06-3414 Michael Kirlew v. Attorney General of the United States

Honorable Cynthia M. Rufe, United States District Judge for the Eastern District*
of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
Nos. 06-2670, 06-3414
___________
MICHAEL KIRLEW,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES
Respondent
___________
On Review of a Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Agency No. A30 093 662
Immigration Judge: Grace A. Sease
___________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
January 14, 2008
Before: FUENTES, JORDAN, Circuit Judges, and RUFE, District Judge.*
(Opinion Filed: February 27, 2008)

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OPINION OF THE COURT
FUENTES, Circuit Judge:
Michael Kirlew (“Kirlew”) petitions for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals
(“BIA”) decision affirming an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) final order of removal, as well
as the BIA’s refusal to reopen proceedings. For the following reasons, we will deny the
petitions.
I.
Because we write for the parties’ benefit, we will recite only those facts necessary
to decide this matter. Kirlew is a 41 year old native and citizen of Jamaica who entered
the United States on September 11, 1973. In 2005, the Department of Homeland Security
(“DHS”) issued two notices alleging that Kirlew was removable for having been
convicted of the following crimes: (1) carrying a firearm without a license in violation of
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6106(a)(2) (the “Firearms Conviction”); (2) criminal conspiracy to
deliver a controlled substance in violation of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 903 (the “Conspiracy
Conviction”); and (3) possession of marijuana (the “Marijuana Conviction”). The DHS
alleged that these convictions rendered him removable from the United States as an alien
convicted of two aggravated felonies, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), § 1101(a)(43)(B) &
(U), as an alien convicted of a firearms offense, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(C), and as an alien
convicted of a controlled substance offense, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).

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Kirlew appeared before an IJ and conceded these convictions. He then obtained
new counsel and filed a series of motions. First, he filed a motion asking the IJ to release
him on bond. The IJ denied this motion, finding sufficient evidence in the record of
Kirlew’s criminal convictions. Kirlew then filed a motion to withdraw his earlier
admissions, claiming the DHS had insufficient proof of his convictions. The IJ also
denied this motion, holding that the DHS met its burden of presenting clear and
convincing evidence of Kirlew’s removability.
Kirlew then filed a motion asking the IJ to recuse herself from this matter. He
claimed that the IJ’s decision denying bond, her failure to permit him to withdraw his
earlier admissions, and her overall attitude during the proceedings evidenced her bias. In
a written opinion, the IJ denied this request. The IJ then issued an oral decision finding
Kirlew removable and ordering him removed to Jamaica.
Kirlew appealed the IJ’s decisions to the BIA, which affirmed. The BIA found
that Kirlew’s removability was based on “abundant conviction records produced by the
DHS....” (Administrative Record (“A.R.”) 23.) The BIA also held that Kirlew did not
demonstrate sufficient good cause to withdraw his concessions of removability.
Furthermore, the BIA held that Kirlew’s motion for recusal was “unsupported by the
record.” (A.R. 3.) Kirlew then petitioned this Court for review.
While his petition was pending, Kirlew moved before the BIA to reopen his
proceedings and reconsider its decision, which the BIA denied. Kirlew then filed a

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second petition with us seeking review of the BIA’s denial of this motion. We
consolidated both petitions for review.
II.
We have jurisdiction to review a final order of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1252.
The BIA’s factual findings are reviewed for substantial evidence, 8 U.S.C. §
1252(b)(4)(B), and its legal determinations are reviewed de novo, Wang v. Ashcroft, 368
F.3d 347, 349 (3d Cir. 2004). Furthermore, we will review the BIA’s denial of Kirlew’s
motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. Borges v. Gonzales, 402 F.3d 398, 404 (3d Cir.
2005). Under the abuse of discretion standard, the BIA’s decision will be reversed if it is
arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law. Fadiga v. AG of the United States, 488 F.3d 142,
153 (3d Cir. 2007).
III.
Kirlew first argues that the evidence establishing the Conspiracy Conviction
violates the requirement of Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 286 (1966), that removal orders
be based on “clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence.” We disagree. The record
contains an Order from the Court of Common Pleas, Lancaster County, recording that
Kirlew was convicted of criminal conspiracy (A.R. 231), which is supported by the NCIC
printout (A.R. 220), the Criminal Information listing the charge (A.R. 232-33), his written
guilty plea to this offense (A.R. 234-36), as well as the Complaint and Affidavit of
probable Cause relating to this offense (A.R. 237-38). Furthermore, each of these

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Kirlew also raises a sufficiency of evidence argument regarding the Marijuana1
Conviction, which he claims was later vacated on May 11, 2006. Since Kirlew raised this
argument in his motion to reopen, we will address it below in our discussion of the
motion to reopen. See infra Part VI.
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documents is admissible to prove the existence of the Conspiracy Conviction. See 8
C.F.R. § 1003.41.
Kirlew raises a number of arguments directed towards the sufficiency of these
documents. His arguments are mainly directed at the clarity of the records, some of
which use abbreviations to describe the term “criminal conspiracy,” and some of which
are unsigned by him. We reject each of these arguments as the documents submitted by
the government, taken together, clearly and unequivocally establish that Kirlew was
convicted of the Conspiracy Conviction. Accordingly, Kirlew is removable for this
offense.1
IV.
Kirlew next contends that he is not removable for the Firearms Conviction because
it was a “licensing offense,” and not a “possession offense” under 8 U.S.C.
§1227(a)(2)(C). We disagree. Contrary to Kirlew’s assertion, the statute under which he
was convicted does not merely criminalize the non-licensing of a weapon – it penalizes
the carrying of a weapon without a license. See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6106(a)(2)
(providing that any “person who is otherwise eligible to possess a valid license under this
chapter but carries a firearm ... without a valid and lawfully issued license” is guilty of a

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misdemeanor (emphasis added)). Because the Firearms Conviction penalized Kirlew for
carrying a firearm, he is removable for that conviction as charged by the government. See
8 U.S.C. §1227(a)(2)(C) (providing that an alien is removable for being convicted of
“carrying” or conspiring to “carry” any weapon in violation of the law).
V.
Kirlew next argues that the BIA erred in affirming the IJ’s refusal to recuse herself
because of judicial bias. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the IJ’s conduct
did not require recusal. Kirlew’s argument that the IJ’s attitude towards his counsel
evidenced her bias is unavailing. While the IJ was perhaps impatient with Kirlew’s
counsel at times, it is also notable that she adjourned the matter on two occasions so
Kirlew could pursue various avenues of relief. (A.R. 86, 99-100.) Any hostility
expressed by her behavior can be characterized as those “expressions of impatience,
dissatisfaction, annoyance, and even anger” that are expressed by judges on occasion and
which do not rise to the level of a due process violation. See Liteky v. United States, 510
U.S. 540, 555-56 (1994). Moreover, we cannot base a finding of bias merely on repeated
adverse rulings, id. at 555, nor can counsel’s personal experiences with the IJ in other
matters, which are not contained in the administrative record, constitute evidence we can
consider in a petition for review. Accordingly, the BIA’s ruling on this issue will not be

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Kirlew also argues that counsel for the DHS during the proceedings did not make2
a good faith argument justifying his contention that the IJ was not biased. Since we hold
that the IJ’s conduct did not justify a finding of bias, we also reject Kirlew’s contentions
regarding the conduct of the DHS’s counsel.
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disturbed.2
VI.
Finally, Kirlew challenges the BIA’s denial of his motion to reopen and
reconsider. Kirlew sought to reopen his proceedings because his Marijuana Conviction
was subsequently vacated and, therefore, he argued that he was entitled to relief under
former Section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c)
(repealed 1996), for the Firearms Conviction and Conspiracy Conviction. In addition,
Kirlew argued that the matter should be reopened because his first attorney rendered
ineffective assistance of counsel. Kirlew also sought reconsideration of the BIA’s
previous decision because he claimed that it “failed to articulate any legal standard,
statutory, case law or regulation in support of its legal conclusion” (A.R. 7) (emphasis in
original) and improperly discounted his claims of bias regarding the IJ.
Because the BIA properly affirmed the IJ’s denial of recusal, we will affirm the
BIA’s decision not to reopen the matter on that ground. Furthermore, while the record
validates Kirlew’s claim that his Marijuana Conviction was subsequently vacated, he
would still be unable to obtain Section 212(c) relief because of the Firearms Conviction.

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Kirlew claims that he submitted an amended motion to reopen which met the3
strictures of Lozada. This amended motion, though, is not reflected in the certified
administrative record, nor does the record indicate that Kirlew ever sought to supplement
his pleadings before the BIA. Furthermore, it is worth noting that, as to Kirlew’s
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Kirlew could not show prejudice. As chronicled
above, the DHS’s evidence was more than sufficient to prove his removability, and he
was not eligible for Section 212(c) relief because of the existence of the Firearms
Conviction from 1995.
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See Caroleo v. Gonzales, 476 F.3d 158, 165 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding that Section 212(c)
relief is unavailable to a lawful permanent resident convicted of a firearms offense
qualifying under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(C)) (citing Komarenko v. INS, 35 F.3d 432 (9th
Cir. 1994)).
Furthermore, as the BIA correctly found, Kirlew’s ineffective assistance of counsel
claim must fail because he did not provide the BIA with an affidavit detailing this claim,
nor did he notify the relevant disciplinary authorities of his charges. In Matter of Lozada,
19 I. & N. Dec. 637, 639 (BIA 1988), the BIA held that an alien raising an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim in a motion to reopen must present the foregoing information.
We have previously upheld the BIA’s use of the Lozada test in adjudicating motions to
reopen for ineffective assistance of counsel. See, e.g., Mudric v. AG of the United States,
469 F.3d 94, 100 (3d Cir. 2006). Because Kirlew did not satisfy the requirements of
Lozada, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reopen on this
ground.3
VII.
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petitions for review.

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