Wanda Hussein Gass v. Dyfs Workers

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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 09-3737
___________
WANDA HUSSEIN GASS,
Appellant
v.
DYFS WORKERS; JABAR MOORE; KAY BADRU;
JOSEPH ADEDOKUN; STEPHANIE SHRETER, OFFICE
OF LAW GUARDIAN ATTORNEY; ERIC FOLEY,
OFFICE OF ATTORNEYGENERAL, ATTORNEY;
ANDREA FONSECA-ROMAN, OFFICE OF ATTORNEY
GENERAL, ATTORNEY; ANGELA DOMAN, OFFICE OF
ATTORNEY GENERAL, ATTORNEY; ALBERTO
ALFONSO, OFFICE OF PUBLIC DEFENDER;
HONORABLE OCTAVIA MELENDEZ, SUPERIOR
COURT JUDGE
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civ. No. 1:09-cv-00928)
District Judge: Honorable Noel L. Hillman
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 16, 2010
Before: SLOVITER, CHAGARES and WEIS, Circuit Judges
Opinion filed : March 17, 2010

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The court, noting that Gass had seemingly attempted to proceed pursuant1
to several criminal statutes (18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242, and 245), concluded that § 1983 was
“the proper vehicle for bringing her civil constitutional violation claims.” (Dist. Ct. Op.
at 2 n.2.)
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__________
OPINION
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PER CURIAM.
In March 2009, Appellant Wanda Gass filed a pro se complaint in the
District Court against New Jersey Division of Youth and Family Services (“DYFS”)
caseworkers, attorneys from the New Jersey Attorney General’s and Public Defender’s
offices, and a New Jersey Superior Court judge. The complaint, alleging that the
defendants conspired to harass her and keep her separated from two minors whom she
claimed are her children, sought $500,000 in damages. Although the complaint did not
name DYFS as a defendant, the summons was addressed to, and apparently served upon,
that entity.
After obtaining a court-ordered extension of time to respond to the
complaint, DYFS moved to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). On September
3, 2009, the District Court entered an order granting the motion. The court, construing
the action as proceeding under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, held that the complaint violated Fed. R.1
Civ. P. 8(a)’s pleading requirements because it “provides defendants with no indication of

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We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary2
review over the District Court’s decision granting DYFS’s motion to dismiss. See AT&T
Corp. v. JMC Telecom, LLC, 470 F.3d 525, 530 (3d Cir. 2006).
Gass has not shown that the District Court abused its discretion in3
granting DYFS’s motion for an extension of time to respond to her complaint. See
Planned Parenthood of Cent. N.J. v. Att’y Gen. of N.J., 297 F.3d 253, 259 (3d Cir. 2002).
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which constitutional rights they have allegedly violated.” (Dist. Ct. Op. at 5.) The court
concluded that amending the complaint would be futile, as Gass could not recover money
damages against DYFS or the named defendants. The court noted that, to the extent Gass
sought to challenge New Jersey state court orders regarding custody of the two minors,
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred any such claim. Moreover, the court stated that the
Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, barred it from intervening in state court
proceedings. Gass now appeals from the District Court’s judgment.2
For substantially the reasons set forth in the District Court’s thorough and
cogent opinion, we find no error in the court’s decision granting DYFS’s motion to
dismiss. Contrary to Gass’s assertion, the District Court did not base its decision on
“undocumented statements” or hearsay. Her remaining arguments fail as well.3
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. Gass’s motion to expand the
record is denied.

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