John Mehalis; Curtis Thibodeau v. Frito-Lay, Inc.; Tyler Montgomery

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 12-3162
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JOHN MEHALIS; CURTIS THIBODEAU,
Appellants
v.
FRITO-LAY, INC.; TYLER MONTGOMERY
____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
District Court No. 3-08-cv-01371 and 3-08-cv-01372
District Judge: The Honorable Anne E. Thompson
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
September 9, 2013
Before: SMITH, ALDISERT, and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges
(Filed: September 12, 2013)
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OPINION
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SMITH, Circuit Judge.
John Mehalis and Curtis Thibodeau worked full time as mechanics for Frito-
Lay, Inc., at its Franklin Park garage in Somerset, New Jersey. Their supervisor,

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Tyler Montgomery, terminated their employment on February 7 and 23, 2007,
respectively. Thereafter, Mehalis and Thibodeau filed suit against Frito-Lay in
state court, alleging that their discharge violated New Jersey’s Conscientious
Employee Protection Act (“CEPA”), N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:19-1. Frito-Lay removed
the actions to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction, where they were
consolidated. After discovery concluded, Frito-Lay successfully moved for
summary judgment. This timely appeal followed.1 We will affirm.
We review an order granting summary judgment de novo. Sarnowski v. Air
Brooke Limousine, Inc., 510 F.3d 398, 401 (3d Cir. 2007). The District Court
granted summary judgment on the ground that neither Mehalis nor Thibodeau
adduced sufficient evidence to support the prima facie element of causation. See
Massarano v. N.J. Transit, 948 A.2d 653, 662 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008)
(reiterating the four elements of a prima facie CEPA claim, including “a causal
connection . . . between the whistle-blowing activity and the adverse employment
action” (quoting Dzwoner v. McDevitt, 828 A.2d 893, 900 (N.J. 2003)). In
addition, the District Court noted that Frito-Lay had proffered a legitimate non-
retaliatory reason for discharging Mehalis and Thibodeau, and that the evidence
failed to establish that this reason for discharge was a pretext. After reviewing the
record before us, we conclude that the District Court did not err in its analysis.
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332 and 1441. We

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Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

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