No.07-2003 WILLIAM E. SEIBEL v. Marketplace Direct, Inc.

Honorable A. Wallace Tashima, Senior Judge of the United States Court of*
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation.
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No.07-2003
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WILLIAM E. SEIBEL,
v.
MARKETPLACE DIRECT, INC.
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On Appeal from the
United States District Court
For the Western District of Pennsylvania
Honorable David Stewart Cercone
No.05-CV-00684
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Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1 (a)
March 24, 2008
Before: McKEE, RENDELL and TASHIMA , Circuit Judges*
(Opinion Filed: April 28, 2008)

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OPINION
McKee, Circuit Judge
Appellant William E. Seibel appeals the district court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of Marketplace Direct Inc. based on the court’s conclusion that
Seibel failed to establish that the employer’s stated reasons for terminating him
were a pretext for illegal age discrimination. For the reasons that follow, we will
affirm.
I.
Because we write primarily for the parties, we need not discuss the facts or
procedural history of this case. The ADEA prohibits employers from
discriminating against individuals in hiring, termination, compensation, or
conditions of employment on the basis of age. 29 U.S.C. § 623 (a)(1). In order to
establish a claim under the ADEA, Seibel must first establish that: 1) that he is
over 40 years of age; 2) qualified for the position in question; 3) suffered an
adverse employment decision; and 4) was replaced by a person whose relative
youth creates an inference of job discrimination. Keller v. Orix Credit Alliance,
Inc., 130 F.3d 1101, 1108 (3d Cir. 1997) (en banc). Seibel established a prima
facie case.

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The burden thus shifted to the employer to produce evidence of a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action. Ezold v. Wolf, Block,
Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 522 (3d Cir. 1992). Once the employer
produced such evidence, the burden shifted back to Seibel to provide sufficient
evidence to allow a fact-finder to either reject the employer’s nondiscriminatory
explanation, or believe that an individious discriminatory reason was more likely
than not a motivating cause of the employee’s discharge (“pretext”). Fuentes v.
Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 763-64 (3d Cir. 1994).
Here, Marketplace Directs claims that Seibel failed to properly perform his
work, did not complete tasks in a timely fashion, and refused to assist several
employees with computer problems. We agree with the district court’s conclusion
that Seibel did not then produce sufficient evidence of a pretext for age
discrimination. Therefore, he does not meet his burden and summary judgment is
appropriate.
III.
For the reasons above, we will affirm the district court’s order granting
Appellees summary judgment motion.

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