Joseph Thorn v. JOSEPH SMITH, Individually

CLD-42
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 06-3049
________________
JOSEPH THORN,
Appellant
v.
JOSEPH SMITH, Individually and in his capacity as Warden/USP
Lewisburg; US BUREAU OF PRISONS;
TROY WILLIAMSON; DAVE MOFFAT;
WARDEN D. SCOTT DODRILL; HARLEY G. LAPPIN
______________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 06-cv-0016 )
District Judge: Honorable James F. McClure, Jr.
________________________
Submitted For Possible Dismissal Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
November 9, 2006
Before: RENDELL, SMITH and COWEN, Circuit Judges
(Filed December 7, 2006)
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OPINION OF THE COURT
______________
PER CURIAM
Joseph Thorn appeals from an order of the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Pennsylvania denying his motion for preliminary injunctive relief in his

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civil rights action.
Thorn’s amended complaint sought injunctive relief to alleviate crowded housing
conditions at the Federal Prison Camp in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania and to block a planned
expansion to house additional inmates, which he asserted violated his rights under the
Eighth Amendment. Thorn also sought a temporary restraining order and a preliminary
injunction ordering prison officials to stop the planned expansion to house additional
inmates. On March 7, 2006, the District Court denied Thorn’s request for a temporary
restraining order. Thereafter, on May 23, 2006, the District Court, without conducting a
hearing, denied Thorn’s request for a preliminary injunction.
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). Because
Thorn has been granted in forma pauperis status pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, we review
this appeal for possible dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). An appeal may
be dismissed if it has no arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,
325 (1989).
A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy that should be granted only if:
(1) the plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) denial will result in irreparable harm
to the plaintiff; (3) granting the injunction will not result in irreparable harm to the
defendant; and (4) granting the injunction is in the public interest. See e.g., NutraSweet
Co. v. Vit-Mar Enterprises, Inc., 176 F.3d 151, 153 (3d Cir. 1999). A plaintiff’s failure to
establish any element in his favor renders a preliminary injunction inappropriate. See id.

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Furthermore, a request for injunctive relief in the prison context must be viewed with
great caution because of the intractable problems of prison administration. See Goff v.
Harper, 60 F.3d 518, 520 (8th Cir. 1995).
The District Court concluded that Thorn could not show that he would suffer
irreparable harm absent issuance of the injunction. We agree. To show irreparable harm,
a plaintiff must demonstrate a clear showing of immediate, irreparable injury; an
injunction may not be used to eliminate the possibility of a remote future injury. See
Acierno v. New Castle County, 40 F.3d 645, 653 (3d Cir. 1994). Although Thorn alleges
that he is suffering irreparable physical and emotion harm, he fails to articulate any actual
irreparable harm that he would suffer absent issuance of the injunction. Furthermore, the
issuance of an injunction would be against the public interest. An injunction would
impose a serious financial and administrative hardship on the federal prison system
because it would require the reassignment of a large number of inmates to different
facilities. Accordingly, Thorn has not established the elements necessary for the issuance
of a preliminary injunction.
For the foregoing reasons, we will dismiss this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B).

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