United States of America v. James T. McCormick

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 08-4441
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
JAMES T. MCCORMICK,
Appellant
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
(D.C. Crim. No. 07-cr-00935-001)
District Judge: Honorable Jerome B. Simandle
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
June 30, 2010
Before: SLOVITER, BARRY and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed: July 1, 2010)
OPINION
BARRY, Circuit Judge
James T. McCormick appeals from the judgment of sentence. We will affirm.

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Begg and D’Angelo were cooperating with the government’s investigation.1
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I.
In May 2006, the government began investigating corruption among four members
of the Pleasantville Board of Education (“PBOE”), all of whom were receiving bribes
from John D’Angelo, an insurance broker with RFC Financial Services (“RFC”), in return
for awarding RFC the school district’s insurance brokerage contract. Because a fifth vote
was needed to award RFC the contract, when a PBOE vacancy arose in the summer of
2006, Louis Mister, president of the Real Democratic Club, suggested that James
McCormick be appointed to fill the vacancy. A precondition of his appointment was that
he vote to award RFC the insurance brokerage contract. In August 2006, McCormick
was appointed.
On September 1, 2006, Bruce Begg, the CEO of the Aetna Roofing Company,1
wrote a check for $1,000 payable to Mister. Mister shared the money with McCormick to
keep McCormick “in line.” (See A441-42). Mister told Jayson Adams, a member of the
PBOE, that money had been given to McCormick.
At a meeting on September 12, 2006, the PBOE awarded RFC the insurance
brokerage contract. Immediately prior to that meeting, “Adams told [McCormick] that as
soon as it was done, we were all going to be paid. Mr. McCormick smiled and he implied
that he was ready.” (A624.) Two weeks after the vote, Begg, at McCormick’s
instruction, wired $3,500 to McCormick’s girlfriend’s bank account.

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But McCormick was dissatisfied. He “was upset that he had only received $3,500.
. . . [He] expressed that if he didn’t get [what he was promised], then he would use his
vote to terminate the contract.” (A629.) At a meeting on October 24, 2006, McCormick
changed his vote and had RFC’s contract rescinded, purportedly because of rumors he
had heard that some of his co-conspirators were cooperating with federal authorities. He
stated that he “wish[ed he] never took this money.” (A416.) In November 2006,
McCormick contacted FBI Special Agent Thomas Raftery. In subsequent meetings with
Raftery, McCormick offered numerous, often conflicting rationales for his acceptance of
the $3,500.
A jury convicted McCormick of conspiracy to extort under color of official right,
18 U.S.C. § 1951(a); attempt to extort under color of official right, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a);
accepting and agreeing to accept a bribe, 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B); use of interstate
facilities to distribute the proceeds of a bribe, 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(1) & (a)(3); and two
counts of money laundering, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(I). His Guidelines range was 41
to 51 months imprisonment. The District Court sentenced him to 42 months
imprisonment.
II.
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have
appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

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A.
McCormick argues, first, that the District Court’s admission of evidence of the
$1,000 payment shared by Mister and himself violated Federal Rules of Evidence 403 and
404(b). We review this ruling for abuse of discretion. United States v. Sokolow, 91 F.3d
396, 402 (3d Cir. 1996).
Rule 404(b) proscribes the admission of “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or
acts . . . to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity
therewith.” However, the Rule “does not extend to evidence of acts which are ‘intrinsic’
to the charged offense.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b), Advisory Committee Notes to 1991
Amendments. In other words, “[w]hen the evidence of another crime is necessary to
establish an element of the offense being tried, there is no ‘other crime.’” United States v.
Blyden, 964 F.2d 1375, 1378 (3d Cir. 1992). Here, the District Court found the disputed
evidence to be “intrinsic to the conspiracy” because it “provide[d] important proof”
regarding membership in, the purpose of, and McCormick’s participation in the
conspiracy. (A181.) Rule 404(b) is thus inapplicable. Rule 403, of course, would
provide for the exclusion of such relevant evidence where “its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” The District Court did not
abuse its discretion in finding that the $1,000 payment was “highly probative” and
concluding that there was no “undue prejudice.” (A181.)

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B.
McCormick argues, next, that improper comments during the government’s
rebuttal summation constituted prosecutorial misconduct. We review for abuse of
discretion. United States v. Retos, 25 F.3d 1220, 1228 n.10 (3d Cir. 1994).
Defense counsel, in summation, criticized the government for its lack of recorded
conversations involving McCormick. In response to that critique, the government stated
in its rebuttal summation that “there is more to it th[a]n you know. There [are] other
cases beside the one that is presented to you.” (A1295.) Although it is far from clear that
this was the statement of which McCormick complained at the time, he did make a rather
nonspecific contemporaneous objection and moved for a mistrial, arguing to the District
Court that the government’s statement implied to the jury that there was “something else”
concerning him. (A1299). The Court disagreed.
A fair reading of the record supports the District Court’s conclusion that the
government had not suggested there were other investigations concerning McCormick.
During summation, defense counsel twice referred to cooperating witnesses who wore
wires in furtherance of an investigation into the conduct of Rafael Velez, another PBOE
member. The challenged statement merely referenced that fact. Accordingly, the District
Court did not abuse its discretion in denying McCormick’s motion for a mistrial.
C.
McCormick next contends that the District Court erred in denying his motion for a

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McCormick argues to us that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. He2
failed, however, to present this argument in a post-trial motion to the District Court, and,
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new trial premised on the government’s failure to disclose materials in violation of Giglio
v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). According to McCormick, during Mister’s trial –
which occurred after McCormick’s – “it came to light that . . . Adams[] was either fired,
or forced to resign from the Department of Youth and Family Services (‘DYFS’)”
because, among other things, “he was using a state vehicle on personal time, and lied
when confronted about it.” (Appellant’s Br. at 26.) We review legal conclusions de novo
and findings of fact for clear error. United States v. Milan, 304 F.3d 273, 286 (3d Cir.
2002).
The government’s obligation to disclose impeachment evidence extends to
material in the prosecutor’s constructive possession. United States v. Reyeros, 537 F.3d
270, 281 (3d Cir. 2008). When considering the constructive possession of material
possessed by state agents, three factors are relevant: “(1) whether the party with
knowledge of the information is acting on the government’s ‘behalf’ or is under its
‘control’; (2) the extent to which state and federal governments are part of a ‘team,’ are
participating in a ‘joint investigation’ or are sharing resources; and (3) whether the entity
charged with constructive possession has ‘ready access’ to the evidence.” Id. at 282
(quotation omitted). The District Court correctly concluded that the Reyeros factors
required a finding that the government did not constructively possess the DYFS
materials.2

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accordingly, it has been waived. United States v. Grubbs, 506 F.3d 434, 443 (6th Cir.
2007).
Also for the first time, McCormick asserts that: (1) the government improperly
insinuated “guilt by association” during its rebuttal summation; and (2) the government
violated his Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination. We have carefully
reviewed the record and find no plain error with respect to either assertion.
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D.
We review the sentence imposed for reasonableness and will not reverse absent an
abuse of discretion. See United States v. Wise, 515 F.3d 207, 217 (3d Cir. 2008).
McCormick contends that the District Court failed to appropriately consider the §
3553(a) factors and, in so doing, imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence. This
contention is without merit. The District Court considered McCormick’s arguments but
nevertheless was persuaded by the seriousness of his offenses, his efforts to hide the
bribe, his conflicting stories regarding his acceptance of the $3,500, and his failure to
accept responsibility. His bottom-of-the-Guidelines sentence was not unreasonable.
McCormick also contends that the District Court “did not give meaningful
consideration to sentencing disparity among similarly situated defendants,” (Appellant’s
Br. at 39), noting that other conspirators – who McCormick fails to note pled guilty
and/or cooperated with the government – received lesser sentences. The record rebuts
this contention, and the District Court concluded that McCormick’s sentence was
“proportional with the sentence[s] of other conspirators.” (A1456.) We see no error.
III.
The judgment of sentence will be affirmed.

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