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072299np-pdf•No: 07-2299 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. Paul E. Reinhart, Jr
072299np-pdfCourt of Appeals for the Third CircuitApr 23, 2008
Honorable A. Wallace Tashima, Senior Judge of the United States Court of*
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation.
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No: 07-2299
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
v.
PAUL E. REINHART, JR.,
Appellant
Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(No. 06-cr-00118)
District Court: Hon. William W. Caldwell
Submitted pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 24, 2008
Before: McKEE, RENDELL and TASHIMA , Circuit Judges*
(Opinion Filed: April 23, 2008)
OPINION
McKEE, Circuit Judge.
Paul E. Reinhart appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his
guilty plea. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.
I.
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Inasmuch as we write primarily for the parties who are familiar with this case, we
need not set forth the factual or procedural history except insofar as it may be helpful to
our brief discussion. We review the district court’s denial of the motion to withdraw the
guilty plea prior to sentencing for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Jones, 336 F.3d
245, 252 (3d Cir. 2003). We apply the same standard in reviewing the court’s denial of a
request for a continuance. United States v. Adedoyin, 369 F.3d 337, 341 (3d Cir. 2004).
In determining whether the defendant has shown a fair and just reason to withdraw his
guilty plea pursuant to Rule 11(d), the district court must consider: (1) whether the
defendant asserts his innocence, (2) the strength of the defendant’s reasons for
withdrawing his plea, and (3) whether the government would be prejudiced by the
withdrawal of the plea. United States v. Brown, 250 F.3d 811, 815 (3d Cir. 2001);
Jones, 336 F.3d at 252. As the district court noted here, Reinhart failed to make any
assertion of innocence. Rather, Reinhart merely asserted that he wanted to withdraw his
plea because he wanted a jury trial. However, that is nothing more than a statement that
he changed his mind after he pled guilty. A defendant cannot seek to withdraw his plea
“on a whim,” and a “shift in defense tactics, a change of mind, or fear of punishment are
not adequate reasons” to allow withdrawal of a guilty plea. Id. at 252-53. Because
Reinhart failed to assert a supportable ground for withdrawing his plea, we need not even
consider whether allowing him to do so would have prejudiced the government. Id. at
254. Thus, we conclude that the district court’s denial of Reinhart’s motion to withdraw
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his guilty plea was not an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Kikumura, 947 F.2d
72, 78 (3d Cir. 1991) (a district court’s denial of a request for continuance will be
considered an abuse of discretion only if it is “so arbitrary as to violate due process”).
II.
Moreover, a thorough competency evaluation of Reinhart had already been
conducted prior to Reinhart’s guilty plea. Additionally, Reinhart made his request a mere
six days before his sentencing, thus creating the appearance that he was attempting to
“game the system” by manipulatively delaying the proceeding.
III.
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Reinhart’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea; therefore, we will
affirm the judgment of conviction and the sentence.
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