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081917np-pdf•Ana Carmen Fabian-Decampos v. Attorney General of the United States
081917np-pdfCourt of Appeals for the Third CircuitMar 12, 2009
IMG-035 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 08-1917
ANA CARMEN FABIAN-DECAMPOS,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
Respondent
Petition for Review of an Order of the
United States Department of Justice
Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency No. A98-889-616)
Immigration Judge: Honorable Frederic Leeds
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 11, 2009
Before: RENDELL, GREENBERG and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges
(Filed: March 12, 2009)
OPINION OF THE COURT
PER CURIAM
Ana Carmen Fabian-DeCampos, a native and citizen of El Salvador, entered the
United States in April 2005. Within days of her entry, the Government charged her as
removable for being present without having been admitted or paroled or for having
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arrived in the United States at any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney
General. Fabian-DeCampos subsequently sought asylum, withholding, and protection
under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). She later conceded the charge of
removability at a hearing before an Immigration Judge (“IJ”).
After the hearing, the IJ made an adverse credibility determination and denied the
applications for relief from removal. Fabian-DeCampos appealed the IJ’s decision to the
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). The BIA dismissed the appeal, affirming the
decision on credibility grounds and on the alternative basis that Fabian-DeCampos failed
to present sufficient evidence to show that she was entitled to asylum or withholding.
The BIA also concluded that she failed to establish a claim for CAT relief. Fabian-
DeCampos presents a petition for review of the BIA’s order.
We have jurisdiction over Fabian-DeCampos’s petition pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a). Because the BIA relied in part on the IJ’s reasoning, we review both
decisions. See Chen v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 215, 222 (3d Cir. 2004). We consider
questions of law de novo. See Gerbier v. Holmes, 280 F.3d 297, 302 n.2 (3d Cir. 2001).
We review factual findings, including adverse credibility determinations, for substantial
evidence. See Butt v. Gonzales, 429 F.3d 430, 433 (3d Cir. 2005). An adverse credibility
finding must be afforded substantial deference, so long as the finding is supported by
sufficient, cogent reasons. See id. at 434. The finding must be upheld unless any
reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary. See Xie v.
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Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 239, 243 (3d Cir. 2004).
Because there is no reason that compels a contrary conclusion, we uphold the
agency’s adverse credibility finding in this case. There were a number of inconsistencies
between Fabian-DeCampos’s written submissions and her oral testimony, as well as
internal inconsistencies in her oral testimony. In the statement she included with her
application for relief from removal, she described her and her first husband’s involvement
in political campaigns against the “Gorila”/“Guerilla” group in El Salvador, threatening
flyers they received, and the murder of her first husband (who was a member of the El
Salvador National Guard) in 1991 by a “group of the Gorila.” R. 156. She also wrote,
“They killed . . . my brother-in-law, Cousin, even on[e] of my cousins was massacred at
her own home.” Id. (She also described her subsequent move to another city, her
remarriage, the tragic loss of two of her children in a 2001 earthquake, and her decision to
come to the United States to give her remaining children a better life and future. Id.)
As in her written statement, in her testimony, Fabian-DeCampos at first implied
that the “F.N.L.N.” was responsible for the deaths of many of her family members, R. 87.
However, on questioning, she revealed that the causes of many of their deaths were
various and unrelated to political persecution. For instance, one family member died after
an attack by an unknown person on a bus, R. 89, another died as a result of an intra-
family conflict over an inheritance, R. 95, and another died at the hands of a drunk or
high family member, R. 97-98. Also, her testimony before the IJ varied from the
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statement with her application. Fabian-DeCampos testified about a degree of political
involvement and a resulting series of written and phoned threats in 2005 that precipitated
her departure, R. 107-08, but she did not include such information in her written
statement. On the whole, it must be said that the adverse credibility finding is supported
by substantial evidence.
Because of the adverse credibility finding, Fabian-DeCampos could not
demonstrate a well-founded fear, or a clear probability, of persecution in El Salvador on
account of a protected ground, see 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42); Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d
463, 469 (3d Cir. 2003), or that it was more likely than not that she would be tortured on
return to El Salvador so as to be entitled to CAT relief, see Tarrawally v. Ashcroft, 338
F.3d 180, 186 (3d Cir. 2003). We will deny her petition for review.
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