United States of America v. Lorenzo Liburd

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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 10-3266
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
LORENZO LIBURD,
Appellant
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On Appeal from the District Court
of the United States Virgin Islands
District Court No. 3-08-cr-00057-001
District Judge: The Honorable Curtis V. Gómez
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
December 17, 2010
Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, FUENTES and SMITH, Circuit Judges
(Filed: December 29, 2010)
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OPINION
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SMITH, Circuit Judge.
In United States v. Liburd, 607 F.3d 339 (3d Cir. 2010), we concluded that
Lorenzo Liburd’s “trial was marred by prosecutorial misconduct which denied him

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due process of law.” Id. at 340. As a result, we vacated Liburd’s convictions for
possessing cocaine with the intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841 and
attempted importation of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 952(a). In addition,
we remanded the matter for further proceedings.
On remand, Liburd moved to dismiss the indictment on the basis that retrial
would violate his Fifth Amendment right not to be subjected to double jeopardy.
The District Court of the Virgin Islands denied the motion. Thereafter, Liburd
entered a conditional plea, preserving his right to appeal the issue whether his
retrial violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. This timely appeal followed.1
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that no
person shall “be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb.” U.S. Const. amend. V. The Revised Organic Act of 1954 extends this right
to the people of the Virgin Islands. 48 U.S.C. § 1561. In United States v. Curtis,
683 F.2d 769 (3d Cir. 1982), we concluded that prosecutorial misconduct
prejudicial to a defendant does not preclude retrial unless the defendant shows that
the prosecutor intended to provoke a mistrial. Id. at 776. Curtis identified three
1 The District Court exercised jurisdiction under 48 U.S.C. § 1612(a) and 18 U.S.C. §
3231. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Abney v. United States, 431 U.S.
651 (1977). Our review of a district court’s denial of a defendant’s double jeopardy
challenge is plenary. United States v. Rigas, 605 F.3d 194, 204 (3d Cir. 2010) (en banc).
Because a defendant’s double jeopardy challenge based on prosecutorial misconduct
requires a district court to make certain factual findings, we review those findings for
clear error. United States v. Curtis, 683 F.2d 769, 776 (3d Cir. 1982).

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factors to consider in deciding whether a defendant has met his burden of showing
that the prosecutor had the intent to provoke a mistrial: (1) whether the “record
indicates that the prosecutor believed that the jury was about to acquit” the
defendant; (2) whether the government “stood to gain from a mistrial”; and (3)
whether the prosecutor proffered some justification for his misconduct. Id. at 777.
Following Curtis, we have “consistently emphasized that application of the double
jeopardy bar is dependent on a showing of the prosecutor’s subjective intent to
cause a mistrial in order to retry the case.” United States v. Williams, 472 F.3d 81,
85-86 (3d Cir. 2007).
Here, the District Court presided over the first trial. Judge Gómez was fully
aware of the prosecutor’s missteps during both the government’s opening
statement and the direct examination of Officer Grouby. After reciting the factual
history of the case, he applied the analysis set forth in Curtis and concluded that
the prosecutor did not intend to goad the defendant into moving for a mistrial.
Liburd contends that the District Court erred because it did not take account of all
of the circumstances in the case.
We find no error, clear or otherwise, in the District Court’s thorough
analysis and its determination that the prosecutor’s misconduct was not “aimed at
provoking a mistrial.” Liburd has not directed us to any evidence which would
support a finding that the government believed an acquittal was likely. As we

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noted in Liburd’s first appeal, “there was ample evidence that Liburd possessed
bricks of cocaine when he passed through the TSA checkpoint, and that those
bricks were not . . . slipped into his bag in the waiting area.” 607 F.3d at 344. Nor
is there any evidence that the government stood to benefit from a retrial. As Judge
Gómez noted, the government proffered an explanation for its conduct. Although
Judge Gómez did not find the prosecutor’s explanation persuasive, he concluded
that the explanation was at least plausible. Because the prosecutor claimed that he
learned of Liburd’s inculpatory statement on the eve of trial, we agree that the
prosecutor’s explanation was plausible. Furthermore, the District Judge’s finding
that the prosecutor did not intend to provoke defendant into a mistrial is supported
by the hesitancy of defense counsel to seek a mistrial. See Curtis, 683 F.2d at 777
(noting that trial court’s finding that prosecutor had the subjective intent to
provoke a mistrial was in tension with the fact that neither defense counsel nor the
court “recognized immediately the need for a mistrial”). Instead, defense counsel
referred to Liburd’s statement during cross examination of Officer Grouby in an
attempt to undermine the accuracy of Officer’s Grouby’s written statement.
Defense counsel did not request a mistrial until the second day of trial.
In sum, we will not disturb the District Court’s finding that the prosecutor
did not intend to cause a mistrial. For that reason, we will affirm the District
Court’s order denying Liburd’s motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds.

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