E. Liggon-Redding v. CONGRESS TITLE, Fidelity National Title Ins. Co.

CLD-175 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 07-1426
________________
E. LIGGON-REDDING,
Appellant
v.
CONGRESS TITLE, Fidelity National
Title Ins. Co.; KEY PROPERTIES
GMAC REALTY
____________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civ. No. 06-cv-03127)
District Judge: Honorable Jerome B. Simandle
_______________________________________
Submitted For Possible Dismissal Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
March 29, 2007
BEFORE: RENDELL, SMITH and JORDAN, CIRCUIT JUDGES
(Filed April 25, 2007)
_______________________
OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM
E. Liggon-Redding appeals from an order of the United States District Court for
the District of New Jersey that dismissed her complaint without prejudice for lack of

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1 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1962.
2
subject matter jurisdiction. For the reasons stated herein, we will dismiss this appeal
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Liggon-Redding filed a complaint alleging fraud in the sale of her home. She
indicated on a cover sheet that she was bringing the case as a tort action, and that all
parties were residents of New Jersey. Following defendants’ motion to dismiss and
further filings from both parties regarding the motion, the District Court determined that it
lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the complaint. Although the cover sheet for
her complaint indicated that the court had federal question jurisdiction, Liggon-Redding
failed to cite any federal statute or constitutional provision in support of her complaint.
The District Court noted that Liggon-Redding cited some federal criminal statutes in her
response to the motion to dismiss, but that none of those statutes created a private right of
action, and that she had not moved to amend her complaint to add claims arising under
those statutes. The Court also noted that Liggon-Redding’s complaint could in no way be
construed to raise a civil RICO claim.1
On appeal, Liggon-Redding argues that she did indeed raise a civil RICO claim,
and that she did not know she had to amend her complaint, because “informing the Court
of the heinous acts of the Defendants was enough.” See Notice of Appeal. We disagree.
“In order to plead a violation of RICO, plaintiffs must allege (1) conduct (2) of an
enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity.” Lum v. Bank of America,

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2 Liggon-Redding’s motion for a “restraining order” or stay, and her motion for
appointment of counsel, are denied as moot.
3
361 F.3d 217, 223 (3d Cir. 2004). Liggon-Redding’s complaint, although it mentioned
the word “fraud,” certainly did not put anyone on notice that she was raising a civil RICO
claim. Where the absence of subject matter jurisdiction is clear from the face of a
complaint, the District Court need not give a plaintiff the opportunity to amend the
complaint before dismissing it. See Miklavic v. USAir, 21 F.3d 551, 557-58 (3d Cir.
1994).
We therefore will dismiss this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).2

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