United States of America v. Jean Dorramil

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 06-2463
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
JEAN DORRAMIL,
Appellant
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Criminal Action No. 04-cr-00405-19)
District Judge: Honorable William W. Caldwell
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
September 28, 2007
Before: AMBRO, JORDAN and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: October 26, 2007)
OPINION
AMBRO, Circuit Judge
Appellant Jean Dorramil pled guilty to distributing crack-cocaine in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). His sentence was 34 months of imprisonment, 36 months of

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1 These factors include:
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of
the defendant;
(2) the need for the sentence imposed-
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law,
and to provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training,
medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner;
(3) the kinds of sentences available;
(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for-
(A) the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable category of
defendant as set forth in the guidelines issued by the Sentencing Commission...;
(5) any pertinent policy statement issued by the Sentencing Commission...[;]
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with
similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and
(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.
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supervised release, plus payment of an assessment. He raises a single issue on appeal:
whether the District Court acted unreasonably by failing to exercise its discretion while
considering the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).1
Dorramil was born in Haiti and immigrated to the United States in 1995. For
reasons that are unclear from the record, the Bureau of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement issued an administrative warrant for his removal in April 2003 that is

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currently pending. Dorramil argues that because of the warrant and his conviction he will
be deported to Haiti upon completion of his prison sentence. He further argues that once
he returns to Haiti, per the policy of the Haitian government, he will be incarcerated in a
Haitian prison for the same crime and subjected to “brutal and harsh conditions.” See
Auguste v. Ridge, 395 F.3d 123, 129 (3d Cir. 2005) (referring to evidence presented in
that case that described the Haitian re-incarceration policy and the deplorable conditions
that exist in Haitian prisons).
In Dorramil’s sentencing memorandum he requested a 15-month non-Guideline
sentence, while the advisory Guideline called for an imprisonment range of 30 to 37
months. Dorramil argued that, due to the likelihood of his removal and subsequent re-
incarceration in Haiti, the 15-month sentence would sufficiently serve as a deterrence to
himself and others, would protect the public from future crimes, would reflect the
seriousness of the offense, and would provide a just punishment. Concurrently, the
Government advised the District Court that, pursuant to its plea agreement with Dorramil,
it was recommending that he be sentenced at the low end of the Guideline imprisonment
range.
In reaching its sentencing decision, the District Court addressed Dorramil’s prior
firearm and felony drug offenses, the failure of prior sentences to deter Dorramil from
engaging in criminal conduct, and concluded that “I just don’t think that any downward
departure at this point can be based upon what he may be facing in the future, and I think
that we have to treat this as a serious offense.” App. at 18a. Dorramil contends that the

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factual support for his sentencing consideration, namely the treatment he would likely
face if he was removed and re-incarcerated in Haiti, was not addressed by the District
Court, thereby evidencing that the Court failed to exercise its discretion in sentencing. He
also argues that the Court was required to provide more than “a rote statement of the §
3553(a) factors” in making its sentencing decision. United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d
324, 329 (3d Cir. 2006).
We have jurisdiction to review the sentencing judgment of the District Court under
18 U.S.C. §3742(a)(1) . We review that sentence for reasonableness. Cooper, 437 F.3d at
327 . We ask, essentially, whether the District Court abused its discretion. United States v.
Goff, _F.3d_, 2007 WL 2445637, *2 (Aug. 30, 2007)(quoting Rita v. United States, 127
S. Ct. 2456, 2465 (2007)). Additionally, we review “deferentially a district court’s
application of the § 3553(a) factors to the facts of a case, and must ensure only that ‘the
district judge imposed the sentence that he or she did for reasons that are logical and
consistent with the factors set forth in section 3553(a).” United States v. Severino, 454
F.3d 206, 210 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Williams, 425 F.3d 478, 481 (7th
Cir. 2005)).
“The touchstone of ‘reasonableness’ is whether the record as a whole reflects
rational and meaningful consideration of the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).”
United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 571 (3d Cir. 2006)(en banc). If the sentence falls
within the Guideline range, it creates a permissible, although not mandatory, rebuttable
presumption of reasonableness. Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2462. Since Dorramil is challenging

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2 He makes a secondary argument that the District Court erroneously conflated a
downward departure from the Guidelines with his requested non-Guideline sentence,
thereby demonstrating no exercise of discretion. We find this argument unpersuasive.
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his sentence, he “has the burden to demonstrate unreasonableness.” United States v. King,
454 F.3d 187, 194 (3d Cir. 2006).
Dorramil’s primary argument is that the District Court failed to exercise its
discretion and never considered the § 3553(a) factors, rendering its decision
unreasonable.2 A district court has much deference in making its sentencing decision.
“The appropriateness of brevity or length, conciseness or detail, when to write, what to
say[,] depend[] upon the circumstances.” Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2468. Here, the District
Court stated that it considered Dorramil’s criminal history, his failure to be deterred from
criminal activity, and the seriousness of the offense with which he was charged.
Furthermore, when the Court stated that “I don’t think that any downward departure at
this point can be based upon what he may be facing in the future...,” it signaled that it had
considered Dorramil’s potential re-incarceration in Haiti, but that it was not going to base
its decision on some event that is conjectural.
The record makes clear that the District Court did consider Dorramil’s argument
and the § 3553(a) factors in making its decision. Furthermore, the sentence imposed by
the Court was within the advisory Guideline range. Its decision was “logical and
consistent with the factors set forth in section 3553(a).” Severino, 454 F.3d at 210. We
conclude the District Court did not abuse its discretion, its decision was reasonable, and

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we therefore affirm the sentence imposed.

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