United States of America v. Reginald L. Hopkins

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 06-3866
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
REGINALD L. HOPKINS,
Appellant
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C.#1:05-cr-00391)
District Judge: Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 22, 2007
Before: FISHER, ALDISERT and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges
(Filed: October 24, 2007 )
OPINION
ALDISERT, Circuit Judge
This appeal by Reginald L. Hopkins requires us to decide whether the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania adequately articulated its

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consideration of the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) when it sentenced Hopkins to
168 months of imprisonment. On appeal, Hopkins contends that the District Court failed
to establish a record demonstrating its meaningful consideration of the § 3553(a) factors.
We will affirm.
I.
The parties are familiar with the facts and proceedings before the District Court, so
we will revisit them only briefly. On April 18, 2006, Hopkins pleaded guilty to Count VII
of a superceding indictment charging him with possession with intent to distribute
cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The plea agreement concerned charges
that arose as a result of Hopkins’s possession of drugs and firearms on three different
occasions within a five month period.
On September 21, 2004, Hopkins was stopped by police officers in Highspire,
Pennsylvania for a traffic violation. During the stop, officers learned that Hopkins’s
driver’s license had been suspended and that Hopkins had an outstanding warrant for his
arrest. Officers arrested Hopkins and found in his vehicle 1.8 grams of crack cocaine, 4.4
grams of marijuana, a fully loaded nine millimeter handgun, additional ammunition for
the gun, and $268.00 in cash.
On October 1, 2004, a member of the Dauphin County Drug Task Force, who was
aware of Hopkins’s suspended driving privileges, observed Hopkins driving in
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. The officer followed Hopkins to a convenience store, but

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Hopkins fled on foot when the officer approached him and escaped. Officers executed a
search warrant on Hopkins’s vehicle and recovered 4.7 grams of crack cocaine, a small
amount of marijuana, and a loaded semi-automatic pistol with the serial number scratched
off.
On February 10, 2005, members of the United States Marshals Fugitive Task
Force and the Harrisburg Police Department observed Hopkins drive to an apartment
building. When Hopkins exited his vehicle, the officers approached him and attempted to
arrest him on several outstanding warrants. Hopkins fled the officers on foot but was
eventually captured with the help of a police K-9 unit. Officers found Hopkins in
possession of a total of 2.3 grams of crack cocaine individually packaged for sale and
$441.00 in cash. In addition, a search of his vehicle recovered a loaded nine millimeter
semi-automatic handgun and a small amount of marijuana.
Pursuant to the written plea agreement, Hopkins admitted that he possessed crack
cocaine with the intent to distribute on all three occasions, and the government agreed to
recommend that Hopkins receive a two-level reduction in offense level for acceptance of
responsibility, if warranted. At the plea colloquy, Hopkins admitted to the facts presented
by the prosecutor. At sentencing, the District Court adopted the Presentence Investigation
Report, which included in its calculation of Hopkins’s sentence the two-level reduction in
offense level for acceptance of responsibility, and sentenced Hopkins to the minimum
sentence provided by the advisory Sentencing Guidelines, 168 months of imprisonment.

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II.
Generally, “a court of appeals gives deference to a district court’s sentencing
determinations and thus reviews sentences on an abuse of discretion basis.” United States
v. Lloyd, 469 F.3d 319, 321 (3d Cir. 2006). When a defendant fails to raise an objection
to the sentence before the district court, however, our review of the sentence is for plain
error. Id. (“Nevertheless, insofar as [the defendant] is advancing contentions that he did
not preserve in the district court, our review is confined by the exacting plain error
standards.”). Before us, Hopkins complains that the District Court failed to perform a
meaningful consideration of the § 3553(a) factors when it sentenced him. Because his
argument made to this Court was not raised before the District Court, see app. 63-68, we
will review it for plain error.
To succeed under the plain error standard, Hopkins bears the burden of showing
that: “(1) an error was committed; (2) the error was plain, that is, clear and obvious; and
(3) the error affected the defendant’s substantial rights[,] . . . [and][i]n cases where the
first three elements are satisfied, an appellate court may exercise its discretion to order
such a correction only if the error[] seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Dixon, 308 F.3d 229, 234 (3d Cir.
2002) (citations and quotations omitted). An error affects substantial rights if the error
was prejudicial to the defendant and “affected the outcome of the district court
proceedings.” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993).

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Section 3553(a) provides:1
(a) Factors to be considered in imposing a sentence. – The court shall
impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to
comply with the purposes set forth in paragraph (2) of this
subsection. The court, in determining the particular sentence to be
imposed, shall consider –
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the
history and characteristics of the defendant;
(2) the need for the sentence imposed –
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to
promote respect for the law, and to provide just
punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal
conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the
defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed
educational or vocational training, medical care,
or other correctional treatment in the most
effective manner;
(3) the kinds of sentences available;
(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range
established for –
(A) the applicable category of offense committed by
the applicable category of defendant as set forth
in the guidelines –
(i) issued by the Sentencing Commission
pursuant to section 994(a)(1) of title 28,
United States Code, subject to any
amendments made to such guidelines by
act of Congress (regardless of whether
such amendments have yet to be
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III.
Hopkins contends that the District Court erred by failing to meaningfully consider
the factors relevant to sentencing, as articulated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), when it1

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incorporated by the Sentencing
Commission into amendments issued
under section 994(p) of title 28); and
(ii) that, except as provided in section
3742(g), are in effect on the date the
defendant is sentenced; or
(B) in the case of a violation of probation or
supervised release, the applicable guidelines or
policy statements issued by the Sentencing
Commission pursuant to section 994(a)(3) of
title 28, United States Code, taking into account
any amendments made to such guideline or
policy statements by act of Congress (regardless
of whether such amendments have yet to be
incorporated by the Sentencing Commission
into amendments issued under section 994(p) of
title 28);
(5) any pertinent policy statement –
(A) issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant
to section 994(a)(2) of title 28, United States
Code, subject to any amendments made to such
policy statement by act of Congress (regardless
of whether such amendments have yet to be
incorporated by the Sentencing Commission
into amendments issued under section 994(p) of
title 28); and
(B) that, except as provided in section 3742(g), is in
effect on the date the defendant is sentenced.
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities
among defendants with similar records who have been
found guilty of similar conduct; and
(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the
offense.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
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sentenced him to 168 months of imprisonment. This Court has previously considered a
similar claim of failure to consider the appropriate § 3553(a) factors, and the legal precept

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applicable to Hopkins’s claim is settled. In United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324 (3d Cir.
2006), we stated:
The record must demonstrate that the court gave meaningful
consideration to the § 3553(a) factors. The court need not
discuss every argument made by a litigant if an argument is
clearly without merit. Nor must a court discuss and make
findings as to each of the § 3553(a) factors if the record
makes clear the court took the factors into account in
sentencing.
Id. at 329 (internal citations omitted). Nothing in the teachings of United States v.
Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), or elsewhere requires a district court to state on the record
that it has explicitly considered each of the § 3553(a) factors or to explicitly record its
consideration of each factor. Cooper, 437 F.3d at 329.
At sentencing, the District Court provided the following statement regarding its
reasons for imposing a sentence of 168 months of imprisonment:
The sentence is within an advisory range that is greater than
24 months, and the specific sentence is imposed for these
reasons: A sentence at the end will provide an adequate
penalty and deterrence.
The Court further makes the additional findings as
follows: Defendant is a career offender and has been involved
with the law since age 17. His prior offenses included drug
distribution. His current offenses included drug offenses and
weapons. Prior periods of incarceration and supervision have
not deterred the defendant from unlawful activity. The Court
has taken into account and considered his unfortunate
childhood environment involving a dysfunctional family, drug
abuse by family members, and lack of parenting. However,
defendant has benefited greatly by the plea agreement. This
consideration, along with a sentence at the low end of the

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Guidelines[,] adequately addresses the considerations of 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a).
App. 66-67. This statement explicitly addressed several of the § 3553(a) factors,
including “the nature and circumstances of the offense,” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1); “the
history and characteristics of the defendant,” id.; “the need for the sentence imposed to
reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just
punishment,” id. § 3553(a)(2)(A); “the need for the sentence imposed . . . to afford
adequate deterrence to criminal conduct,” id. § 3553(a)(2)(B); and “the . . . sentencing
range established for the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable
category of defendant as set forth in the guidelines issued by the Sentencing Commission
. . . ,” id. § 3553(a)(4)(A)(i).
Because our standard of review is plain error, the fact that the District Court “did
not give a fuller explanation certainly could not rise to the level of plain error or, indeed,
any error at all.” Lloyd, 469 F.3d at 325-326. Even though the District Court did not
explicitly address each § 3553(a) factor, it established a record demonstrating its
meaningful consideration of them. We are satisfied that the District Court properly
considered the § 3553(a) factors and thus conclude that the District Court did not err
when it sentenced Hopkins to 168 months of imprisonment.
* * * * *
We have considered all contentions presented by the parties and conclude that no
additional discussion is necessary.

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The judgment of the District Court will be affirmed.

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