Hector Orama v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 747 F.2d 863 3d Cir. 1984 . On December 13, 2006,…

071393np-pdfCourt of Appeals for the Third CircuitAug 3, 2007

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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 07-1393
________________
HECTOR ORAMA,
Appellant
vs.
CHRISTOPHER BOYKO
____________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civ. No. 05-cv-01526)
District Judge: Honorable William J. Martini
_______________________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
August 1, 2007
Before: FISHER, ALDISERT and WEIS, Circuit Judges
(Filed August 3, 2007)
_______________________
OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM.
Hector Orama appeals the order of the United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey dismissing his civil rights complaint. We will affirm the District
Court’s order.

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I.
In March 2005, Orama filed a complaint in the District Court, alleging that
Morris County Police Officer Christopher Boyko violated his rights by causing him injury
in the course of handcuffing him and testing him for driving under the influence. Orama
also alleges that Boyko discriminated against him due to his race and disability. The
defendant answered the complaint and the Magistrate Judge issued a scheduling order.
On July 10, 2006, the Magistrate Judge held a conference with the parties to address
deficiencies in discovery.
After the conference, the Magistrate Judge issued an order directing that
Orama’s pretrial submissions were due on September 8, 2006. Orama did not submit the
materials, and on September 27, 2006, the Magistrate Judge issued an order to show
cause why sanctions should not be imposed. In response, Orama submitted a letter
asserting that the District Court had discriminated against him. Orama complained that
Boyko was receiving “special privileges.” Orama also claimed he was threatened with
being put in jail “everytime [Boyko] wants to obtain information.” Orama did not offer
any additional explanation of these accusations. His letter also noted that “[i]f the
Defendant is in such a rush to finish this case and is willing to pay for pain and suffering,
I am willing to listen to a reasonable negotiation.” He indicated that if Boyko did not
engage in negotiation, he would continue to wait for a response from the various agencies
and legal advocacy groups that he had contacted for assistance.

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Orama’s notice of appeal cites the date of the report and recommendation.1
However, the document also refers to District Court Judge William J. Martini, and the
judgment in favor of the defendant. Giving Orama the wide latitude afforded to pro se
litigants, we construe his notice as appealing the District Court’s final order entered
January 22, 2007.
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On October 10, 2006, the Magistrate Judge, by letter order, gave Orama
“one final opportunity to meet his obligations as a litigant,” and assigned a November 3,
2006, deadline for submission of the materials. The letter specified that if Orama failed
to comply, the Magistrate Judge would recommend appropriate sanctions. When Orama
again failed to comply, the Magistrate Judge recommended that the complaint be
dismissed with prejudice, citing Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 747 F.2d 863
(3d Cir. 1984). On December 13, 2006, the District Court issued an order giving Orama
“one final opportunity to show cause,” and setting an oral argument date. Oral
arguments were held, and on December 27, 2006, the District Court ordered Orama to
produce all pretrial submissions by January 5, 2007. The order specified that the report
and recommendation would remain under consideration pending Orama’s compliance
with the order. When Orama again failed to submit the materials, the District Court
adopted the report and recommendation and dismissed the complaint with prejudice.
Orama now appeals. He has also filed a motion requesting that the1
defendant produce the original video tape documenting his May 2003 arrest.

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II.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and review the District
Court’s order of dismissal for abuse of discretion. See Mindek v. Rigatti, 964 F.2d 1369,
1373 (3d Cir. 1992).
Management of discovery is uniquely within the discretion of the trial
judge. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(a)-(b); In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation, 685 F.2d 810,
817 (3d Cir. 1982) (“matters of docket control and conduct of discovery are committed to
the sound discretion of the district court”). District courts may use sanctions to facilitate
pretrial proceedings and enforce pretrial orders. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b); Mindek, 964
F.2d at 1373. In light of Orama’s multiple failures to comply with the District Court’s
calls for pretrial submissions, sanctions were warranted. The only remaining issue is
whether the District Court’s abused its discretion by employing the “extreme sanction” of
dismissal with prejudice.
Dismissal with prejudice is only appropriate in limited circumstances;
doubts should be resolved in favor of reaching a decision on the merits. Emerson v. Thiel
College, 296 F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir. 2002). Accordingly, before dismissing an action, a
district court is required to make explicit findings regarding the six factors enumerated in
our decision in Poulis. See United States v. $8,221,877.16 in U.S. Currency, 330 F.3d
141, 162 (3d Cir. 2003); Emcasco Ins. Co. v. Sambrick, 834 F.2d 71, 74 (3d Cir. 1987).
The Poulis factors to be weighed by the District Court are: (1) the extent of the party’s

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personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the adversary caused by the failure to meet
scheduling orders and respond to discovery; (3) a history of dilatoriness; (4) whether the
conduct of the party . . . was willful or in bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of sanctions
other than dismissal, which entails an analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6) the
meritoriousness of the claim. See Poulis, 747 F.2d at 868.
The District Court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Orama’s
failures to comply warranted dismissal with pprejudice. The report and recommendation
set out findings with regard to each factor. The Magistrate Judge noted in Orama’s favor
that Orama did not have a history of non-compliance with court orders, and that the judge
could not conclude from the pleadings alone that Orama did not have meritorious claims.
The Court concluded, however, that this was outweighed by Orama’s willful decision not
to comply with past orders, and expressed intention not to comply with future orders,
making it impossible to ready the matter for trial, and rendering alternative sanctions
ineffective. See Mindek, 964 F.2d 1373 (not all Poulis factors need to be satisfied in
order to dismiss a complaint). Although Orama’s argument that Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 16(f) does not mandate dismissal is correct, repeated failure to comply with
pretrial orders can be grounds for dismissal. See id. We cannot conclude that the District
Court abused its discretion in finding dismissal warranted here.
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. Appellant’s
motion to compel production of the videotape of his arrest is denied.

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