Maurice Primrose v. RONALD R. HOLT, Warden of FCI-Schuylkill

APS-7 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 05-2470
________________
MAURICE PRIMROSE
v.
RONALD R. HOLT, Warden of FCI-Schuylkill
_______________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 04-cv-02717)
District Judge: Honorable William W. Caldwell
_______________________________________
Submitted For Possible Summary Action
Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
October 6, 2005
Before: SLOVITER, MCKEE AND FISHER, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: October 27, 2005)
_______________________
OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM
Maurice Primrose appeals from the District Court’s order denying his habeas
corpus petition filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. In his habeas petition, Primrose
challenges the calculation of his good conduct time (GCT) by the Bureau of Prisons

-- 1 of 3 --

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a). We exercise1
plenary review over the District Court’s legal conclusions and apply a clearly erroneous
standard to its findings of fact. See Ruggiano v. Reish, 307 F.3d 121, 126 (3d Cir. 2002).
2
(BOP). Because we conclude that Primrose’s appeal presents no substantial question, we
will summarily affirm the District Court’s order.
Primrose is currently incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution-Schuylkill
in Minersville, Pennsylvania, serving a federal sentence of 274 months imposed in 1990.
According to the BOP, Primrose is eligible under the applicable statute, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3624(b), to earn up to 1188 days of GCT. The BOP’s calculation of GCT is based on
the time Primrose will actually serve in prison, not on the entire 274-month sentence
imposed. The BOP projects Primrose’s release date as June 7, 2010.
After administratively challenging the BOP’s calculation of his GCT, Primrose
filed a § 2241 habeas corpus petition in the District Court. In his habeas petition,
Primrose argues that the BOP’s calculation of his GCT deprives him of the amount to
which he is entitled by statute. Primrose asserts that § 3624(b) allows him to earn up to
54 days per year based on the term of sentence imposed, not 54 days per year based on
time actually served as the BOP’s calculation provides. The District Court rejected
Primrose’s position and denied his habeas petition. Primrose appeals.1
We will affirm the District Court’s order. We resolved this issue in O’Donald v.
Johns, 402 F.3d 172 (3d Cir. 2005). In O’Donald, we held that the meaning of § 3624(b)
is ambiguous and thus deferred to the BOP’s reasonable interpretation of the statute. See

-- 2 of 3 --

3
id. at 174. Primrose’s challenge, identical to the one raised and rejected in O’Donald, is
unavailing.
In short, we conclude that Primrose’s appeal is controlled by O’Donald and thus
presents no substantial question. Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the District
Court’s order. See Third Circuit L.A.R. 27.4, I.O.P. 10.6.

-- 3 of 3 --