V. George Amiriantz v. State of New Jersey

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 07-1274
V. GEORGE AMIRIANTZ,
Appellant
v.
STATE OF NEW JERSEY
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
D.C. Civil Action No. 06-cv-1743
(Honorable Freda L. Wolfson)
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 17, 2007
Before: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, HARDIMAN and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges
(Filed: October 25, 2007)
OPINION OF THE COURT
PER CURIAM.
George Amiriantz appeals from the district court’s dismissal of his complaint for
failure to state a claim. For the following reasons, we will affirm the district court’s
judgment.

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1
New Jersey Statutes Annotated § 26:3D-59(e) exempts the area within the perimeter
of:
(1) any casino as defined in section 6 of P.L.1977, c. 110 (C.5:12-6)
approved by the Casino Control Commission that contains at least 150
stand-alone slot machines, 10 table games, or some combination thereof
approved by the commission, which machines and games are available to
the public for wagering; and
(2) any casino simulcasting facility approved by the Casino Control Commission
pursuant to section 4 of P.L.1992, c. 19 (C.5:12-194) that contains a simulcast
counter and dedicated seating for at least 50 simulcast patrons or a simulcast
operation and at least 10 table games, which simulcast facilities and games are
available to the public for wagering.
2
I.
On April 13, 2006, Amiriantz filed a complaint against the State of New Jersey
challenging the state’s newly enacted “New Jersey Smoke-Free Air Act” (the “Act”) as a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. See N.J. Stat.
Ann § 26:3D-55, et seq. The Act itself prohibits smoking in virtually all enclosed indoor
places of public access, workplaces, and in any area of a public or nonpublic elementary
or secondary school. See id. at § 26:3D-58. The Act also provides for certain
exemptions, one of which exempts the areas within the perimeters of casinos and casino
simulcasting facilities (the “casino exemption”).1 See id. at § 26:3D-59(e). Amiriantz, an
owner/operator of a transportation company in New Jersey, challenged this casino
exemption claiming that it unconstitutionally subjects his business to an onerous
regulation that the casino businesses were freed from. The State of New Jersey moved to
dismiss the complaint.

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3
On November 30, 2006, the district court issued an opinion and order dismissing
the complaint for failure to state a claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). First, the court
determined that because Amiriantz had named the State of New Jersey in his complaint,
rather than the state officials responsible for enforcing the Act, it was subject to dismissal
under the Eleventh Amendment. See MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Bell Atlantic-Pa., 271
F.3d 491, 503-08 (3d Cir. 2001); see also Penn. Fed’n of Sportsmen’s Clubs, Inc. v.
Hess, 297 F.3d 310, 323 (3d Cir. 2002). Nevertheless, permitting him the benefit of the
doubt, and allowing for the possibility that Amiriantz could have amended his complaint
to name state officials with the court’s permission, the court went further and discussed
the merits of the equal protection claim. Citing Schumacher v. Nix, 965 F.2d 1262, 1269
(3d Cir. 1992), the court determined that the casino exemption was entitled to rational
basis review because Amiriantz failed to allege that the New Jersey Legislature’s
classification affected any fundamental rights. Under this standard, the court concluded,
the same economic policy considerations underlying the creation of gaming areas in New
Jersey also provided support for the exemption of the casinos from the Act. See N.J. Stat.
Ann. § 5:12-1 et seq.

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4
II.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. This court’s review of a
district court’s dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is plenary. See Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d
176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) “tests the sufficiency
of the allegations contained in the complaint.” Id. When reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6)
dismissal, we view the allegations of the complaint in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff. See Pinker v. Roche Holdings, Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002).
III.
Having reviewed the parties’ submissions and relevant portions of the district court
record, we conclude that the district court’s thorough opinion properly disposed of the
constitutional argument in this case. The Equal Protection Clause requires that similarly
situated persons be treated alike. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S.
432, 439 (1985) (citing Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)). If a distinction between
persons does not implicate a suspect or quasi-suspect class, however, state action will be
upheld if it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. See Tillman v. Lebanon
County Corr. Facility, 221 F.3d 410, 423 (3d Cir. 2000). Under this standard, an equal
protection claim can be brought by a “class of one,” a plaintiff alleging that he has been
“intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no
rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S.
562 (2000).

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2
We agree also with the district court’s conclusion that Amiriantz, as the
owner/operator of a transportation company, was not similarly situated to the casinos and
casino simulcasting facilities addressed under the exemption.
5
As the district court determined, because the casino exemption does not infringe
on a fundamental right, it need only have a rational basis; we agree that it does.2 “The
Supreme Court has acknowledged the existence of a presumption in favor of the state’s
action in cases involving ‘social or economic legislation.’ . . . This presumption imposes
upon plaintiffs the heavy burden of making a ‘clear showing of arbitrariness and
irrationality’ in order to upset the legislation.” Phila. Police and Fire Ass’n for
Handicapped Children, Inc. v. City of Phila., 874 F.2d 156, 163 (3d Cir. 1989) (internal
citations omitted). Such legislation “is valid unless ‘the varying treatment of different
groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate
purposes that [a court] can only conclude that the legislature’s actions were irrational.’”
Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 332 (1981) (citing Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97
(1979)). For the reasons given by the district court, appellant failed to state a claim that
the inclusion of the casino exemption within the Act was not rationally related to the
achievement of a legitimate legislative purpose. Thus, we will affirm the court’s
judgment.

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