Arthur L. Hairston, Sr. v. WARDEN JOHN NASH, Official Capacity, FCI Fort Dix

CLD-324 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 06-5219
________________
ARTHUR L. HAIRSTON, SR.,
Appellant
v.
WARDEN JOHN NASH, Official Capacity, FCI Fort Dix;
FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS
____________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the District of New Jersey
(D.N.J. Civ. No. 06-cv-04893)
District Judge: Honorable Jerome B. Simandle
_______________________________________
Submitted For Possible Dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or Possible Summary
Action Under Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
July 26, 2007
Before: RENDELL, SMITH AND JORDAN, CIRCUIT JUDGES
(Filed: August 23, 2007)
_______________________
OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM
Arthur L. Hairston, Sr., a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals from the

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We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review is plenary. See1
Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999).
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District Court’s dismissal of his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and
1915A(b)(1). Because the District Court’s dismissal was proper and this appeal does not
present a substantial question, we will summarily affirm. See 3d Cir. LAR 27.4; 3d Cir.
IOP 10.6.
I.
The District Court liberally construed Hairston’s complaint to assert a claim under
Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), that
defendants violated his variously-sourced constitutional right of access to the courts.
According to Hairston, his prison law library has removed the reporters containing pre-
1950 United States Supreme Court opinions. Hairston further claims that he has been
“prejudiced greatly” because he was forced to file petitions for writs of habeas corpus
without the benefit of those opinions, but does not allege how.
The District Court granted Hairston leave to proceed in forma pauperis, then
dismissed his complaint without prejudice and with leave to amend. Hairston sought to
do so, and attached one of the habeas petitions he had filed, but again failed to allege how
he had been prejudiced. Thus, by order entered December 14, 2006, the District Court
denied his motion to amend and dismissed his complaint with prejudice. We will affirm.1

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II.
In reviewing Hairston’s complaint, we accept his allegations as true, liberally
construe them in light of his pro se status, and determine whether they provide notice of a
legally-cognizable claim. See Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007). See also
Tourscher, 184 F.3d at 240 (applying Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) standard to dismissal for
failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)). We agree with the District Court that they
do not.
A claim for denial of access to the courts cannot be based solely on alleged
deficiencies with a prison library. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996).
Instead, a plaintiff must have suffered an “actual injury,” which requires a showing that
“the alleged shortcomings in the library . . . hindered his efforts to pursue a legal claim.”
Id. Moreover, the allegedly-hindered claim must be one of arguable merit; it cannot be
frivolous. See id. at 353 & n.3; Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002). These
elements must be alleged in the complaint. See Christopher, 536 U.S. at 415-16.
Hairston’s complaints, however, even liberally construed, assert nothing more than
the kind of generalized grievance with the prison law library that Lewis held inactionable.
Hairston did not allege any actual injury. He asserted in his original complaint that he
was “prejudiced greatly” because he had to file certain habeas petitions without access to
the books in question, but did not say how. He did not allege, for example, how that lack
of access prevented him from making or adequately supporting any particular argument or

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We note that Hairston filed the habeas petition in the Northern District of West2
Virginia. That court dismissed it as an unauthorized second or successive habeas petition,
see Hairston v. United States, N.D. W. Va. Civ. No. 06-cv-00123 (Dec. 21, 2006 order),
and the Fourth Circuit declined to issue a certificate of appealability, see United States v.
Hairston, 4th Cir. C. A. No. 07-6129 (May 14, 2007 op.). These decisions turned on the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, not pre-1950 authority.
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claim. He attached to his amended complaint a habeas petition, but once again did not
allege how the lack of access to the books in question “hindered his efforts” to pursue the
claims therein. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351. Moreover, our review of that petition – which
includes arguments that “all drug laws” are unconstitutional and that the District Court
that sentenced him is an unconstitutional Article IV court – does not persuade us that he
has alleged any hindrance in pursuing a nonfrivolous claim.2
In reaching this decision, we have considered a document that Hairston filed in this
Court, which he titled “motion preceding informal briefing.” Hairston argues that the
District Court, in recently dismissing another of his complaints, cited Mansfield, C. &
L.M. Ry. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379 (1884), which is reported in one of the volumes that
Hairston alleges his prison library no longer contains. The District Court also cited that
decision in its opinion dismissing without prejudice Hairston’s complaint in this case.
That fact is of no consequence here. The District Court cited Mansfield merely for the
proposition that “[f]ederal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,” a principle for which
resort to pre-1950 case law is hardly necessary. See, e.g., Bender v. Williamsport Area
Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986). Moreover, the court’s citation of Mansfield and

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recitation of this principle was not necessary to its decision. Thus, Hairston’s alleged lack
of access to Mansfield did not injure him.
Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s dismissal of Hairston’s
complaint.
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