United States of America v. George C. Snyder

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 08-3283
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
GEORGE C. SNYDER,
Appellant
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of
(D.C. Civil Action No. 99-cr-00053-001)
District Judge: Honorable Joy Flowers Conti
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal as Untimely or
Possible Summary Action Pursuant to
Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6(a)
December 11, 2008
Before: SLOVITER, FUENTES and JORDAN, Circuit Judges
(Filed December 29, 2008)
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OPINION
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PER CURIAM
George Snyder appeals from an order of the United States District Court for the

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Western District of Pennsylvania denying his motion for return of seized property
pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(g). For the reasons set forth below, we will summarily
affirm. See I.O.P. 10.6.
I.
On April 19, 2000, Snyder was sentenced to 21 months of imprisonment in the
United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania for willfully filing
materially false income tax returns. Prior to his sentencing, Snyder filed a motion for
production of seized documents. The Government provided copies of some of the seized
documents to Snyder’s attorney. By letter dated August 26, 2004, IRS Special Agent
Cynthia Underwood advised Snyder that he should contact her to make arrangements to
retrieve his remaining documents. Accompanied by a tax fraud investigative aide,
Special Agent Underwood met with Snyder and gave him all of the documents that she
said were remaining in the Government’s possession.
On July 31, 2006, Snyder filed a motion for return of seized property pursuant to
Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(g) in the District Court. The Court filed a Memorandum Order on
August 6, 2007 denying Snyder’s motion as moot. The Order stated that the Government
provided sufficient information in its responsive motion to establish that it already
returned Snyder’s property. On August 27, 2007, Snyder filed a motion for
reconsideration, arguing that the Court failed to hold an evidentiary hearing prior to
entering its Order. The District Court denied Snyder’s motion for reconsideration on July

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A defendant’s motion for return of property made after the termination of criminal1
proceedings is treated as a civil action for equitable relief. United States v. Chambers,
192 F.3d 374, 376 (3d Cir. 1999). Therefore, we apply Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B)’s time
limits.
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7, 2008. Snyder timely appealed.1
II.
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we review
the District Court’s denial of Snyder’s motion de novo. United States v. Albinson, 356
F.3d 278, 281 n.5 (3d Cir. 2004).
III.
The District Court properly denied Snyder’s motion for return of seized property
pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(g). Under the Rule, “[a] person aggrieved by an unlawful
search and seizure of property may move for the property’s return.” Fed. R. Crim. P.
41(g). It is well settled that the government may seize evidence for use in an
investigation and trial; however, it must return the property once the criminal proceedings
have concluded, unless it is contraband or subject to forfeiture. United States v. Bein,
214 F.3d 408, 411 (3d Cir. 2000). The District Court determined, based upon Special
Agent Underwood’s letter and subsequent meeting with Snyder, as well as her detailed
inventory of his property, that the Government returned all of Snyder’s property, denying
Snyder’s Rule 41(g) motion as moot.
In his motion for reconsideration, Snyder argued that the District Court erred in not

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holding an evidentiary hearing prior to ruling on the motion. The District Court denied
reconsideration. After reviewing the evidence in this case, we conclude that the District
Court’s determination was appropriate.
We have previously held that “an evidentiary hearing is required for the resolution
of any disputed issue of fact necessary to the resolution of [a] [Rule 41(g)] motion.”
Chambers, 192 F.3d at 377. However, courts “need not necessarily conduct an
evidentiary hearing on every Rule 41(g) motion”; a court is required to conduct a hearing
only in those cases where it is “necessary to decide the motion.” Albinson, 356 F.3d at
281. A court may utilize its own methodology to determine whether the government
retained disputed property, “so long as this determination rests on a firmer basis than the
government’s unsubstantiated assertions that it no longer ‘possesses the property at
issue.’” Id. at 282 (quoting Chambers, 192 F. 3d at 377-78). Affidavits may be sufficient
to support the court’s determination. Id.
The Government presented evidence sufficient to demonstrate that it returned all
of Snyder’s property to him. IRS Special Agent Underwood, in her August 26, 2003
letter, detailed the steps that Snyder needed to take in order to retrieve all documents
remaining in the Government’s possession. Snyder subsequently met with Special Agent
Underwood to retrieve his property, and she prepared a detailed inventory of the items
returned to Snyder. Additionally, responding to Snyder’s motion for reconsideration,
Special Agent Underwood submitted an affidavit attesting to the documentary procedures

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in place at the time the items were seized. Snyder, on the other hand, failed to detail or
summarize which documents he believed had not been returned. Thus, the District Court
did not rule on Snyder’s motion based upon the “unsubstantiated assertions” of the
Government. Albinson, 356 F.3d at 282. The Court relied instead upon documentary
evidence to determine whether the Government met its burden of proof. Its decision to
forgo an evidentiary hearing was appropriate under the circumstances. Id.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the District Court properly denied
Snyder’s motion for return of property as well as reconsideration. We will summarily
affirm. See Third Cir. LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.

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