CHANNEL WALL, Administratrix for the Estate of Thomas Wall v. Dauphin County

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
Case No: 04-4112
CHANNEL WALL, Administratrix
for the Estate of Thomas Wall,
Appellant
v.
DAUPHIN COUNTY; ANTHONY PETRUCCI, President,
Dauphin County Prison Board Commission;
DOMINIC DEROSE, Warden, Dauphin County Prison;
LENOARE CARROL, Deputy Warden; DENISE STEWART, Major;
DAVE COLDREN, Head of Maintenance; ELIZABETH NICHOLS,
Deputy Warden; WAYNE K. ROSS, M.D.; GRAHAM HETRICK, Coroner
On Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 02-CV-02369)
District Judge: The Honorable Yvette Kane
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
December 15, 2005
Before: SLOVITER, SMITH, and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges
(Filed: February 15, 2006)
OPINION OF THE COURT

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She also alleged a § 1985 conspiracy claim and state law wrongful death and1
survival actions.
2
SMITH, Circuit Judge.
Thomas Wall, a pretrial detainee, collapsed in the Dauphin County Prison
gymnasium while playing basketball on August 6, 2001. He was transported to a local
hospital where he later died. His mother, Channel Wall, as administratrix of his estate,
filed suit against Dauphin County and prison officials pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
alleging, among other things, that Wall was deprived of his constitutional rights under the
Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments because he was exposed to
hazardously high temperatures in the prison gymnasium, that prison officials were
deliberately indifferent to the hazardous condition, and that Wall was denied proper
medical care when he collapsed.1
On May 28, 2003, Ms. Wall withdrew her Complaint as to defendants Coroner
Hetrick and Dr. Ross and, on September 30, 2003, the District Court dismissed Ms.
Wall’s § 1985 conspiracy claim, § 1983 Fifth and Eighth Amendment claims, and all §
1983 claims against the defendants acting in their individual capacities. Ms. Wall
subsequently withdrew her claims related to her son’s unlawful detention. On November
21, 2003, the County and prison officials filed a motion for summary judgment on Ms.
Wall’s remaining § 1983 Fourteenth Amendment due process claims related to Thomas
Wall’s collapse and subsequent treatment, as well as Ms. Wall’s state law claims. The

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The District Court exercised jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2
1331. Because the District Court entered a final order granting summary judgment in
favor of all defendants, we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
Our review of a District Court’s order granting summary judgment is plenary.
Camiolo v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 334 F.3d 345, 354 (3d Cir. 2003). We apply the
standard set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), under which we may affirm
the District Court’s order if, when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party, there is “no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
3
District Court granted the motion on September 30, 2004. Ms. Wall now appeals that
order.
Ms. Wall argues that county officials violated Thomas Wall’s Fourteenth
Amendment rights by (1) subjecting him to unlawful punishment by exposing him to
hazardous conditions in the prison gymnasium, (2) jeopardizing his health and well-being
by acting with deliberate indifference to the substantial risk of serious harm, and (3)
denying him proper medical care following his collapse in the prison gymnasium.
Because we agree with the District Court’s conclusion that the record does not support
Ms. Wall’s contentions, we will affirm.2
I.
Section 1983 does not create substantive rights, but rather provides a remedy for
the violation of rights established elsewhere by federal law. City of Oklahoma City v.
Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 816 (1985). A § 1983 plaintiff must establish that some person has
deprived him of a federal right, and that the person who has deprived him of that right
acted under color of state or territorial law. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980).

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4
Here, Ms. Wall contends that prison officials deprived her son–a pretrial detainee–of his
rights to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment by subjecting him to unlawful
punishment. She alleges that permitting recreational time in an excessively hot
gymnasium constituted “punishment.”
Unlike those prisoners who have been convicted and sentenced, pretrial detainees
may not be “punished.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979). The government,
however, is entitled to “employ devices that are calculated to effectuate . . . detention”
when an individual is properly detained pending trial. Id. at 537. In order to determine
whether a restriction or practice constitutes punishment,
[a] court must decide whether the disability is imposed for the purpose of
punishment or whether it is but an incident of some other legitimate
governmental purpose. Absent a showing of an expressed intent to punish
on the part of the detention facility officials, that determination generally
will turn on whether [it has] an alternative purpose . . . and whether it
appears excessive in relation to [that] purpose . . . . Thus, if a particular
condition or restriction of pretrial detention is reasonably related to a
legitimate governmental objective, it does not, without more, amount to
“punishment.” Conversely, if a restriction or condition is not reasonably
related to a legitimate goal–if it is arbitrary or purposeless–a court may
permissibly infer that the purpose of the government action is punishment
that may not constitutionally be inflicted upon detainees qua detainees.
Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150, 158 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 538-39).
As the Supreme Court has instructed, we are to afford substantial deference to prison
officials’ decisions to adopt and execute policies that are necessary to maintain security
and internal order within the walls of the institution. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 547.
Inmates at the Dauphin County Prison are permitted to engage in recreational

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5
activities either outdoors or in the prison gymnasium at specified times. The location of
recreation time is determined by prison personnel, but each inmate decides whether to
participate in recreational activities or remain in his cell. Participation in recreation time
is entirely voluntary. Once an inmate is outside or in the gym, however, he may leave
only if there is a medical reason.
In this case, Dauphin County’s provision of recreation time is rationally related to
the legitimate, nonpunitive purpose of allowing inmates to exercise, and the
accompanying restrictions on the location, time, and inmates’ ability to travel between the
recreation area and cell block serves the County’s legitimate interest in maintaining order
and security. The practice of providing a gymnasium for recreational activities–and
limiting activities to that location–is not excessive in relation to those purposes,
particularly in light of the fact that there is a medical exception, pursuant to which an
inmate may leave the recreational area if he notifies prison personnel that he has a health
problem. In this case, Thomas Wall was voluntarily participating in physical activities in
the gymnasium, and there is no evidence that he asked for and was denied the opportunity
to leave. Because Dauphin County’s practice of providing recreational facilities to
inmates and of restricting inmates’ ability to freely travel between those facilities and
their cells does not constitute “punishment,” we will affirm the District Court’s Order

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Because Thomas Wall was a pre-trial detainee, the traditional Eighth Amendment3
inquiry regarding whether prison officials were “deliberately indifferent” does not apply.
See Hubbard, 399 F.3d at 163-67.
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granting summary judgment.3
II.
Ms. Wall also claims that prison officials denied Thomas Wall proper medical
care. In order to establish a violation of a pre-trial detainee’s right to medical care, the
plaintiff must produce evidence of “(i) serious medical need, and (ii) acts or omissions of
prison officials that indicate deliberate indifference to that need.” Natale v. Camden
County Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 581-82 (3d Cir. 2003) (evaluating Fourteenth
Amendment claims under same standard as that applied to similar claims under the Eighth
Amendment). Evidence that prison officials intentionally refused to provide medical care
despite their knowledge that an inmate was in need of such care is sufficient to establish
deliberate indifference. Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 235 (3d Cir. 2004) (citations
omitted). However, as the District Court properly noted, “[i]f a prisoner is under the care
of medical experts, a non-medical prison official will generally be justified in believing
that the prisoner is in capable hands.” Id. at 236. Consequently, a non-medical prison
official will not be liable for a claim of inadequate medical care in such circumstances
absent evidence that the official had “a reason to believe (or actual knowledge)” that the
medical experts are mistreating or failing to treat the inmate. Id.
The parties agree that when Thomas Wall collapsed in the gymnasium, he had a

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“serious medical need.” Moreover, Ms. Wall concedes that Thomas Toolan, an
employee of Prime Care Medical, Inc., the Prison’s medical contractor, responded very
quickly after Thomas Wall collapsed. Nevertheless, she claims that prison officials acted
with deliberate indifference by failing to call 911 immediately. We find this claim to be
without merit. Mr. Toolan, a licensed nurse, began treating Mr. Wall as soon as he
collapsed. Ms. Wall has presented no evidence that prison officials knew–or should have
known–that Toolan’s response was inappropriate or inadequate. We therefore cannot
conclude that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the
defendants.
III.
Finally, Ms. Wall appeals the dismissal of her state law claims. Because the
District Court properly dismissed all of Wall’s federal claims as a matter of law, the state
law claims were also properly dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367; United Mine Workers v.
Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
IV.
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the District Court’s Order granting
summary judgment.

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