United States of America v. Carlos Cuellar

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 06-3631
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
CARLOS CUELLAR,
Appellant.
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. No. 06-cr-0092)
District Judge: Honorable Stanley R. Chesler
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Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 15, 2008
Before: SLOVITER, JORDAN, and ALARCON*, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: April 16, 2008 )
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OPINION OF THE COURT
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*Honorable Arthur L. Alarcon, Senior Circuit Judge of the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals sitting by designation.

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JORDAN, Circuit Judge.
I. Background
Carlos Cuellar pled guilty to a one-count information that charged him with
conspiring to launder in excess of $1,000,000 in proceeds of illegal narcotics activity, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h). The District Court subsequently held a sentencing
hearing at which it resolved disputes concerning the application of the United States
Sentencing Guidelines in the case. Cuellar sought a two-level downward adjustment to
his Guidelines offense level based on what he argued was his minor role in the offense.
The Court, however, took a decidedly different view of his role and denied the
application, saying,
This man is in the core of the money laundering operation. He’s the key
focal point, the funnel through which the money goes ... . He and his
brother are both getting one percent of the proceeds ..., which is not chump
change. In short, by no standard is Mr. Cuellar’s role in this minor.
(App. at 110.)
The District Court sentenced Cuellar to 98 months imprisonment, three years of
supervised release, a fine of $5,000, and a $100 special assessment. The prison time was
essentially in the middle of the advisory Guideline range of 87 months to 108 months to
which Cuellar was exposed because of his criminal history score and offense level.
Cuellar timely filed this appeal, challenging the District Court’s refusal to categorize him
as having played a minor role in the money laundering conspiracy. We will affirm.

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1The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231; we exercise
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742.
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II. Discussion1
Section 3B1.2 of the Guidelines states that, “[i]f the defendant was a minor
participant in any criminal activity,” then the sentencing court should “decrease [the
applicable offense level] by 2 levels.” Whether a defendant was a minor participant in the
offense of conviction is a fact specific inquiry as to which district courts are permitted
broad discretion. United States v. Rodriguez, 342 F.3d 296, 300 n. 5 (3d Cir. 2003).
Nevertheless, we review the sentencing court’s conclusion under a mixed standard of
review. “We exercise plenary review where the district court's denial of a downward
adjustment is based primarily on a legal interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines.
However, where the district court's decision rests on factual determinations, we review
for clear error.” United States v. Isaza-Zapata, 148 F.3d 236, 237 (3d Cir. 1998) (internal
citations omitted).
In this case, there is no significant dispute over what Cuellar did. The argument is
over how to apply the Guidelines to the undisputed facts. We therefore disagree with the
government’s assertion that the applicable standard of review in this case is for clear
error. Instead, we exercise plenary review, though we continue to acknowledge the
discretion properly afforded the District Court in deciding what may and may not fairly be
characterized as “minor.” Id. at 238 (“The district courts are allowed broad discretion in

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applying this section [,i.e., § 3B1.2], and their rulings are left largely undisturbed by the
courts of appeal.”).
No matter how searching the standard of review, we see no error in the sentencing
decision. Indeed, we agree with the District Court’s observation that Cuellar held a
uniquely important position in the conspiracy and was well-paid for it. His role cannot
fairly be called “minor,” as that term is used in the Guidelines.
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgement of conviction and sentence.

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