07-4271 Satya Sugihjanto v. Attorney General of the United States

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
________________
Nos. 07-3268 & 07-4271
________________
SATYA SUGIHJANTO,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
Respondent
Petition for Review of an Order of the
United States Department of Justice
Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA No. A96-257-949 )
Immigration Judge: Honorable Miriam Mills
_______________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
August 13, 2008
Before: RENDELL, GREENBERG and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges
(Filed: August 14, 2008 )
___________________
OPINION OF THE COURT
___________________
PER CURIAM
Satya Sugihjanto, an Indonesian native and citizen, petitions for review of two
final orders of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) concerning the denial of

-- 1 of 5 --

2
Sugihjanto’s application for withholding of removal and relief under the Convention
Against Torture (“CAT”). Before the Immigration Judge (“IJ”), Sugihjanto testified to
several incidents of alleged persecution based on his Chinese heritage and his practice of
Catholicism. The IJ found that Sugihjanto was ineligible for withholding of removal
because the incidents he testified to did not constitute past persecution and because he
failed to establish that he had a well-founded fear of future persecution. The IJ also
found that Sugihjanto did not meet his burden of proof under the CAT. The BIA affirmed
without opinion and dismissed the appeal. Sugijanto filed a motion for reconsideration
which the BIA denied. Sugijanto timely filed petitions for review from both the original
dismissal and the motion for reconsideration. The two petitions have been consolidated
on appeal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(6).
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). Where the BIA substantially
adopts the findings of the IJ, we review the decisions of both the IJ and the BIA. He
Chun Chen v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 215, 222 (3d Cir. 2004). We review the IJ and BIA’s
findings under the substantial evidence standard. Yu v. Att’y Gen., 513 F.3d 346 (3d Cir.
2008). We review the denial of reconsideration for abuse of discretion. Borges v.
Gonzales, 402 F.3d 398, 404 (3d Cir. 2005).
To obtain withholding of removal, Sugihjanto bore the burden of establishing that
his life or freedom would be threatened in Indonesia on account of his race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. 8 U.S.C.

-- 2 of 5 --

3
§ 1231(b)(3)(A); Romanishyn v. Attorney General, 455 F.3d 175, 178 n.1 (3d Cir. 2006).
Sugihjanto argues that he provided sufficient evidence of past persecution which, in
addition to evidence of a pattern of persecution of Christians and ethnic Chinese in
Indonesia, demonstrated that he would more likely than not be persecuted if he returned
to Indonesia. As evidence of past persecution, Sugihjanto testified to seeing his siblings
attacked when he was seven years old. As another example, Sugihjanto testified that he
was robbed when he was thirteen years old and the perpetrators were not apprehended
because he was Chinese. Finally, he testified that he was in an accident with a native
Indonesian when he was seventeen. Sugihjanto claimed that after the accident, a crowd
surrounded the scene of the accident and accosted him. Finally, Sugihjanto alleged that
he was targeted and harassed by Indonesian Muslims several times during his childhood
and that his family, many of whom still reside in Indonesia, continue to “experience
mental pressures” because they live surrounded by native Indonesians.
We have endorsed the definition of persecution as “threats to life, confinement,
torture, and economic restrictions so severe that they constitute a threat to life or
freedom.” Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir. 1993). Although Sugihjanto
encountered some unfortunate incidents in his youth, those incidents were not of the
severity necessary to constitute persecution. See Lie v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530, 536 (3d
Cir. 2005) (noting that random acts of robbery and assault resulting in minor injuries
cannot be characterized as acts of persecution). Nor did Sugihjanto show that these

-- 3 of 5 --

4
incidents were the result of governmental action or the government’s inability to control
its population. See id. at 537. Thus, we do not find that the evidence presented by
Sugihjanto is “so compelling that no reasonable fact finder could fail to find the requisite
fear of persecution.” INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483-84 (1992).
The IJ’s conclusion that Sugihjanto failed to prove a well-founded fear of future
persecution is also supported by substantial evidence. See Gomez-Zuluaga v. Att’y Gen.,
527 F.3d 330, 345 (3d Cir. 2008) (discussing standard for finding future persecution). As
the IJ noted, Sugihjanto had family members who remained in Indonesia unharmed since
his departure. We have held that “when family members remain in petitioner’s native
country without meeting harm, and there is no individualized showing that petitioner
would be singled out for persecution, the reasonableness of a petitioner’s well-founded
fear of future persecution is diminished.” Lie, 396 F.3d at 537. Sugihjanto also
submitted multiple periodical articles, and the 2004 Country Report for Indonesia issued
by the State Department, to bolster his claim. While the report contains accounts of
anti-Chinese and anti-Christian sentiment in Indonesia, such racism and discrimination do
not appear to rise to the level of systematic and pervasive persecution. See Chen v.
Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 221, 233 (3d Cir. 2004).
We agree with the Government that Sugihjanto’s CAT claim was not properly
raised before the BIA and, therefore, we lack jurisdiction to entertain the claim. See
Abdulrahman v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 587, 594-95 (3d Cir. 2003) (an alien is required to

-- 4 of 5 --

5
raise and exhaust his remedies as to each claim or ground of relief if he is to preserve the
right of judicial review of that claim). Even assuming, arguendo, that we have
jurisdiction to review the IJ’s CAT determination, Sugihjanto could not succeed on this
ground because he has not shown that it is more likely than not that he would be tortured
by the Indonesian government or that the government would acquiesce in any torture.
See 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2); Silva-Rengifo v. Att’y Gen., 473 F.3d 58, 65 (3d Cir. 2005).
Finally, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for
reconsideration since Sugihjanto merely reiterated the same arguments he made in his
BIA brief. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b) (a motion to reconsider must specify errors of law or
fact in the BIA’s prior decision). Further, Sugihjanto’s argument that the BIA erred in
affirming the IJ’s decision without an opinion is clearly meritless. See Dia v. Ashcroft,
353 F.3d 228, 231 (3d Cir. 2003)(en banc)(upholding streamlining procedures
promulgated by the Attorney General).
For the above-stated reasons, we will deny the petition for review.

-- 5 of 5 --