Xiao Feng Lin v. Attorney General of the United States

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 06-2944
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XIAO FENG LIN,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
Respondent
____________
On Petition for Review from an
Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
(Board No. A79 425 066)
Immigration Judge: Donald Vincent Ferlise
____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
September 27, 2007
Before: McKEE, BARRY and FISHER, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: October 5, 2007)
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OPINION OF THE COURT
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FISHER, Circuit Judge.
Xiao Feng Lin petitions for review of a final order of removal of the Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), affirming the decision of an immigration judge (“IJ”),

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which denied her requests for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1)
and, for the reasons that follow, will deny the petition.
I.
Because we write only for the parties, who are familiar with this case, we will
forgo a lengthy recitation of the facts. Lin, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic
of China, attempted to enter the United States at the Miami International Airport without
valid documentation on November 11, 2001. She was detained and questioned by airport
officials, at which time she expressed a fear of returning to China and requested asylum.
She subsequently applied for withholding of removal and CAT relief. The Department of
Homeland Security referred Lin’s application to the immigration court and commenced
removal proceedings against her.
At an immigration hearing held on February 9, 2005, Lin testified that a local
village official in China, from whom her father had borrowed money he was unable to
repay, had attempted to coerce her into a marriage with his son in exchange for relief
from the debt. Lin stated that, on at least two occasions, the village official came to her
family’s house and demanded that the money he had lent to Lin’s father be repaid. On
one occasion, Lin testified, the village official threatened to have the family arrested if the
father did not repay the debt in one week. On another occasion, the official returned with
three men and broke all the windows in their house and stole various items. After this
latter incident, the official returned and told Lin that if she married his son, the money

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would not have to be repaid. Lin departed China on October 6, 2000, after paying
smugglers $60,000.
In an oral decision, the IJ noted several internal inconsistencies in Lin’s testimony,
as well as inconsistencies between her testimony and her documentary evidence.
Moreover, the IJ pointed to material omissions in Lin’s asylum application. Based on
these inconsistencies and omissions, the IJ concluded that Lin had failed to provide
credible testimony or evidence in support of her asylum claim. Furthermore, the IJ
concluded that Lin had filed a frivolous asylum claim. Alternatively, the IJ found that
even if Lin’s testimony had been deemed credible, she was nevertheless unable to
demonstrate past persecution, and there was insufficient evidence to establish that she
would be harmed if returned to China. Consequently, the IJ denied Lin’s application for
asylum and withholding of removal. The IJ also denied Lin’s request for relief under the
CAT, finding that she had failed to establish that it was more likely than not she would be
subjected to torture if returned to China. Accordingly, the IJ ordered Lin removed to
China.
On May 17, 2006, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision, including his adverse
credibility determinations. The BIA, however, did not agree that Lin had filed a frivolous
asylum application, and overruled the IJ’s decision with regard to that determination. As
alternative bases for dismissing the appeal, the BIA stated that Lin had failed to establish
that she was a member of a protected social group for purposes of her asylum claim, and
that she had failed to establish that the government official was acting within his official

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capacity. Accordingly, Lin’s appeal was dismissed and she filed a timely petition for
review with our Court. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1).
II.
An applicant for asylum has the burden of proving his or her eligibility for asylum.
Abdille v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477, 482 (3d Cir. 2001). Under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158 and
1101(a)(42)(A), an individual is eligible for asylum only if she demonstrates persecution
in the past or a well-founded fear of future persecution on the basis of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. See
Balasubramanrim v. INS, 143 F.3d 157, 164-65 (3d Cir. 1998). The alien must show by
credible, direct, and specific evidence an objectively reasonable basis for the claimed fear
of persecution. Id. at 165. In this case, the IJ determined that Lin’s testimony was not
credible, and the BIA relied, on part, on the IJ’s adverse credibility determinations in
affirming. Where the BIA has relied in its opinion on an IJ’s adverse credibility analysis,
we may review both opinions. Fiadjoe v. Att’y Gen., 411 F.3d 135, 152-53 (3d Cir.
2005). We review the findings of the BIA and IJ, including adverse credibility
determinations, under the substantial evidence standard. Chen v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 215,
222 (3d Cir. 2004). The scope of review under this standard is narrow, and “we must
uphold the credibility determination of the BIA or IJ unless ‘any reasonable adjudicator
would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.’” Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(b)(4)(B)). We defer to the IJ’s adverse credibility determinations so long as they

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1In addition, we agree with the BIA that even if Lin’s testimony were deemed
credible, she has failed to establish that she is a member of a distinctive social group
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are “supported by specific cogent reasons.” Gao v. Ashcroft, 299 F.3d 266, 276 (3d Cir.
2002).
The IJ’s credibility determinations in this case were supported by specific and
cogent reasons and the denial of asylum was therefore supported by substantial evidence.
The IJ noted that despite Lin’s testimony that she feared returning to China because of the
possibility of a coerced marriage, there was no mention of the alleged coerced marriage in
her asylum application. To this end, the IJ observed that Lin made no mention, in her
airport interview with immigration officers, of the coerced marriage. In addition, the IJ
reasonably questioned why Lin would not move away from her village to another part of
China, rather than travel all the way to the United States, to escape the alleged
persecution of her village official. With regard to documentation, the IJ observed that a
certificate provided by Lin as evidence indicated that Lin herself had borrowed money
from the village official, contradicting her testimony that only her father had borrowed
money, and the certificate made no mention of a loan to her father. Finally, the IJ
reasonably questioned why Lin did not pay her father’s alleged debt back with the
$60,000 she had obtained to pay smugglers, thereby avoiding any coerced marriage or
future harm. In light of these numerous material inconsistencies and omissions, the IJ and
BIA reasonably determined that Lin had not provided credible testimony. Accordingly,
Lin’s request for asylum was properly denied. 1

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protected by the asylum statute. Lin has maintained that she is a member of a particular
social group of “young women threatened with imprisonment for failing to oblige the
demands of a government official to marry his relations.” This description fails to
establish a distinctive social group. See Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 172 (3d Cir.
2003) (“Under the [asylum] statute a ‘particular social group’ must exist independently of
the persecution suffered by the applicant for asylum.”).
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For these same reasons, we hold that substantial evidence supports the denial of
Lin’s application for withholding of removal and relief under the CAT. See INS v. Stevic,
467 U.S. 407, 413 (1984) (explaining that to qualify for withholding of removal, an
applicant must present credible testimony or evidence demonstrating a “clear probability”
of persecution if removed); Obale v. Att’y Gen., 453 F.3d 151, 161 (3d Cir. 2006)
(observing that to qualify for protection under the CAT an applicant must show by
credible testimony or evidence that it is more likely than not that she will be tortured if
removed).
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition.

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