Allstate Indemnity Company v. Dennis J. Coroniti

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
Nos. 06-3051, 06-3052, 06-3053
ALLSTATE INDEMNITY COMPANY
v.
DENNIS J. CORONITI,
Appellant
_____
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 04-cv-00808)
District Judge: Honorable A. Richard Caputo
Argued October 24, 2007
Before: SLOVITER, CHAGARES, and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges
JUDGMENT ORDER
The insured, Dennis Coroniti, purchased automobile insurance from Allstate
Indemnity Company (“Allstate”) pursuant to a policy that provided liability and
underinsured motorist coverage (“UIM”) for two automobiles owned by Coroniti, a 1988
Chevrolet Suburban and a 1981 Chevrolet Van, with limits of $100,000 per person for

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each car. Coroniti was injured and, because of the stacking provisions of Pennsylvania
law, Allstate offered to pay him $200,000 under the policy. Coroniti also owned a 1970
GMC and a 1976 Chevrolet Van G30 that were not in use. Coroniti claimed that he is
also entitled to stack the $100,000 UIM coverage under the aforesaid policy on behalf of
each of these unused vehicles, and made a claim on Allstate for $400,000. The District
Court granted summary judgment for Allstate.
Because it is undisputed that Coroniti did not intend to drive or otherwise use these
two vehicles, the coverage pages of the policy stated that there was “suspended coverage”
for each one and stated that the premiums for the liability insurance on these vehicles
were suspended. The only coverage listed for each of these vehicles was auto
comprehensive insurance, with the annual premium listed of $22 for the 1970 GMC and
$27 for the 1976 Chevrolet.
The District Court reasoned that the policy was ambiguous and therefore it
proceeded to examine extrinsic evidence from which it concluded that it was “clear that
the parties did not intend to provide UIM coverage” for the 1970 GMC and the 1976
Chevrolet. Coroniti has appealed claiming that the District Court erred in granting
Allstate’s motion for summary judgment and denying his motion for summary judgment,
and that the District Court erred in considering extrinsic evidence.
The law of this circuit is clear that when the written contract is clear and
unequivocal, there is no need to resort to extrinsic evidence. See Bohler-Uddeholm Am.,
Inc. v. Ellwood Group, Inc., 247 F.3d 79, 92 (3d Cir. 2001). On the other hand, our cases

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have permitted consideration of extrinsic evidence in order to determine whether the
ambiguity can be resolved. See Sikirica v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 214, 220 (3d
Cir. 2005); Pacific Indem. Co. v. Linn, 766 F.2d 754, 761 (3d Cir. 1985). We see no
error in the District Court’s determination with respect to the ambiguity in the insurance
contract at issue here and its examination of extrinsic evidence. The extrinsic evidence to
which the District Court referred demonstrates that Coroniti sought comprehensive
coverage only.
Coroniti argues that § 1731 of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial
Responsibility Law (“MVFRL”) is applicable here. Section 1731 provides that no motor
vehicle liability insurance policy shall be issued unless UIM coverage is offered in an
amount equal to the limit for bodily injury. However, the Pennsylvania Superior Court in
Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Calhoun, 635 A.2d 643, 647 (Pa. Super Ct. 1993), held that § 1731
is “as a matter of law, inapplicable to a policy providing for comprehensive coverage
only,” as such a policy is not a “motor vehicle liability insurance policy.” Therefore, the
District Court did not err in rejecting Coroniti’s MVFRL claim.
Because summary judgment was appropriately entered by the District Court, there
is no support for Coroniti’s argument that the District Court deprived him of his
constitutional right to a jury trial. Coroniti also argues that the District Court erred in
entering judgment in favor of Allstate on his claims of estoppel, laches, and unclean
hands. We have reviewed the briefs filed by the parties, heard oral argument on this
matter, and conclude that, essentially for the reasons set forth by the District Court, its

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judgment will be affirmed.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Dolores K. Sloviter
Circuit Judge
Dated: October 25, 2007

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