womack’s applications soon. For
these reasons, we will deny Womack’s mandamus petition.

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