William J. Brophy v. City of Philadelphia Police Department

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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 04-3520
WILLIAM J. BROPHY,
Appellant
v.
CITY OF PHILADELPHIA POLICE DEPARTMENT;
CITY OF PHILADELPHIA,
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APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
(D.C. Civ. No. 03-cv-04139)
District Judge: Honorable Norma L. Shapiro
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Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
July 15, 2005
Before: SLOVITER, McKEE and WEIS, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: July 20, 2005)
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OPINION
WEIS, Circuit Judge.
In the year 2000, at age 73, the plaintiff applied for employment as a police
officer for the City of Philadelphia but did not successfully complete the training

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program. He had previously been a police officer for the City, but left his position in
1953. In the years following his departure from the Philadelphia Police Department,
plaintiff worked in various law enforcement capacities.
After he had filed an age discrimination complaint against the City with the
EEOC in 2001, plaintiff was admitted to the Philadelphia Police Academy for a ten-
month training period. He did not pass the required low-level light firearms test nor did
he complete the running test in the prescribed time. As a consequence, he did not
graduate from the Academy and was not hired as a police officer.
Plaintiff filed suit in the District Court alleging violation of the ADEA, 29
U.S.C. § 626(b), and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 Pa. Stat. §§ 951-963.
The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and denied
plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration.
In this appeal, plaintiff contends that the District Court erred in:
1. Granting summary judgment on “pre-academy” claims, the subject of
the plaintiff’s first EEOC complaint.
2. Failing to fault the City for not granting a waiver of training.
3. Failing to acknowledge that plaintiff was discriminatorily discharged
from the Academy.
4. Granting summary judgment under the PHRA despite a pretrial
severance.
5. Granting summary judgment in the claims of harassment and
retaliation.

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6. Failing to address plaintiff’s motions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f).
We have carefully reviewed each of the plaintiff’s contentions and find that
the claims lack merit. The District Court did not err in granting summary judgment in
favor of the defendants or in denying the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration. We agree
with the result stated in the District Court’s thorough opinion.
Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court will be affirmed.

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