Diana Smith v. Department of Human Services

CPS-309 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 06-2912
________________
DIANA SMITH,
Appellant,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES; ZAKIA
MOORE; TREVOR HANNIFORD; ERIN MURPHY
DACAU-MARNI GANGEL; RACHEL HOLTZMAN;
DONNA HOLLAND; SARAH MUNYAN
____________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 06-mc-000075)
District Judge: Honorable James T. Giles
_______________________________________
Submitted For Possible Dismissal Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
August 17, 2006
Before: BARRY, SMITH AND NYGAARD, CIRCUIT JUDGES
(Filed: August 30, 2006 )
_______________________
OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM
Diana Smith appeals from the order of the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania dismissing her miscellaneous action for lack of

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1 See District of Columbia Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v.
Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923).
2
jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.1
In the District Court, Diana Smith filed a “motion for extension of time on appeal
from the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania...,” claiming that, although she had begun
preparing her appeal from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s dismissal of her application
for extraordinary relief, changes in her health condition limited her ability to work on it.
The motion claims that in 2002, the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas adjudicated her
son “dependent” under Pennsylvania law and took him into state custody based on
allegations that she had sexually abused him, allegations that Smith says are unfounded.
When DHS filed a petition for involuntary termination, Smith filed an “application for
extraordinary relief” in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in response. She challenges the
state court’s decision in November 2005, granting DHS’s petition and terminating her
parental rights. She contests the evidence presented at the hearing on termination of her
parental rights and claims that the judge denied her request to present certain evidence.
She contests court orders connected with these proceedings such as the court’s directive
that she obtain counseling, attend parenting classes, and participate in drug and alcohol
treatment. She seeks reversal of the state court order terminating her parental rights, an
order granting unsupervised visitation with her son, and an order mandating her son’s
immediate return to her custody and termination of the state’s case.
The DHS filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

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12(b)(1) and (b)(6). The District Court subsequently denied Smith’s motion for extension
of time based upon the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Smith timely appealed, stating in part
that she was informed that “in order to appeal the Supreme Court dismissal of my
application for extraordinary relief, I must first file with the United States District
Court...”
We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Smith has been
granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal. As discussed further below, we
will dismiss this appeal pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B). See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d
220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).
In Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005), the
Supreme Court clarified the scope of Rooker-Feldman and made clear that courts have
applied it beyond its appropriate boundaries. See Turner v. Crawford Square Apartments
III, L.P., 449 F.3d 542, 547 (3d Cir. 2006). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprives a
District Court of subject matter jurisdiction only in “cases brought by state-court losers
complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court
proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those
judgments.” Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284.
In her motion and her notice of appeal, Smith explicitly states that she is appealing
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s dismissal of her application for extraordinary relief.
The claims contained in her motion allege injuries from erroneous state court judgments
and seek reversal or modification of those state court judgments. Smith’s miscellaneous

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action is the classic case described in Exxon Mobil, of a plaintiff “complaining of injuries
caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings
commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Id.
Smith’s miscellaneous action thus is barred by Rooker-Feldman.
Because Smith’s appeal is entirely lacking in merit, we will dismiss it under §
1915(e)(2)(B). Smith’s motions for transcripts, for expedited appeal, and for injunctive
relief are denied.

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