Cheryl J. Saracino v. Drexel -- 2 of 4 -- Saracino also challenges the District Court’s denial of her…

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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 06-2609
________________
CHERYL J. SARACINO,
Appellant
vs.
STATE OF NEW JERSEY DEPT OF UI/DT FINANCE
C/O MR. WILLIAM FARRELL CHIEF
_______________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civ. No. 04-cv-01172)
District Judge: Honorable Joel A. Pisano
_______________________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 3, 2007
Before: FISHER, ALDISERT and WEIS, CIRCUIT JUDGES
(Filed October 9, 2007)
______________________
OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM.
Cheryl Saracino worked at the New Jersey Department of Labor, Division
of Unemployment and Disability Insurance (“the Department”) for 24 years. On April 22,
2003, she was terminated. On March 5, 2004, she filed a complaint in the United States

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The administrative charge was attached to her federal court complaint and dated the1
same day she filed her suit in federal court. There appears to be no evidence that she
submitted the charge to the Division of Civil Rights.
The Department moved to dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction because2
Saracino filed her notice of appeal 53 days after the District Court entered its order
granting summary judgment. See FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1)(notice of appeal must be filed
within 30 days of the entry of judgment). However, because the District Court order was
not set forth on a separate document as required by FED. R. CIV. P. 58(a)(1), its judgment
was not deemed entered until 150 days after it was issued. See FED. R. APP. P.
4(a)(7)(A)(ii). Therefore Saracino’s notice of appeal was timely. See FED. R. CIV. P.
4(a)(2); In re Cendant Corp., 454 F.3d 235, 245 (3d Cir. 2006).
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District Court for the District of New Jersey. In the complaint, she claimed that the
Department violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.,
by discriminating against because of her sex and her religion and retaliating against her
for a sexual harassment complaint that she had filed in 1995 or 1996. Attached to the
complaint is a New Jersey Division of Civil Rights form for filing a discrimination
charge. It has been filled out echoing the charges in Saracino’s complaint. However, it is
unclear whether she ever filed it.1
The Department was served with the complaint on March 31, 2004. On
July 13, Saracino filed a motion for a default judgment. The next day the Department
requested an extension of time to file an answer. The District Court granted the extension
and denied Saracino’s motion. At the close of discovery, the Department filed a motion
for summary judgment, which was granted.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary2
review over an order granting a motion for summary judgment. See Kelly v. Drexel

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Saracino also challenges the District Court’s denial of her motion for a default3
judgment. However, considering that the Division requested an extension of time
immediately after Saracino filed her motion and she was not prejudiced by the delay in
answering, we find that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying her
motion. See Chamberlain v. Giampapa, 210 F.3d 154, 164 (3d Cir. 2000)
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University, 94 F.3d 102, 104 (3d Cir. 1996). Summary judgment is appropriate when the
record shows that there is no need for a trial because “there is no genuine issue of
material fact and []the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R.
CIV. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Cattrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). We may affirm the
District Court on any ground supported by the record. Tourscher v. McCullough, 184
F.3d 236, 239 (3d Cir. 1999).3
Prior to bringing a Title VII suit in federal court, a civil rights plaintiff must
file a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”). See e.g. Love v. Pullman, 404 U.S. 522, 523 (1972). Generally a
complainant must file her charge with the EEOC within 180 days. EEOC v. Commercial
Office Products Co., 486 U.S. 107, 110 (1988). However, if “a complainant initially
institutes proceedings with a state or local agency with authority to grant or seek relief
from the practice charged, the time limit for filing with the EEOC is extended to 300
days.” Id. New Jersey is such a state. See Cardenas v. Massey, 269 F.3d 251, 255 (3d
Cir. 2001). Thus, in order to proceed with her lawsuit, Saracino had to have filed a
charge with the EEOC or the New Jersey Division of Civil Rights within 300 days of the
unlawful discrimination of which she complains.

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Appellant’s motion for oral argument is denied.4
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The latest date on which this unlawful discrimination could have occurred
is April 22, 2003, when she was terminated. Thus, the discrimination occurred at least
318 days before she filed her charge. Because she failed to properly exhaust her
administrative remedies prior to filing her suit in District Court the Division was entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s
judgment.4

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