Dana Cromartie v. Sears Roebuck

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 07-3184
DANA CROMARTIE,
Appellant
v.
SEARS ROEBUCK AND COMPANY
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 05-cv-2205)
Magistrate Judge: Honorable Timothy R. Rice
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 1, 2008
Before SLOVITER, BARRY and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges
(Filed: April 8, 2008)
OPINION
PER CURIAM
Dana Cromartie seeks review of the Magistrate Judge’s order confirming the
settlement of her employment discrimination claim against Appellee Sears Roebuck. For
the reasons that follow, we will affirm.

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I.
In July 2005, Cromartie filed a pro se employment discrimination suit against
Sears Roebuck. The court appointed counsel and the parties consented to proceed before
a Magistrate Judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). During a phone conversation on March 22,
2007, Cromartie and Ronald V. Cole, Cromartie’s attorney in the matter, discussed
settling the case. Appellant expressed that she wanted to settle the case for approximately
$60,000, or twice the amount of her annual salary. Cole testified that after he provided
Cromartie with a legal assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of her case, she agreed
to settle the case for any amount in exchange for Cole waiving a certain amount of his
legal fees. Cromartie, however, maintains that she did not want to settle the case for less
than a sum amounting to twice her annual salary.
Cole and Sears agreed to settle the case for $7,500. On April 12, 2007, Cole sent
Cromartie a letter informing her that the matter was settled for $7,500. Cromartie
testified that she sent a letter in response objecting to the amount of the settlement. Cole
testified that he never received her letter and did not receive any communications from
Cromartie until May 25, when she sent an e-mail informing him that she refused to sign
the settlement release because the amount was not what she agreed to during the April 12
phone call. The Magistrate Judge held an evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether
Cole had express authority from Cromartie to settle the case. Cromartie was
unrepresented by counsel during the hearing. On June 15, 2007, the Court entered an
order confirming the settlement agreement between the parties.

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Specifically, the Court disbelieved that Cromartie sent a letter in response to1
Cole’s April 12 letter objecting to the terms of the settlement. Cromartie stated that she
typed the letter, then rewrote it by hand and that she had a copy of the handwritten letter
and the letter on her computer. However, despite bringing other documents to the
evidentiary hearing, she failed to present a copy of the letter to the court.
II.
A district court’s approval of a settlement agreement is a final order over which we
have appellate jurisdiction. See Binker v. Pennsylvania, 977 F.2d 738, 744 (3d Cir.
1992). We review the Magistrate Judge’s findings of fact for clear error, and we exercise
plenary review over his conclusions of law. See Brisbin v. Superior Value Co., 398 F.3d
279, 285 (3d Cir. 2005). “A factual finding is clearly erroneous when ‘the reviewing
court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been committed.’” Id. (citations omitted).
In the instant case, the Magistrate Judge applied the proper legal standard in
determining that Cromartie expressly authorized her attorney to enter into a settlement
agreement for whatever amount he could negotiate. See Covington v. Continental
General Tire, Inc., 381 F.3d 216, 220-21 (3d Cir. 2004). The Court also did not commit
error by crediting Cole’s testimony over Cromartie’s. See United States v. Igbonwa, 120
F.3d 437, 441 (3d Cir. 1997) (appellate review is most deferential with respect to
determinations of witness credibility). Cole’s testimony was backed by documentary
evidence and the testimony of other witnesses involved in the case, while Cromartie’s
testimony was unsupported by evidence or other witnesses. Further, the Court found that1
Cromartie abandoned the litigation by failing to communicate with her attorney and

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failing to attend depositions. The Court also found persuasive that Cole agreed to waive
his fees in exchange for settling the case for the highest amount he could negotiate.
Finally, Cromartie’s complaint that she was unprepared for the evidentiary hearing
because she did not have adequate representation is meritless. The transcript reveals that
the Magistrate Judge carefully explained the nature of the hearing and stated that he
would gladly defer the proceedings if Cromartie wished to retain her own counsel.
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the district court.
TO THE CLERK:
Please file the foregoing opinion.
/s/ Maryanne Trump Barry
Circuit Judge

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