Melville A. Parris v. Ricardo Chavez

APS-344 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
________________
NO. 06-1301
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MELVILLE A. PARRIS; MICHAEL JAMES; KEVIN LAVILLE;
TREVOR DORSETT; JAMES WHITTED; DERYCK JACKSON;
ELROY DOWE; RUSSELL E.D. ROBINSON; CARTER MAGLORIE;
RICKENSON SOUFFRANT; ALEX HODGE; OSCAR CAIN; LEON NESBITT
v.
RICARDO CHAVEZ; MICHAEL SMITH; A. RIVERA; TANIA M. MACIAS
HARLEY G. LAPPIN; ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES;
U.S. MARSHAL SERVICE
Melville A. Parris,
Appellant
____________________________________
On Appeal From the District Court
For the District of the Virgin Islands
(D.C. Civ. No. 05-cv-0059)
District Judge: Honorable James T. Giles
____________________________________
Submitted For Possible Dismissal Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
September 28, 2006
BEFORE: SLOVITER, McKEE and FISHER, CIRCUIT JUDGES
(Filed October 13, 2006)
_______________________
OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM

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In particular, the plaintiffs claimed that they were subject to racial and religious1
discrimination, that they were precluded from making unmonitored telephone calls to
their attorneys, that their access to the law library was restricted, and that they had been
denied adequate medical care.
Although the dismissal of the complaint in this case without prejudice, the order is2
final and appealable because, under the District Court’s reasoning, the plaintiffs could not
amend their filing to remedy the problem that prompted the dismissal. See Borelli v. City
of Reading, 532 F.2d 950, 951-52 (3d Cir. 1976) (per curiam).
2
The appellants, current and former inmates at the Metropolitan Detention Center
(MDC) Guaynabo in San Juan, Puerto Rico, appeal from the District Court’s order
dismissing their complaint for lack of jurisdiction and denying their application to
proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). For the following reasons, we will vacate and
remand.
In May 2005, the plaintiffs filed an action in the District Court for the District of
the Virgin Islands alleging that their constitutional rights were violated by officials and
employees of the prison, the United States Attorney General, and the United States
Marshals Service. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of1
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). The District Court sua sponte dismissed the complaint
without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction, noting that the plaintiffs’ claims “must be filed
in the judicial district where [they] are being held in custody, that is, the United States
District Court for the District of Puerto Rico.” The plaintiffs appealed.2
A district court’s habeas jurisdiction is “territorially limited and extends only to
persons detained and custodial officials acting within the boundaries of that district.” Yi
v. Maugans, 24 F.3d 500, 503 (3d Cir. 1994); see also Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit

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To the extent that the District Court denied the plaintiffs’ motion to proceed IFP3
because they did not provide information sufficient to determine whether they qualify for
IFP status, the plaintiffs may attempt to cure the defect by submitting a complete IFP
application on remand.
3
Court, 410 U.S. 484, 493-95 (1973) (holding that habeas jurisdiction is proper where
court issuing writ has jurisdiction over custodian). Therefore, if the plaintiffs were
pursuing habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, the District Court’s order may have
been proper. The plaintiffs, however, sought damages for alleged violations of their
constitutional rights arising from their confinement in the Metropolitan Detention Center
(MDC) Guaynabo. With such claims, jurisdiction over the person and subject matter is
governed by standards separate from those applicable to habeas review. Cf. Van Dinh v.
Reno, 197 F.3d 427, 431 (10th Cir. 1999) (stating that “[e]ven if the district court had
jurisdiction to hear [the] original habeas claims . . . that jurisdiction did not automatically
extend to the Bivens class action which raised totally different issues.”).
Because we conclude that the District Court applied an incorrect jurisdictional
standard, we will summarily vacate the District Court’s December 27, 2005 order, and
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Without expressing any3
opinion as to the merits, we note that nothing in the record suggests that a remand would
be futile.

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