Robert Schofield v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, ROBERT PIDICH, ROSE C. JOHNSTON, and KELLEE TINSLEY

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 06-4451
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ROBERT SCHOFIELD,
Appellant
v.
METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,
ROBERT PIDICH, ROSE C. JOHNSTON,
and KELLEE TINSLEY
Appellees
____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D. C. Civil No. 03-cv-00357)
District Judge: Honorable Thomas I. Vanaskie
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Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 25, 2007
Before: SLOVITER, CHAGARES and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges.
(Filed October 30, 2007)
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OPINION OF THE COURT
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1 The District Court previously dismissed claims against two other MetLife
employees, Defendants Rose Johnston and Kellee Tinsley, and Schofield has not
challenged their dismissal on appeal.
2 Schofield also brought claims under the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. and state common law. Those claims were
dismissed on December 16, 2003 and Schofield does not challenge their dismissal on
appeal.
2
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.
This employment discrimination case is an appeal from the District Court’s grant
of summary judgment in favor of Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (MetLife) and
one of its employees, Robert Pidich (Pidich).1 Plaintiff Robert Schofield (Schofield)
brought claims of age and disability discrimination under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq., the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA), 43
Pa. Stat. Ann. §§ 951 et seq., and the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. §
2601 et seq., complaining that he was unfairly treated upon his return from disability
leave in the winter of 2001 and that MetLife’s ultimate decision to terminate him in May
2002 was motivated by his age and disability.2
I.
“Our standard of review over the District Court’s grant of summary judgment is
plenary, and we apply the same standard that the District Court should have applied.” In
re Color Tile Inc., 475 F.3d 508, 512 (3d Cir. 2007). “Summary judgment is appropriate
when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

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together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Andreoli v.
Gates, 482 F.3d 641, 647 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (c)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, we
“must view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all
inferences in that party’s favor.” Id. (citation omitted).
II.
Because we write for the parties, we repeat only the facts essential to our decision.
MetLife operates an information technology support center in Clarks Summit,
Pennsylvania. Beginning in 1997, Schofield served as a project manager at the facility,
and was charged with supervising a team of programmers and information technology
consultants. Schofield reported directly to Pidich, who considered Schofield one of the
best project managers at the facility.
Regrettably, Schofield began suffering from severe anxiety and depression in
2001. His condition gradually worsened, and in January 2002 he was placed on disability
leave after his condition caused him to miss work through most of the previous month.
While on disability leave, Schofield attempted suicide.
Schofield returned to work at the beginning of April 2002. Shortly before his
return, Schofield spoke with Pidich, who allegedly suggested that Schofield probably
would not be reinstated as a project manager but would instead act as a consultant to an
unspecified individual who would take over his previous position. Nevertheless,

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Schofield returned as a project manager and not as a consultant. Pidich and one of
Schofield’s team members, Defendant Tinsley, agreed to cover for him in the event he
felt it necessary to leave work due to his illness, and Schofield did miss work on several
occasions. But his work performance was otherwise satisfactory and Pidich continued to
think of Schofield as one of his best project managers.
Schofield’s working relationship with Tinsley was more problematic, however.
Schofield believed that Tinsley became irritable and would often snap at him over trivial
matters. Schofield began sending Tinsley emails unrelated to work and often inquired
into Tinsley’s personal matters, suggesting on one occasion that he was concerned to see
her smoking at a colleague’s wedding. In an April 26, 2002 email, Schofield confessed to
“a very strong attachment and affection” for Tinsley and declared that Tinsley came
“second only to my wife.” Finally, in a May 2, 2002 email entitled “All or nothing,”
Schofield thanked Tinsley for her support during his illness but added that his recovery
was not complete and that “‘Option B’ is still a serious consideration.” Schofield
concluded:
I have been very open about how I have come to regard you. I would like
to know how you see me.
Sorry to put this on you but I’m sure you can understand I can’t stand not
knowing the whole picture and being able to make sense out of it. That
usually gets me in trouble but that’s the way it is.
After reading Schofield’s email, Tinsley became upset and left work. Shortly
thereafter, Tinsley contacted Rose Johnston (Johnston), a MetLife Human Resources

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Generalist, and complained about Schofield’s actions. Johnston treated Tinsley’s call as a
complaint of harassment and hostile work environment, and initiated an investigation.
Fearing for her safety, Tinsley did not return to work until after Schofield’s termination.
On May 7, 2002, Johnston and Mark Davis, another MetLife human resources
staffer, met with Schofield to discuss Tinsley’s complaint. As Schofield admits, Johnston
stated at the beginning that the meeting did not concern the possible termination of his
employment. Nevertheless, Schofield interrupted Johnston shortly after the meeting had
started, stating: “Let me save you some time. I cannot deal with this right now. I’m out
of here.” He then placed his facility security pass on the conference table and went home.
Both Johnston and Davis believed Schofield intended to resign, and Johnston began
processing his resignation the same day.
The next day Schofield contacted Johnston to discuss the situation and requested a
meeting regarding a possible return to work. Schofield, Johnston, and Pidich met shortly
thereafter. Johnston and Pidich informed Schofield that his return would be contingent on
limiting his contact with Tinsley and that this would likely require him to transfer to
another facility team. This condition was consistent with MetLife’s policy of separating
employees involved in a harassment complaint. Schofield left the meeting without
agreeing to these conditions, but later called Johnston and Pidich to request unconditional
reinstatement until Tinsley decided that she wanted to return to work. If Tinsley returned,
Schofield suggested she be placed on special assignment while he and MetLife negotiated
a retirement package. MetLife rejected Schofield’s proposal.

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III.
On September 15, 2006, the District Court granted summary judgment to
Defendants, finding that Schofield had failed to present sufficient evidence that his
position and job duties had changed following his return from disability leave or that his
leave was a factor influencing MetLife’s actions during the investigation of Tinsley’s
harassment complaint. The District Court also found that Schofield had failed to present
evidence that his voluntary resignation was an adverse employment action or that
MetLife’s actions were motivated by discriminatory animus.
Under the FMLA, an employee returning from leave is entitled “to be restored by
the employer to the position of employment held by the employee when the leave
commenced,” or to “an equivalent position with equivalent employment benefits, pay,
and other terms and conditions of employment.” 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(1). The District
Court rejected Schofield’s claim that he was not reinstated to the same or an equivalent
position, noting that he returned in April 2002 to the same project manager position with
the same duties and responsibilities. Schofield argues that the District Court overlooked
Pidich’s suggestion that Schofield would not be reinstated as a project manager, as well
as MetLife’s insistence that Schofield limit his contact with Tinsley if he wanted to be
reinstated after his apparent resignation on May 7.
Contrary to Schofield’s argument, the District Court explicitly noted Schofield’s
reliance upon his conversation with Pidich, and correctly found that mere requests, offers,
or even threats to change positions are not adverse employment actions that warrant

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recovery under the FMLA. Schofield v. Metro. Life Mut. Ins. Co., 2006 WL 2660704 at
*5 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 15, 2006) (citing Ajayi v. Aramark Bus. Servs., Inc., 336 F.3d 520, 531
(7th Cir. 2003)). The same rationale applies to MetLife’s requests that Schofield limit his
contact with Tinsley. Even if we were inclined to overlook the objective evidence that
Schofield had already resigned his position, or to find that the requested limitation on
contact with Tinsley would have constituted a sufficient change in Schofield’s job
position, MetLife’s “threats” in the context of its investigation of the Tinsley complaint
cannot serve as the premise for his claim that he was not reinstated to an equivalent
position.
Nor can MetLife’s actions during the investigation form the basis of an FMLA
retaliation claim. Schofield suggests that the manner in which MetLife investigated
Tinsley’s harassment complaint was motivated by his medical leave. We reject this
argument, and agree with the District Court that the full month between Schofield’s return
from leave and MetLife’s investigation entitles MetLife to summary judgment. To
prevail on a retaliation claim, an FMLA plaintiff must show, among other things, that the
adverse decision was causally related to taking FMLA leave. Conoshenti v. Pub. Serv.
Elec. & Gas Co., 364 F.3d 135, 146 (3d Cir. 2004). We have been reluctant to infer a
causal connection based on temporal proximity alone. See Weston v. Pennsylvania, 251
F.3d 420, 431 (3d Cir. 2001). Unless the timing is “unusually suggestive of retaliatory
motive,” we have generally required “timing plus other evidence.” See Williams v. Phila.
Hous. Auth. Police Dep’t., 380 F.3d 751, 760 (3d Cir. 2004) (internal citation omitted).

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3 Schofield makes much of an alleged statement by Pidich that the incident with
Tinsley was all Schofield’s fault “because [Schofield] was sick.” Assuming arguendo
that this statement demonstrates discriminatory animus, there is no evidence that Pidich
was involved in the decision to initiate the investigation. Moreover, Pidich’s alleged
statement does nothing to challenge the legitimate and nondiscriminatory rationale
MetLife has asserted to justify its actions.
8
Here, the month between Schofield’s return and the Tinsley investigation, during which
both Pidich and Tinsley covered for Schofield during absences necessitated by his illness,
is antithetical to conduct “unusually suggestive of retaliatory motive.” Furthermore,
Schofield has submitted no evidence to suggest that MetLife’s decision to initiate the
investigation was motivated by his disability leave,3 that MetLife did not have a
reasonable basis to treat Tinsley’s complaint seriously, or that MetLife’s policy of
separating employees involved in a harassment complaint was somehow a pretext for
discriminatory retaliation.
Schofield’s failure to persuasively challenge MetLife’s asserted justifications for
its actions in investigating the Tinsley complaint also dooms his ADA, ADEA, and
PHRA claims. To avoid summary judgment an employment discrimination plaintiff must
present sufficient evidence from which a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that the
employer’s proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons are “either a post hoc
fabrication or otherwise did not actually motivate the employment action.” Fuentes v.
Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764-65 (3d Cir. 1994). Here, Schofield makes no attempt to
undermine MetLife’s asserted justifications, and instead points to alleged remarks made
by Pidich and an out-of-state MetLife employee to the effect that MetLife was targeting

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employees over 50 years of age for termination. As the District Court observed “[s]tray
remarks . . . unrelated to the decision process are rarely given great weight, particularly if
they were made temporally remote from the date of decision.” Ezold v. Wolf, Block,
Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 545 (3d Cir. 1992). It is unclear when Pidich made
the alleged remark, and in any case the comment had virtually nothing to do with the
decision process that affected Schofield, namely an investigation of a sexual harassment
complaint that concluded with Schofield abruptly leaving the company. Likewise, the
out-of-state MetLife employee had absolutely no role in the investigation of the Tinsley
complaint. Accordingly, the District Court was plainly correct in finding that Schofield
had not met his burden under Fuentes.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of Defendants.

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