Priyono Sumardy v. Attorney General of the United States

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 06-1861
PRIYONO SUMARDY,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES;
SECRETARY OF DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY;
BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,
Respondent
Petition for Review of an Order
of the Board of Immigration Appeals
No. A96-204-393
Immigration Judge: Charles M. Honeyman
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
July 12, 2007
Before: SLOVITER, ALDISERT and ROTH, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: August 1, 2007)

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OPINION OF THE COURT
ALDISERT, Circuit Judge.
Priyono Sumardy, a native and citizen of Indonesia, petitions for review of a final
order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). The BIA affirmed the Immigration
Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of his application for asylum, withholding of removal and relief
under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction to review the
BIA’s final order pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252. Sumardy’s petition is limited to his
request for withholding of removal. We will deny the Petition.
I.
The parties are familiar with the facts and proceedings before the BIA and the IJ,
so we will revisit them only briefly. Sumardy is a Christian and an ethnically Chinese
citizen of Indonesia. On March 10, 2001, he entered the United States for an authorized
six-month stay. On March 31, 2004—two and a half years after the expiration of his legal
status—Sumardy filed an application for asylum, withholding of removal and relief under
the CAT. In support of his application, Sumardy argued that he suffered persecution in
Indonesia on account of his religion and ethnicity. He asserted persecution on four
alleged bases: (1) being treated as a “second class” citizen, (2) an assault he suffered

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during a robbery, (3) having to remain inside during an anti-Christian riot in 1998 and (4)
anxiety over general conditions. App. 99.
The IJ who considered Sumardy’s case rejected all three applications. First, the IJ
determined that Sumardy was ineligible for asylum because his application was not filed
in a timely manner. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B). Second, the IJ decided that Sumardy
did not qualify for withholding of removal because he failed to establish past persecution
or that it is more likely than not that he will suffer future persecution. See 8 U.S.C. §
1231(b)(3)(A) (governing withholding of removal claims). Specifically, the IJ
determined that the incidents alleged by Sumardy, viewed cumulatively, were not
sufficient to support a finding of past persecution on account of ethnicity or religion. The
IJ also found that recent reports on country conditions in Indonesia undercut Sumardy’s
argument that he will suffer future persecution if he is returned. Turning to the third
application, the IJ determined that Sumardy did not qualify for protection under the CAT
because he failed to prove it is more likely than not that he would be tortured by, or with
the acquiescence of, the government. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16 (governing CAT claims).
The BIA affirmed and adopted the IJ’s decision. Specifically, the BIA agreed with
the IJ that (1) the asylum application was not timely filed; (2) petitioner failed to show a
“clear probability that his life or freedom would be threatened on account of a protected

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ground”; and (3) the harm complained of by Sumardy amounted to “discrimination and
harassment, but not persecution.” App. 2-3.
Sumardy now petitions this Court to review the decision of the Board.
II.
On petition to this Court, Sumardy has not raised any argument regarding the IJ’s
denial of his asylum application on grounds of untimeliness, a determination which, in
any event, we lack jurisdiction to review. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3). Sumardy also has
not raised any argument regarding his application under the CAT, though he did on his
appeal to the BIA. As a result, we deem his CAT claim to have been waived. See Nagle
v. Alspach, 8 F.3d 141, 143 (3d Cir. 1993). We are therefore asked to review only the
BIA’s rejection of his application for withholding of removal.
III.
We now turn to the standard of review for the denial of Sumardy’s application for
withholding of removal. We must give significant deference to the BIA’s decision. We
review the Board’s decision under the “substantial evidence” standard and may reverse
only if the “evidence not only supports that conclusion, but compels it . . . .” INS v.
Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992) (emphasis in original). Although we generally
review only the decisions of the BIA, where the BIA affirms and adopts the decision of
the immigration judge, we review the decision of the IJ. See Partyka v. Attorney General,
417 F.3d 408, 411 (3d Cir. 2005).

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IV.
The law in this area is well-settled. To be entitled to withholding of removal, an
alien must demonstrate that “‘it is more likely than not that [he] would be subject to
persecution’ in the country to which he would be returned.” INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,
480 U.S. 421, 423 (1987) (quoting INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 429-430 (1984)). An
alien can establish eligibility for withholding of removal either (1) by creating a
rebuttable presumption of future persecution by demonstrating past persecution or (2) by
showing that it is more likely than not that he will suffer future persecution. 8 C.F.R. §
1208.16(b). After review of the record, we conclude that substantial evidence supports
the BIA’s conclusion that Sumardy does not qualify for withholding of removal.
Sumardy argues that the treatment he received at the hands of Muslim extremists
and ethnic Indonesians amounts to past persecution. We disagree. Substantial evidence
supports the IJ’s determination that the alleged incidents, viewed cumulatively, do not
amount to harm that was sufficiently threatening to life or freedom to support a finding of
past persecution. This Court has defined persecution to include “threats to life,
confinement, torture, and economic restrictions so severe that they constitute a threat to
life or freedom.” Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 168 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Fatin v.
INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir. 1993)). The events alleged by Sumardy—the robbery
and the riot—do not rise to this level. See, e.g., Lie v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530, 536 (3d
Cir. 2005) (holding that an isolated robbery motivated by ethnicity is not sufficiently

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severe to rise to the level of persecution where the only harms suffered are loss of
property and minor injury).
We next turn to Sumardy’s contention that he will be subjected to future
persecution in Indonesia because he is an ethnically Chinese Christian. Once again,
substantial evidence supports the IJ’s holding that Sumardy cannot prove it is more likely
than not that he will suffer future persecution. To establish a future persecution claim, a
petitioner must demonstrate by clear probability either (1) that he would be singled out for
persecution on account of his race or religion, or (2) that there is a “pattern or practice of
persecution of a group of persons similarly situated to the applicant . . . .” 8 C.F.R. §
208.16(b)(2). To constitute a “pattern or practice,” the persecution of a group must be
“systemic, pervasive, or organized.” Lie, 396 F.3d at 537 (quoting Ngure v. Ashcroft,
367 F.3d 975, 991 (8th Cir. 2004)). Upon petition to this Court, Sumardy has not argued
that he will be singled out for future persecution, but focuses on the pattern or practice of
persecution test.
Sumardy argues that the treatment of Chinese Christians by Muslim extremists
and ethnic Indonesians constitutes a pattern or practice of persecution. This contradicts
the precedent of this Court. In Lie, we held that ethnically Chinese Christians, like
Sumardy, do not face systemic persecution in Indonesia because any ongoing violence
appears to be “wrought by fellow citizens” and is not the result of “governmental action
or acquiescence.” Lie, 396 F.3d at 537-538; see Abdulrahman v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 587,

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592 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that an act does not constitute persecution unless it is
committed by the government or forces the government is either unable or unwilling to
control).
Sumardy has not demonstrated that the circumstances in Indonesia have changed
for the worse since the decision in Lie. His argument that there is a nationwide pattern of
increasing harm is unsupported by the 2003 State Department Country Report on Human
Rights Practices or the State Department International Religious Freedom Report of 2004.
Those reports, as the IJ noted, indicate a drop in violence and an improvement in religious
tolerance. Accordingly, we find that substantial evidence supports the IJ’s finding that
Sumardy’s risk of future persecution in Indonesia is less than a clear probability. We
therefore will deny the Petition for Review.
V.
We have considered all contentions of the parties and conclude that no further
discussion is necessary.
The Petition for Review will be denied.

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