Rudolph P. Keszthelyi v. Federal Bureau of Prisons

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BLD-108 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 07-3851
___________
RUDOLPH P. KESZTHELYI,
v.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS;
CORNELL COMPANY, INC.
(W.D. of PA. (Pittsuburgh) No. 06-cv-01425)
RUDOLPH P. KESZTHELYI
v.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS;
CORNELL COMPNAY, INC.
JAMES E. HYMAN, C.E.O. of Cornell Co.;
HARVEY G. LAPPIN, Director of Federal Bureau of Prisons
(W.D. of PA. (Johnstown) No. 07-cv-00024J)
Rudolph P. Keszthelyi,
Appellant
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 07-00024)
District Judge: Honorable Kim R. Gibson

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____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
January 17, 2008
Before: MCKEE, RENDELL and SMITH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: September 22, 2008)
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
Rudolph P. Keszthelyi, a prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights complaint
and a motion for a preliminary injunction in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania, seeking an order directing the Bureau of Prisons to stop
assigning Latino inmates to the Monmouth Valley Correctional Center (“MVCC”) in
Philipsburg, Pennsylvania because of the allegedly imminent danger of a race riot. In his
amended complaint, Keszthelyi asserts that defendant prison officials have intentionally
sent only Latino prisoners or African-Americans from Washington, D.C., and have
refrained from sending “United States citizens who were white,” knowing that the
resulting racial imbalance at MVCC would create a “high likelihood of potential
violence.” Keszthelyi asserts that the resulting racial imbalance has produced violent
assaults at MVCC, and that these assaults have caused Keszthelyi severe emotional

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distress and have violated his constitutional rights. The Magistrate Judge recommended
denying Keszthelyi’s motion for a preliminary injunction, and, after reviewing
Keszthelyi’s objections, the District Court denied the motion. Keszthelyi timely appealed.
For the reasons provided by the District Court, we will affirm.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 65 authorizes District Courts to grant preliminary injunctions. The party
seeking a preliminary injunction has the burden of proving: (1) a likelihood of success on
the merits; (2) irreparable harm if the injunction is denied; (3) that the issuance of an
injunction will not result in an even greater harm to the nonmoving party; and (4) that the
public interest favors relief. Child Evangelism Fellowship of New Jersey, Inc. v. Stafford
Twnshp. Sch. Dist., 386 F.3d 514, 524 (3d Cir. 2004) (internal citation omitted).
Keszthelyi has not alleged any facts that would support the issuance of injunctive relief.
Keszthelyi asserts that an influx of Latino prisoners caused a previous race riot,
which harmed him emotionally, and that he fears another such riot. However, Keszthelyi
does not allege facts sufficient to show that an immediate halt in assigning Latino inmates
is necessary to prevent an imminent race riot and that no other measures would ensure
prisoner safety. See Campbell Soup Co. v. ConAgra, Inc., 977 F.2d 86, 91 (3d Cir. 1992)
(“The preliminary injunction must be the only way of protecting the plaintiff from harm.”).
Thus, there is no basis for concluding that Keszthelyi will suffer irreparable harm in the
absence of injunctive relief. Accordingly, we have concluded that the appeal presents no
substantial question, and we will summarily affirm the District Court’s order denying
Keszthelyi’s motion for a preliminary injunction.

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