Monica Queljoe; Johnny Sunarso Darmawan v. Attorney General of the United States

Hon. Arthur L. Alarcón, Senior Judge, United States Court*
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation.
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 07-1145
MONICA QUELJOE; JOHNNY SUNARSO DARMAWAN,
Petitioners
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
Respondent
On Petition for Review of an Order
of the Board of Immigration Appeals
(Nos. A79-299-152/153)
Immigration Judge: Hon. Miriam K. Mills
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 14, 2008
Before: SLOVITER, JORDAN, and ALARCÓN, Circuit Judges*
Filed: April 14, 2008
______
OPINION

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SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.
Monica Queljoe, the principal applicant, and her husband, Johnny Sunarso
Darmawan (collectively “Petitioners”), petition for review of a final order of the Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), that affirmed, without opinion, the decision of the
Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under
the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). The IJ denied Queljoe’s requests for asylum,
withholding of removal, and protection under the CAT. The IJ granted voluntary
departure within sixty days. We will deny the petition for review.
I.
Petitioners are Indonesian citizens of Chinese ethnicity who overstayed their
authorized time in this country. They sought asylum, withholding of removal, and
protection under the CAT. We discern from Petitioner’s brief and Queljoe’s testimony at
a hearing before the IJ that she asserts a claim of discrimination as a Chinese Christian
during her life in Indonesia and past persecution in Indonesia as a result of witnessing the
May 1998 riots. She presented no evidence of government discrimination. In her
affidavit, Queljoe stated that “[a]s a Chinese descent and a Christian, I have experienced
the discriminations and hatred from the native people in Indonesia.” App. at 376. She
referred to difficulties experienced by “[m]ost of the Chinese people . . . whenever they
apply for necessary documents in the government offices” and that they “must pay a much
higher fee than it is required for the native Indonesian people.” App. at 376. She also

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referred to slurs and remarks by native Indonesians on the street. She offered no
testimony of any discrimination that she experienced or that was directed at her or her
husband. She has not made a viable claim of ethnic or religious discrimination.
II.
Queljoe’s principal claim to asylum is based on her assertion that she has a well-
founded fear of future persecution because the 1998 riots and subsequent bombings, most
of which occurred in regions other than where she lived, have caused her fear.
Queljoe does not allege that she suffered any actual harm. Although she describes
her witnessing the May 1998 riots as harm, we reject that contention. Witnessing the
1998 riots and simple awareness of bombings and other violent incidents that occurred
throughout Indonesia do not warrant a finding that Queljoe suffered sufficiently severe
harm to constitute persecution. See Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955, 961 (9th Cir. 1996)
(discrimination by itself generally does not constitute persecution); Singh v. INS, 134
F.3d 962, 967 (9th Cir. 1998) (general violence does not rise to the level of persecution);
see also Lie v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530, 536 (3d Cir. 2005). Similarly, she has not shown
that subsequent incidents that occurred rose to the level of “threats to life, confinement,
torture, and economic restrictions so severe that they constitute a threat to life or
freedom.” Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1240, 1243 (3d Cir. 1993). The IJ found her
testimony “general, meager, unquestionable and therefore not sufficiently reliable to
establish her claim.” App. at 61-62. The court’s factual determinations must be upheld if
“supported by reasonable, substantial and probative evidence on the record considered as

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a whole.” INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992) (citation and internal
quotations omitted). The factual findings of the IJ are conclusive unless “any reasonable
adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).
The record supports the IJ’s finding that Queljoe’s sole testimony is
uncorroborated, inconsistent and general. See Singh, 134 F.3d at 967. The inadequacy of
Queljoe’s testimony precludes a showing of subjective fear. See Lie, 396 F.3d at 536.
This alone defeats Queljoe’s claim of fear of future persecution.
Even if Queljoe had satisfied the subjective prong of the fear of future persecution
test, she failed to satisfy the objective prong of the test as she has not shown that she
would be singled out and persecuted upon her return to Indonesia. See id. at 536. The
fact that Queljoe’s sister and brother-in-law have never left Indonesia, and that her
parents remain in Indonesia following their voluntarily return from the United States, all
without incurring any harm, undercut her claim. See id. at 537.
Furthermore, Queljoe has failed to show that the Indonesian government
implements a pattern or practice of persecution toward Chinese Christians in Indonesia.
See id. at 536. The IJ noted that the Indonesian constitution protects the major religions
of Indonesia, including Christianity. Also, the IJ found the travel warnings irrelevant
because Queljoe could not connect the warning to her claim that Chinese Christians are
being targeted in Indonesia. In Lie, we noted that it appeared the May 1998 riots
occurred without the acquiescence of the Indonesian government. See id. at 537.
The only other evidence Queljoe offered was the 2004 U.S. Department of State

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We note that these issues are listed in an undated record1
document entitled “Respondents’ Reasons for Appeal,” apparently
presented to the BIA. Even if they were properly before us, they
do not provide any basis for us to grant the petition for review. It
follows from Queljoe’s failure to meet the standard for asylum that
she has failed to meet the more stringent standard for relief of
withholding of removal. See Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157,
182 (3d Cir. 2003). Moreover, Queljoe has failed to show “it is
more likely than not that . . . she would be tortured if removed” to
Indonesia, 8 C.F.R. §1208.16(c)(2), the standard for a claim for
CAT protection. Queljoe’s testimony did not refer to government
acquiescence relating to an act of torture nor to any torture inflicted
in general, and she submitted no evidence on this issue.
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Country Report and the 2004 Religious Freedom Report, which the IJ found inconsistent
with Queljoe’s claims. Finally, the IJ found that any well-founded fear of persecution
that Queljoe had is undermined by Queljoe’s delay of almost three years in leaving
Indonesia after the 1998 riots and by the fact that Queljoe’s family continues to live in
Indonesia without harm.
III.
It follows from our foregoing discussion that Queljoe has failed to meet the
standard for asylum. Although the Statement of Questions Presented in Queljoe’s appeal
brief lists among those questions the issue whether the BIA erred in affirming without
opinion the IJ’s decision denying withholding of removal pursuant to INA § 241(b)(3)(A)
and withholding under CAT, those issues were not fairly presented in Queljoe’s appeal
brief to the BIA. We are therefore without jurisdiction to consider them.1
For the reasons set forth, we deny the petition for review.

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