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071326np-pdf•Case No: 07-1326 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. Scott Kdonton
071326np-pdfCourt of Appeals for the Third CircuitFeb 27, 2008
*The Honorable Gustave Diamond, Senior District Judge for the Western District
of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
Case No: 07-1326
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
SCOTT K DONTON,
Appellant
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
Criminal No. 05-cr-00416
District Judge: The Honorable Edwin M. Kosik
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
February 15, 2008
Before: SLOVITER AND SMITH, Circuit Judges,
and DIAMOND, District Judge*
(Filed: February 27, 2008)
OPINION
DIAMOND, District Judge.
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Scott K Donton was convicted by a jury on both counts of a superseding indictment
charging him with receipt of child pornography and possession of child pornography in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§2252A(a)(2)(B) and 2252A(a)(5)(B). He subsequently was
sentenced by the District Court to concurrent terms of 60 months’ imprisonment. Donton
appeals only his conviction arguing insufficiency of the evidence. For the reasons set
forth below, we will affirm.
Because we write only for the parties we need only summarize the evidence
presented at trial, with which both parties are familiar. After Donton’s name appeared on
business records seized during the execution of a search warrant at the offices of an
internet business offering child pornography online, a sting operation was initiated
whereby an undercover business based in Maryland sent Donton a form letter containing
a checklist of sexual interests. Donton completed the form with his name, signature,
mailing address, and e-mail address, and checked numerous boxes indicating his interest
in, inter alia, child pornography. He mailed the completed form to the Maryland address.
Upon receipt of Donton’s completed form, agents sent Donton a second mailing
offering for sale various videotapes depicting child pornography. Donton responded to
this mailing by completing an order form for four videotapes, all of which were described
in the mailing as featuring pre-teenage children engaged in sexual activity. Donton
signed the form, included his correct mailing address and e-mail address, enclosed a
signed money order in the amount of $85, and mailed it.
After receiving Donton’s order form, agents arranged a controlled delivery to
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Donton’s residence of the four ordered videotapes containing child pornography that had
been seized in prior investigations. Donton’s regular postal carrier delivered the package
and Donton signed two receipts for it. Shortly thereafter, agents converged on Donton’s
residence to execute a search warrant. Donton had already taken one video from the
package and had begun to play it by the time the agents arrived. Child pornography also
was discovered on a computer seized during the execution of the search warrant. While
the search was in progress, Donton admitted that he had received the initial mailing and
completed the form inquiring as to his sexual interests and that he had completed and sent
in the order form and money order for the four videotapes, but indicated that he thought it
was “some kind of joke.” He further admitted that he had used his credit card to access
internet sites that might contain child pornography.
At trial, Donton denied that the signature on the order forms or money order was
his. He suggested that his postal carrier forced him to sign for the package and that he
was unaware of what was on the tapes. As to his admissions, he stated that he only told
the agents “what they wanted to hear” so they would leave his home. Donton also
attempted to deflect blame for the child pornography found on the computer onto others
in the residence who he testified had greater access to that computer, including his
brother, with whom he had an ongoing feud. Donton’s father also testified that his sons
did not get along.
We have appellate jurisdiction in this case under 28 U.S.C. §1291. While our
review of the sufficiency of the evidence is plenary, we must “view the evidence in the
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3 The offense of receipt of child pornography requires proof that a defendant
“knowingly receives . . . any material that contains child pornography that has been
mailed, or shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce by any means,
including by computer.” 18 U.S.C. §2252A(a)(2)(B). The offense of possession of child
pornography requires proof that a defendant “knowingly possesses any . . . material that
contains an image of child pornography that has been mailed, or shipped or transported in
interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by computer . . . .” 18 U.S.C.
§2252A(a)(5)(B).
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light most favorable to the government, and will sustain the verdict if any rational trier of
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”
United States v. Leahy, 445 F.3d 634, 657 (3d Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). “‘[A] claim
of insufficiency of the evidence places a very heavy burden on the appellant,’” id., a
burden Donton clearly has failed to meet here. Rather, the evidence in this case as
outlined above, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, was more than
sufficient to sustain the jury’s guilty verdict on both counts as any rational trier of fact
could have found Donton guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of all the elements of both
receipt and possession of child pornography3 based upon that evidence.
On appeal, Donton contends that his own trial testimony, along with that of his
father, as well as the absence from the record of other evidence which he suggests the
government neglected to proffer, was sufficient to cast doubt upon the credibility of the
government’s witnesses and to create a reasonable doubt as to Donton’s guilt. However,
it is not for us to weigh the evidence or to determine the credibility of the witnesses.
United States v. Dent, 149 F.3d, 180 187 (3d Cir. 1998). Instead, we look solely to the
evidence presented and view that evidence in the light most favorable to the government.
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Because that evidence was sufficient for any rational trier of fact to find Donton guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt on both counts with which he was charged, the jury’s verdict
must be sustained.
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
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