Leopold Jecrois, Jr. v. Attorney General of the Untied States

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 06-2716
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LEOPOLD JECROIS, JR.,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE
UNTIED STATES,
Respondent
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Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(No. A77-023-889)
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Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
July 13, 2007
Before: RENDELL, AMBRO, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: July 23, 2007)
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OPINION OF THE COURT
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NYGAARD, Circuit Judge.
Leopold Jecrois, a citizen of Haiti, petitions for review of a final order of
removal, entered May 9, 2006, denying his motion to reopen based on changed country
conditions. We review a final order of the BIA denying a motion to reopen for abuse of
discretion. Mahmoud v. Gonzales, 427 F.3d 248, 250 (3d Cir. 2005). Under this
standard, the BIA’s decision will be reversed only if it is arbitrary, irrational or contrary
to law. Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 175 (3d Cir. 2002). We conclude that the
BIA acted within its discretion.
Jecrois entered the United States using a genuine Haitian passport.
However, his passport contained fraudulent temporary I-511 stamps, which are placed in
an alien’s passport to indicate he or she has lawful permanent residence status in the
United States. Jecrois was charged with removability as an alien who had by fraud or
willful misrepresentation sought to procure admission into the United States and as an
alien who was not in possession of a valid entry document. Through counsel, Jecrois
admitted the second charge, but contested the first. He filed an application for asylum
and withholding of removal on the basis of his brother’s membership in a Haitian literacy
organization, the “OAPD.” Jecrois was not a member of this organization, but attended
its meetings with his brother and helped the group by distributing promotional materials.

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During a meeting of this group in October of 1999, while Jecrois was in
attendance, his uncle was beaten to death and his brother was abducted, never to be seen
or heard from since. Another group, the Christian Democratic Party (PDCH), was
responsible for the disruption and attacks. Jecrois stated that he believed the PDCH was
also formed to promote literacy and viewed the OAPD as a rival political faction.
Following this meeting, Jecrois hid and later paid someone for the false I-511 stamps.
The IJ was unconvinced that the PDCH was a political party that operates
throughout Haiti; that exerts influence over the government; or that has a potential to rise
to such a position in the future. Finally, because Jecrois did not meet the burden of proof
for asylum, the IJ held that Jecrois could not meet the higher burden of proof for
withholding of removal or protection under the Convention Against Torture and that, in
any event, Jecrois had failed to introduce any evidence regarding any fear of torture.
The BIA affirmed the IJ’s order of removal in January of 2003, finding no
error in the IJ’s conclusion that Jecrois failed to meet his burden of proving past
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution. The BIA also affirmed the IJ’s
determination that Jecrois was not entitled to withholding of removal or protection under
the CAT. Jecrois did not seek further review of the BIA’s decision and the merits of its
determination are not before us.
More than three years later, Jecrois filed a motion to reopen the proceedings
based on changed circumstances. The BIA is obliged not to grant a motion to reopen in
immigration proceedings “unless it appears . . . that evidence sought to be offered is

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material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the
former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). Thus, we are presented with the narrow
question of whether the BIA abused its discretion in not reopening Jecrois’ proceedings in
light of material, newly available evidence he presented on “changed conditions” in Haiti.
We are satisfied that the record considered as a whole supports the BIA’s refusal to
permit a reopening of Jecrois’ proceedings was not an abuse of its discretion.
As an initial matter, the BIA correctly found that Jecrois’ motion to reopen
was untimely. Because the BIA issued its final administrative decision affirming the IJ’s
denial of Jecrois’ application on January 9, 2003, he had to file his motion to reopen
within 90 days of that date. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Because Jecrois did not file his
motion until April 11, 2006, the motion was untimely. Jecrois contends that the exception
to the filing requirements applies here because his proffered evidence was previously
unavailable and establishes changed conditions in Haiti.
In his petition to reopen based on changed country conditions, Jecrois
submitted two pieces of information that post-date the IJ’s and the BIA’s adverse
decision, i.e., materials that were “not available and could not have been discovered or
presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). Jecrois attached a June 2,
2005 Congressional Research Services Report for Congress entitled “Haiti:
Developments and U.S. Policy Since 1991 and Current Congressional Concerns.” This
report contained no mention of the PDCH and did not provide any information about the
persecution of OAPD members by the PDCH. Additionally, Jecrois attached the Country

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Report on Human Rights Practices for 2004, as published by the Bureau of Democracy,
Human Rights and Labor (United States Department of State). This report indicated that
Haiti’s human rights record remained “poor” but did not mention any activities of the
PDCH or the OAPD. The BIA found this evidence unconvincing. Neither of the reports
Jecrois submitted with his motion to reopen indicated that members of the OAPD are now
facing persecution from the Haitian government or from the PDCH on a countrywide
basis.
The BIA specifically determined that “this evidence does not demonstrate
that the changed conditions in Haiti have materially impacted the respondent’s specific
claim which was based on his fear of a small opposition party in Haiti, the PDCH.” The
BIA’s decision denying Jecrois’ motion to reopen sets forth a proper and sufficient basis
for review because the BIA considered the issues raised and announced its decision in
terms sufficient for meaningful review.
Accordingly, none of the proffered evidence established material changed
circumstances in Haiti after Jecrois’ asylum hearing and therefore Jecrois failed to satisfy
the exception to the timely filing requirement. Thus, we conclude that the BIA did not
abuse its discretion by denying the motion to reopen the proceedings.
Petition denied.

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