James Walter Bonham v. Maria Givens; Paul Kettl; Robert Allen Kirk

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 05-5473
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JAMES WALTER BONHAM
v.
MARIA GIVENS; PAUL KETTL; ROBERT ALLEN KIRK
____________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 05-cv-00067)
District Judge: Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo
__________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
July 25, 2006
Before: SLOVITER, SMITH AND VAN ANTWERPEN, CIRCUIT JUDGES
(Filed: July 27, 2006)
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OPINION
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PER CURIAM
Appellant James Bonham, proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights action under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 in United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania,
alleging a deprivation of his liberty and property in violation of due process and the

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Fourth Amendment. This action against three employees of Harrisburg State Hospital
(“HSH”), Maria Givens, a social worker, Paul Kettl, a psychiatrist, and Robert Allen
Kirk, the Chief of Psychiatry, was in connection with his involuntary commitment to that
hospital. Bonham claimed that he has been detained against his will since March 19,
2001, and that he was illegally deprived, by unnamed Harrisburg police officers, of his
wallet, a Post Office Box key, and a belt. He also claimed that his mail was stolen prior
to his commitment. Bonham sought release, the return of his property, and money
damages. He has since been transferred to Danville State Hospital (“DSH”).
The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint or, in the alternative, for summary
judgment on the ground that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted, see Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6). In the alternative, the defendants contended
that subject matter jurisdiction was lacking under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See
District of Columbia Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity
Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923).
In an order entered on November 30, 2005, the District Court dismissed the
complaint with prejudice and directed that any new complaints against the named
defendants, or related to Bonham’s continued involuntary commitment, could not be filed
without leave of court. The court concluded that Bonham had not alleged that the
requirements of the Mental Health Procedures Act (“MHPA”), 50 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §
7301-7305 (West 2001), are unconstitutional, and, in any event, his commitment was in
accordance with the requirements. Nevertheless, the court’s decision rested on the

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Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The court reasoned that Bonham’s continued commitment to
DSH had been recently affirmed by a Montour County Court of Common Pleas judge in
August 2005, and his civil action sought remedies that would prevent the enforcement of
the state court order continuing his involuntary commitment.
As to the taking of his property, the District Court concluded that Bonham had not
shown that the defendants were personally involved. Finally, in view of the fact that
Bonham had previously filed two habeas corpus petitions in connection with this
commitment, Bonham v. Pennsylvania Dep’t of Public Welfare, D.C. Civ. No. 02-cv-
01956, and Bonham v. Pennsylvania Dep’t of Public Welfare, D.C. Civ. No. 04-cv-
01674, both of which were dismissed with prejudice, the court directed him to seek
permission before filing any further actions in connection with the current commitment.
Bonham appeals.
We will affirm. We have carefully reviewed Bonham’s arguments on appeal, the
District Court’s prior opinions in his habeas corpus cases, and the record, and we are
persuaded that the District Court’s dismissal of the complaint with prejudice was proper.
We first consider whether the District Court erred in concluding that Rooker-Feldman
barred Bonham’s action in light of Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544
U.S. 280 (2005). In Exxon Mobil, the Supreme Court clarified the scope of
Rooker-Feldman and made clear that courts have applied it beyond its appropriate
boundaries. See Turner v. Crawford Square Apartments III, L.P., — F.3d — , 2006 WL
1504106, at *1 (3d Cir. May 31, 2006). Our review of the District Court's application of

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Rooker-Feldman is plenary. See Parkview Assoc. Partnership v. City of Lebanon, 225
F.3d 321, 323-24 (3d Cir. 2000).
Rooker-Feldman deprives a District Court of jurisdiction, but it applies only to
“cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court
judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district
court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284. In
Turner, the plaintiff’s complaint raised federal claims grounded on the Fair Housing Act,
“not caused by the state-court judgment but instead attributable to defendants’ alleged
FHA violations that preceded the state court judgment.” Turner, 2006 WL 1504106, at
*4. However, we agree with the District Court that Bonham’s action, in contrast to the
plaintiff’s in Turner, effectively alleged injuries caused by state-court judgments
authorizing the continuation of his involuntary commitment, which invited district court
review and rejection of those judgments. Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284.
Even assuming arguendo that Bonham’s claims were not barred by Rooker-
Feldman, his complaint would have been subject to dismissal in any event under Rule
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Bonham was
committed to HSH pursuant to section 304(c) of the Mental Health Procedures Act, 50
Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 7304(c). We agree with the District Court, who provided thorough
explanations previously in denying Bonham’s habeas petitions, that the defendants acted
toward Bonham in accordance with the MHPA, and that his commitment was authorized
by law. See generally Doby v. DeCrescenzo, 171 F.3d 858, 871-72 (3d Cir. 1999)

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(upholding MHPA procedures under Fourth Amendment). In addition to the August
2005 order noted by the District Court, we note that a Dauphin County Court of Common
Pleas judge approved Bonham’s continued commitment on February 3, 2005, following a
hearing at which he was represented by a Dauphin County Public Defender.
As to taking his property, none of the named defendants had any involvement, and
a defendant must be personally involved in the alleged actions for liability to attach under
section 1983. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 375-77 (1976). As to enjoining
Bonham from filing any further actions concerning his current commitment without prior
leave of court, we have held that district courts in this circuit may issue an injunction
under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), to require litigants who have engaged in
abusive and groundless litigation to obtain approval of the court before filing further
complaints. See Chipps v. U.S. District Court for Middle District of Pa., 882 F.2d 72 (3d
Cir. 1989).
We agree with the District Court that Bonham’s three meritless civil suits warrant
some restriction on his litigating opportunities. Chipps, 882 F.2d at 73; see also In re
Oliver, 682 F.2d 443, 444 (3d Cir. 1982). The court did not, however, afford Bonham the
notice and opportunity to respond that are required when injunctions of this type are
entered. See, e.g., Gagliardi v. McWilliams, 834 F.2d 81, 83 (3d Cir. 1987). Because
there nevertheless was a basis for enjoining Bonham, and because he did not challenge
the injunction in his otherwise thorough brief on appeal, we are satisfied that there has
been no abuse of discretion. Moreover, we are confidant that the District Court is aware

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that Bonham has been involuntarily committed for over five (5) years and thus will freely
grant him leave to file a new action should the nature of it not be groundless and
repetitive.
We will affirm the order dismissing the complaint and enjoining Bonham from
filing any further groundless and repetitive actions concerning his current commitment
without leave of court.

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