Janet Wooler v. CITIZENS BANK . On Appeal from the United States District Court For the Eastern…

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 07-1035
JANET WOOLER,
Appellant
v.
CITIZENS BANK
.
On Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(Civ. No. 06-cv-01439)
District Judge: Honorable Berle M. Schiller
Submitted pursuant to LAR 34.1(a)
March 10, 2008
___________
Before: FUENTES, CHAGARES, and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges.
(Opinion Filed: April 2, 2008)
OPINION
FUENTES, Circuit Judge:
Janet Wooler (“Wooler”) appeals from the final order entered on November 30,
2006, in which the District Court granted Defendant Citizens Bank’s motion for summary

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judgment. Wooler argues that the District Court erred in finding that there was no
genuine issue of material fact to support her claims of age and gender discrimination.
Finding that the record fully supports the District Court’s findings of fact and law, we
affirm.
I.
Between November 2001 and January 2005, Wooler – a woman who was 52
years of age in January of 2005 – worked as the Assistant Branch Manager at Citizens
Bank’s Doylestown, Pennsylvania branch. After receiving several negative evaluations
for her performance, Wooler was fired in January 2005. At the time she was fired,
Wooler was serving as the acting Branch Manager; that position was soon filled by a 56-
year old woman. In April 2005, the bank transferred a 29-year old man into the position
of Assistant Branch Manager.
Wooler sued Citizens Bank, alleging age discrimination in violation of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) and gender discrimination in violation of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. With respect to the age discrimination claim,
she argued that her supervisor made two off-color remarks: 1) stating in front of the staff
at another employee’s fortieth birthday that he and Wooler were too old to remember
their fortieth birthdays; and 2) asking Wooler whether she had Alzheimer’s disease when
she could not locate a form on a customer account. Moreover, Wooler alleged that she
was subjected to gender discrimination because other similarly situated male employees

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were treated more favorably and because she was eventually replaced by a male
employee.
In granting Citizens Bank’s motion for summary judgment, the District Court
found that though Wooler made a prima facie case for age discrimination, Citizens Bank
had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating her given the poor
performance evaluations she had received. In addition, the District Court found that
Wooler failed to establish a prima facie case for gender discrimination because she did
not present any evidence that similarly situated males were treated differently, or any
other evidence giving rise to an inference of discrimination. Finally, the District Court
found that Wooler could not sustain a retaliation claim because she did not establish a
causal link between her complaint about her supervisor’s comments and her termination.
Wooler filed a timely notice of appeal on December 29, 2006, arguing that the
District Court erred in granting Citizens Bank’s motion for summary judgment.
II.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The District Court had federal
question jurisdiction over Wooler’s age and gender discrimination claims under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331.
We exercise plenary review over a district court’s grant of summary judgment,
applying the same standard of review that the district court should have applied. See
MBIA Ins. Corp. v. Royal Indem. Co., 426 F.3d 204, 209 (3d Cir. 2005). A court may

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grant summary judgment when “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). “When the
nonmoving party bears the burden of persuasion at trial, the moving party may meet its
burden on summary judgment by showing that the nonmoving party’s evidence is
insufficient to carry its burden of persuasion at trial. A nonmoving party creates a
genuine issue of material fact when it provides evidence such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Lawrence v. National Westminster Bank N.J.,
98 F.3d 61, 69 (3d Cir. 1996) (internal citations omitted). “At summary judgment, a
plaintiff cannot rely on unsupported allegations, but must go beyond pleadings and
provide some evidence that would show that there exists a genuine issue for trial.” Jones
v. United Parcel Serv., 214 F.3d 402, 407 (3d Cir. 2000).
III.
A.
Under the ADEA, a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of age discrimination
by demonstrating that she: (1) was a member of a protected class, i.e., that she was over
forty, (2) was qualified for the position, (3) suffered an adverse employment decision, and
(4) was ultimately replaced by a person sufficiently younger to permit an inference of age
discrimination. Duffy v. Paper Magic Group, Inc., 265 F.3d 163, 167 (3d Cir. 2001).
Once a prima facie case is established, there is an inference of unlawful discrimination
and the burden of proof then shifts to the employer who can dispel the inference by

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articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. See id. at 167 n.1. If
the employer meets this burden, then the employee must demonstrate by a preponderance
of the evidence that the articulated reasons were a pretext for discrimination. See id.
Here, the District Court properly found that though Wooler established a prima facie case,
there was a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Wooler’s firing – her poor
performance.
Wooler argues that the reason provided for her dismissal was pretextual, as her
work performance was positively evaluated until shortly before her termination. She
further argues that the true reason for the termination was Citizens Bank’s retaliation for
her complaint regarding her supervisor’s comments about her age. Citizens Bank
responds that the supervisor in question left the bank four months before Wooler’s
termination and that the District Court was correct in finding that there was a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for Wooler’s termination, given her deficient sales levels and
two successive failed audits. Citizens Bank also notes that Wooler was disciplined along
with four other employees after an internal audit and given a chance to improve her
performance, even though one employee was terminated immediately. Since Wooler
subsequently continued to fail to meet her sales standards, Citizens Bank argues, she was
ultimately fired.
Based on a comprehensive review of the record, we agree with the District Court
that Wooler “failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact with respect to her age
discrimination claim” and that Citizens Bank therefore was entitled to summary judgment

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on this issue. App. at 9. Similarly, we agree with the District Court’s finding that Wooler
failed to demonstrate that Citizens Bank’s proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for terminating her was mere pretext in retaliation for her complaint. App. at 15.
B.
To establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, the plaintiff must show that she: (1) was a member of the
protected class; (2) was qualified for the job; and (3) suffered an adverse employment
decision under circumstances that give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.
See Tx. Dep’t of Comm. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). If the plaintiff
establishes a prima facie case, the employer must proffer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for the adverse employment decision. See Goosby v. Johnson & Johnson Medical,
Inc., 228 F.3d 313, 319 (3d Cir. 2000). If the employer provides such a reason, the
burden of proof shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the reason was merely a pretext
for unlawful discrimination. See id.
Wooler argues that the District Court erred in finding that she did not establish a
prima facie case of gender discrimination, because male employees were allowed to
underperform without being disciplined in the same manner. Moreover, she claims that
the supervisor who made off-color remarks about her age was never disciplined.
However, the District Court correctly found that there was no prima facie case of gender
discrimination, because Wooler failed to identify a similarly situated male who was

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1 Wooler’s claims under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act fail for the same
reasons that her Title VII and ADEA claims fail.
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treated more favorably. The record also shows that Wooler’s supervisor was, in fact,
disciplined for his remarks. Finally, Wooler’s allegation could not constitute direct
evidence of discrimination because the supervisor was not a decision-maker, and left the
bank before the audits leading to Wooler’s termination were conducted.
We therefore agree with the District Court that Wooler failed to provide any
“evidence that similarly situated males were treated differently” or any “other evidence
sufficient to give rise to an inference of discrimination” to establish a prima facie case of
gender discrimination under Title VII. App. at 11.1
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the District Court’s final order granting
Defendant Citizens Bank’s motion for summary judgment, entered on November 30,
2006.

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