United States of America v. William Hicks

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 06-1449
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
WILLIAM HICKS,
Appellant
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(District Court No. 04-cr-00687-1)
District Judge: Hon. Mary Little Cooper
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
on December 13, 2006
Before: SMITH and ROTH, Circuit Judges
YOHN*, District Judge
(Opinion Filed: March 8, 2007)
O P I N I O N
*Honorable William H. Yohn, Jr., Senior District Judge for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.

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1
These charges included unlawful possession of a weapon, a felon in possession of a
weapon, aggravated assault on a police officer, obtaining and possessing a controlled
dangerous substance, obtaining or possessing a controlled dangerous substance with
intent to distribute, possession of a controlled dangerous substance with intent to
distribute within 500 feet of a housing project, possession of marijuana, and resisting
arrest.
2
ROTH, Circuit Judge:
William Hicks appeals his sentence of 77 months imprisonment imposed by the
District Court for illegal possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). We have jurisdiction to review his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §
3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 327 (3d Cir.
2006). For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm.
The sentence from which Hicks appeals stems from the events of May 18, 2004.
On that evening, two police officers spotted Hicks standing outside a parked vehicle,
face-to-face with an unidentified female. Alerted to the officers’ approach, the female
quickly fled and Hicks was observed placing a loaded .38 caliber revolver into the back
seat of the vehicle. He was further observed discarding a clear plastic bag containing
9.28 grams of cocaine. Confronted by the officers, Hicks resisted arrest and a physical
altercation ensued during which Hicks discarded another plastic bag containing 0.84
grams of marijuana along with a single edge razor blade. A search of his person revealed
a small amount of suspected crack cocaine found in his pocket. Hicks was arrested on
multiple state charges,1 which were later dismissed. Hicks was subsequently charged by
federal indictment with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18

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2
Any reference to the United States Sentencing Guidelines refers to the November 1,
2005 edition, as that is the edition used by the District Court in calculating Hicks’s
sentence.
3
Specifically, U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5) requires a four-level increase of the defendant’s
offense level if he used or possessed the firearm “in connection with another felony
offense...” Application note 4 to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5) explains that the four-level
enhancement for using the firearm in connection with another felony offense may be
assessed “whether or not a criminal charge was brought, or conviction obtained.” U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines Manual 2K2.1(b)(5) cmt. n. 4.
3
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
On June 9, 2005, Hicks pled guilty to the indictment in the United States District
Court for the District of New Jersey and a Presentence Investigation Report was prepared.
It assessed a four-level enhancement of Hicks’s offense level pursuant to U.S.S.G. §
2K2.1(b)(5) 2 because Hicks possessed the firearm in connection with another felony
offense,3 namely the distribution of illegal drugs. Hicks objected to, among other things,
the four-level enhancement and a sentencing hearing was held on January 27, 2006. At
the hearing, Hicks claimed that the felony offense upon which the enhancement was
based must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. He further maintained that even if a
lesser standard of proof applied, there was insufficient evidence to warrant an
enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5). The District Court ultimately dismissed his
objections and found that Hicks was engaged in drug distribution activity at the time he
was apprehended on May 18, 2004, and, thus, applied a four-level enhancement to his
sentence. In doing so, the court first concluded that the preponderance of the evidence
standard was the proper standard to apply in determining Hicks’s sentence. Applying this

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4
Hicks’s sentence was calculated as follows: Hicks’s offense produced a base offense
level of 20 under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) with a four-level enhancement assessed
under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5) and a three-point reduction for acceptance of responsibility
under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a) and (b). This resulted in a total offense level of 21. The court
calculated a criminal history category of six under the guidelines, which resulted in a
guidelines range of 77-96 months incarceration. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual,
ch. 5, pt. A.
4
standard, the court explained that the circumstances surrounding the events of that night
point strongly to drug distribution activity, warranting a four-level enhancement. In this
regard, the court did not limit its ruling to the quantity of cocaine found at the scene but
inferred that additional drug distribution activity occurred prior to the arrival of the
officers, given the presence and subsequent flight of the unidentified female. Applying
the four-level enhancement, the District Court sentenced Hicks to 77 months in prison,4 as
well as 3 years of supervised release and a $500 fine.
Hicks timely appealed his sentence. On appeal, Hicks raises similar arguments to
those he raised at the sentencing hearing. First, Hicks claims that the District Court’s
application of the preponderance of the evidence standard in assessing the four-level
guideline enhancement was a violation of his Fifth Amendment right to due process. In
that regard, he asserts that the Due Process Clause requires facts relevant to enhancements
under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, particularly those that constitute a
separate offense under governing law, to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
We review claims of legal error de novo, United States v. Pojilenko, 416 F.3d 243,
246 (3d Cir. 2005), and conclude that the preponderance of the evidence standard is the
proper standard to apply in this instance. This Court has recently settled this issue in

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5
United States v. Grier, No. 05-1698, 2007 WL 315102 (3d Cir. Feb. 5, 2007), where we
held that “the right to proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not apply to facts relevant to
enhancements under an advisory Guidelines regime.” Id. at *6. Therefore, the District
Court’s finding by a preponderance of the evidence that Hicks possessed a firearm in
connection with drug distribution activity does not violate his Fifth Amendment right to
due process.
Next, Hicks claims that the District Court erred in assessing a four-level
enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5) because there was insufficient evidence under
the preponderance of the evidence standard to conclude that Hicks was engaged in drug
distribution activity. In support of his contention, Hicks maintains that the drugs
recovered on the night of his arrest were for personal use and he was not attempting to
distribute them to the unidentified female with whom he was conversing. Furthermore,
he maintains that neither the vehicle nor the firearm belonged to him and that he never
used or displayed the firearm during his conversation with the female or during his
encounter with the police. Thus, he claims that the four-level enhancement was assessed
in error.
We review factual findings relevant to the Guidelines for clear error. See United
States v. Grier, No. 05-1698, 2007 WL 315102, at *2 (3d Cir. Feb. 5, 2007). A finding is
clearly erroneous when the reviewing court is “left with the definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364,
395 (1948). We find that the District Court’s application of the four-level enhancement

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under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5) was not clearly erroneous. For the enhancement to apply,
the Government has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant possessed “any firearm or ammunition in connection with another felony
offense...” In determining whether the Government has met its burden, district courts
“routinely, and permissibly, draw inferences” from the circumstances. United States v.
Loney, 219 F.3d 281, 288 (3d Cir. 2000). Based on the record, we find that it was
reasonable for the court to infer from the circumstances surrounding Hicks’s arrest that he
was engaged in drug distribution activity. Furthermore, we conclude that there existed a
sufficient relationship between the firearm and the drug activity to justify a four-level
enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5).
Because the standard used by the District Court was proper and its factual
determinations were not clearly erroneous, we will affirm the judgment of sentence of the
District Court.

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