United States of America v. Tyrone Wells

* Hon. Richard D. Cudahy, United States Senior Circuit Judge
for the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, sitting by
designation.
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 06-1456
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee
v.
TYRONE WELLS,
Appellant
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 03-cr-00362)
District Judge: Hon. William W. Caldwell
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
January 19, 2007
Before: SLOVITER, RENDELL, and CUDAHY,* Circuit Judges
(Filed: February 8, 2007)
OPINION
CUDAHY, Circuit Judge.
Tyrone Wells appeals his below-guidelines sentence for various drug-related offenses,
urging that the district court failed to adequately discuss the factors relevant to sentencing and

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that his sentence was unreasonable. The district court’s unchallenged Sentencing Guidelines
calculation assigned Wells a recommended guidelines range of 210 to 262 months in prison.
The court, taking into account Wells’s post-conviction rehabilitative efforts and his HIV
infection, sentenced Wells to 174 months in prison. Wells argues that in light of various
considerations this sentence was still unreasonably high.
We lack jurisdiction to review a district court’s discretionary decision not to impose a
sentence below the Sentencing Guidelines-recommended range (or its decision not to impose an
even shorter sentence, when, as in the present case, the court did impose a below-guidelines
sentence), so long at the district court was aware of and exercised its discretion. United Sates v.
Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 627 (2002), citing 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a); United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d
324, 332-33 (3d Cir. 2006); United States v. Powell, 269 F.3d 175, 179 (3d Cir. 2001), quoting
United States v. Mummert, 34 F.3d 201, 205 (3d Cir. 1994) (“[I]f the district court’s ruling was
based on an exercise of discretion, we lack jurisdiction.”). By contrast, if the district court was
unaware of or failed to exercise its discretion, the sentence would be “imposed in violation of
law” and we would have jurisdiction. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(1); Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 627.
In the present case it is obvious that the district court was aware of its power to impose a
below-guidelines sentence; it did so. Further, Wells does not demonstrate that the court failed to
exercise its discretion by giving “meaningful consideration” to the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.
Cooper, 437 F.3d at 329, citing United States v. Williams, 425 F.3d 478, 480 (7th Cir. 2005).
None of the issues he mentions were ignored by the district court. It discussed Wells’s HIV
infection with him at length and indeed imposed a below-guidelines sentence because of it.
(App. at 11.) The restitution order was within guidelines bounds and, based on the PSR’s

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unchallenged finding that Wells could pay a minimal, below-guidelines fine through an Inmate
Financial Responsibility Program (PSR at 8), within his means. We have definitively held that
courts need not impose below-guidelines sentences to remedy the crack/powder cocaine
sentencing differential, United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 249 (3d Cir. 2006), and the court
need not spend time on arguments that are clearly without merit, Cooper, 437 F.3d at 329, citing
United States v. Cunningham, 429 F.3d 673, 678 (7th Cir. 2005).
We are convinced that the district court meaningfully considered Wells’s contentions and
imposed the sentence it did in an exercise of its discretion. We consequently lack further
jurisdiction to consider the reasonableness of his below-guidelines sentence and affirm.

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