Hong Ren v. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES On Petition for Review of an Order of the…

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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 09-1062
___________
HONG REN,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES
___________________________________
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency No. A77-122-625)
Immigration Judge: Annie S. Garcy
____________________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 17, 2010
Before: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, SMITH and WEIS Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: March 18, 2010)
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OPINION
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PER CURIAM.
Hong Ren seeks review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”)
denial of her motion to reopen proceedings. Because we conclude that the BIA did not
abuse its discretion in denying that motion, we will deny Ren’s petition for review.

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I.
Petitioner Hong Ren, a citizen of the People’s Republic of China and a native of the
Fujian Province, left China after she was ordered to report for insertion of an intra-uterine
device (“IUD”). She entered the United States without inspection in June 1999 and
applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against
Torture (“CAT”), claiming a well-founded fear of persecution for opposing China’s
coercive population control policies. The Immigration Judge denied her application, and
the BIA dismissed her appeal in 2003.
Ren filed a motion to reopen proceedings in August 2008, claiming that she
fears that she will be forcibly sterilized in China due to the birth of her two sons in the
United States. On December 11, 2008, the BIA denied relief, concluding that the motion
to reopen exceeded the time limitations under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Ren filed a timely
petition for review.
II.
We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) to review the denial of Ren’s
motion to reopen. We review the denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion.
Liu v. Attorney General, 555 F.3d 145, 148 (3d Cir. 2009). Under this standard, we may
reverse the BIA’s decision only if it is “arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.” Sevoian
v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 174 (3d Cir. 2002).

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In general, motions to reopen must be filed within ninety days from the date
“the final administrative decision was rendered.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). This time
limitation does not apply if the movant seeks reopening “based on changed circumstances
arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been
ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been
discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).
III.
In support of reopening, Ren submitted a new asylum application and
affidavit. She also provided: (1) an affidavit from her husband; (2) her marriage
certificate; (3) her children’s birth certificates; (4) statements and identity documents
from her mother and her father-in-law in China; (5) the 2007 Country Report on China;
(6) the 2004 Country Report on China; (7) the 2004 congressional testimony of T. Kumar;
(8) a media report; (9) three notices from the Birth Control Office of Mawei Town; (10)
three notices from the Village Committee of Xinma Village, Mawei Town, Mawei
District, Fuzhou City; and (11) statements, sterilization notices and certificates, medical
reports, a photograph, and identity documents from relatives and friends in China. After
carefully reviewing the record, we conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in
determining that Ren’s documentary evidence did not establish materially changed
conditions in China.

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Ren claims the BIA abused its discretion in failing to consider her evidence.
She claims the BIA did not mention “the majority” of her evidence, including the three
sterilization notices from the Village Committee and their “significant escalation of tone
and language,” or the letters from her family. While Ren is correct that we have
remanded cases in which the BIA failed to consider important evidence in support of
reopening, see, e.g., Zheng v. Att’y Gen., 549 F.3d 260, 268-69 (3d Cir. 2008), such is
not the case here. The BIA specifically mentioned the majority of her evidence, including
the sterilization notices and the letters from her family.
The BIA found that the identity documents and all but one of the
sterilization notices were black and white copies that do not contain original signatures,
seals, or authenticating information. See 8 C.F.R. § 287.6. Ren failed to explain her
failure to provide authentication. She also fails to address the issue in her brief, and, as
such, the issue is waived. See Bagot v. Ashcroft, 398 F.3d 252, 256 (3d Cir. 2005)
(holding that absent exceptional circumstances, a litigant waives an issue by failing to
present it). Even if we were to consider the issue, we would not be compelled to disagree
with the BIA’s decision to reject the evidence. While we have held that failure to
authenticate under § 287.6 does not warrant “per se exclusion of documentary evidence,
and a petitioner is permitted to prove authenticity in another manner,” Ren’s failure to
authenticate her evidence in any manner undermines its evidentiary value. Chen v.
Gonzales, 434 F.3d 212, 218 n.6 (3d Cir. 2005).

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Ren’s remaining evidence includes her affidavit, which is based in part on
information from the unauthenticated documents, marriage and birth certificates,
statement from her husband, and the 2007 Country Report. The BIA concluded that this
evidence merely establishes that Ren’s personal circumstances have changed, and is
insufficient to support reopening. See Liu, 555 F.3d at 148. We agree that she has not
shown changed circumstances in China to satisfy the exception to the time limitation for
filing a motion. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c)(2), (3)(ii).
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review.

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