Allyson Wallace v. UNITED PARCEL SERVICE On Appeal From the United States District Court For the…

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 07-2336
ALLYSON WALLACE,
Appellant
v.
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civ. No. 02-cv-01685)
District Judge: Joseph A. Greenaway, Jr.
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
September 26, 2007
Before: SLOVITER, MCKEE and AMBRO, Circuit Judges
(Filed October 15, 2007 )
_________________
OPINION
_________________
PER CURIAM
Pro se appellant, Allyson Wallace, appeals from the District Court’s entry of
judgment in favor of appellee United Postal Service, Inc. (“UPS”), after a jury
unanimously found no cause of action in her suit brought pursuant to Title VII of the

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Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. We will affirm.
Wallace, an African-American woman, worked for UPS from 1999 until 2001.
After being hired as a bagger at UPS’s facility in Secaucus, New Jersey, UPS found that
Wallace exhibited some performance and disciplinary problems, and was ultimately
placed on notice of discharge for “walking off the job” in April of 2001. Shortly after
receiving her discharge notice, Wallace filed a complaint with the Secaucus Police
Department alleging that she had been subjected to harassment at the UPS facility. Over
the course of the following two months, Wallace submitted four forged doctor’s notes to
her UPS supervisors, three of which pertained to absences from work and a fourth note
authorizing a return to “light” duty. Wallace’s employment with UPS was terminated on
June 13, 2001.
After obtaining a right to sue letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”), Wallace filed the underlying complaint with the United States
District Court for the District of New Jersey. Wallace alleged that UPS: (1) committed
Title VII violations by: a) terminating her employment on account of her race, color,
national origin and gender; b) failing to promote her on account of her race and gender; c)
terminating her in retaliation for her complaints of discrimination; and d) subjecting her
to a hostile work environment based on her race and gender; (2) violated her
constitutional rights under the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments; and (3)
committed violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 and 1986.

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Counsel was appointed to represent Wallace and the court set the deadline for
dispositive motions for September 23, 2005. At the close of discovery, UPS filed a
motion for summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. In a Memorandum Opinion
and Order entered on June 29, 2006, the District Court granted that motion with respect to
all claims save Wallace’s claim of hostile work environment.
The District Court concluded that under the burden-shifting test established by the
Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), Wallace
failed to offer any evidence to undermine UPS’s legitimate nondiscriminatory explanation
for terminating her employment on account of her submission of the forged notes. With
respect to the failure to promote claim, the District Court determined that Wallace failed
to present any evidence that an available position existed, that she qualified for such a
position, that she applied and was rejected for the position, and that UPS continued to
seek applicants for the position. The District Court likewise concluded that Wallace
failed to submit evidence from which the court could infer the existence of a causal
connection between her termination and the filing of a complaint with the Secaucus
Police Department or the lodging of internal complaints at UPS. The District Court noted
that, in addition to the fact that Wallace received the notice of discharge from UPS prior
to her filing a harassment complaint with the police, the circumstances of her discharge
included her admitted acts of forging numerous doctor’s notes and submitting them to her
employer.
The District Court determined that Wallace did, however, submit evidence to show

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the existence of a genuine issue of fact for trial on her hostile work environment claim
given her testimony at deposition that she was called racially and gender-specific
derogatory names on numerous occasions and given the deposition testimony of other
UPS employees who heard the racial slur used at UPS on other occasions. Finally, the
District Court noted Wallace’s express non-opposition to UPS’s summary judgment
request on her claims asserted under §§ 1983, 1985 and 1986, as well as her claims under
the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Accordingly, the District Court
awarded summary judgment in favor of UPS on every claim in the complaint except for
the claim of a hostile work environment which was set for trial.
The District Court subsequently entertained oral argument on the parties’ in
limine motions to bar certain evidence and a jury trial commenced on April 11, 2007.
The jury returned a verdict on April 27, 2007, finding no cause of action against UPS.
The District Court entered judgment on the jury verdict on April 30, 2007, and this timely
appeal followed.
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Even under
the most liberal reading of her informal brief, Wallace fails to set forth any argument
warranting a decision to overturn the jury’s verdict finding no cause of action with respect
to her hostile work environment claim. Wallace does little more than simply set forth a
conclusory statement alleging that the District Court “dismantled this matter” by barring
the introduction at trial of evidence related to her summarily dismissed claims and her
work-related injuries. We can find no error on the part of the District Court, however, in

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barring the introduction of evidence related to the discrimination claims which it had
previously concluded lacked sufficient evidentiary support and which had no particular
relevance to Wallace’s hostile work environment claim. See Narin v. Lower Merion
School District, 206 F.3d 323, 334 (3d Cir. 2000); Walden v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 126
F.3d 506, 517 (3d Cir.1997). Additionally, as UPS points out, Wallace was permitted to
provide testimony at trial regarding her alleged workplace injuries. As for the exclusion
of evidence related to any of Wallace’s “civil and constitutional” claims, Wallace’s
attorney specifically indicated that UPS’s motion for summary disposition of these claims
was not being opposed. See Opposition to UPS’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 2
n.1. Wallace can not now be heard to complain that evidence of these claims should have
been presented at trial.
Wallace’s reference to the “all white jury” which decided her case warrants no
discussion as there was no jury-related challenge raised in the District Court and the
statement in her informal brief is not supported by any argument whatsoever. Likewise,
we will not review the issues listed in Wallace’s notice of appeal as those issues are not
addressed in her appellate brief. See Skretvedt v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours, 372 F.3d
193, 202-03 (3d Cir. 2004) (an issue that is not discussed in the brief is waived).
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s entry of judgment in
favor of appellee UPS.

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