LAW OFFICES OF CHRISTOPHER S. LUCAS & ASSOCIATES, by and through Christopher S. Lucas v. Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Db

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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
__________
NO. 04-2695
__________
LAW OFFICES OF CHRISTOPHER S. LUCAS & ASSOCIATES,
by and through Christopher S. Lucas,
Appellant
v.
DISCIPLINARY BOARD OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA, (DB)
__________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 04-cv-00090)
District Judge: Honorable John E. Jones, III
__________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
on March 11, 2005
Before: NYGAARD, McKEE, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges
(Filed: April 4, 2005)
__________
OPINION OF THE COURT
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RENDELL, Circuit Judge.
Christopher Lucas appeals the District Court’s dismissal of a declaratory judgment
action against the Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania (“Board”).
Lucas alleges that the Pennsylvania Rules of Disciplinary Enforcement (“Rules”), which
prohibit disclosure of attorney disciplinary complaints to the media, as applied to him,
constitutes a violation of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. On
appeal, Lucas argues the District Court erred in determining that the Eleventh
Amendment barred the action and also in failing to apply the Ex Parte Young exception to
Eleventh Amendment immunity. Because we agree with the District Court’s analysis and
conclusions, we will affirm the dismissal of the declaratory judgment.
On August 1, 2003, Lucas filed a complaint with the Board alleging that another
attorney (“Attorney X”) submitted false testimony in federal and state court suits. Lucas
filed this complaint in response to Attorney X’s filing of a complaint with the Board
regarding certain actions taken by Lucas. Lucas wished to disclose his complaint against
Attorney X to a newspaper reporter. Lucas, however, alleges that doing so would violate
the Rules that provide complaints submitted to the Board and all proceedings involving
misconduct or disability of an attorney shall be confidential. The Board advised Lucas
that it preferred his complaint be withdrawn. Lucas withdrew his complaint and initiated
an action seeking a declaratory judgment as to whether application of the Rules to such
disclosure would constitute a violation of the First Amendment.

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The Board filed a motion to dismiss, which District Court granted, on the basis of
the Board’s sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment and because the Board is
not a person within the meaning of section 1983. On appeal, Lucas challenges only the
District Court’s first conclusion. The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
Our review of motions to dismiss on the basis of sovereign immunity is plenary.
See MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Bell Atlantic-Pennsylvania, 271 F.3d 491, 503 (3d Cir.
2001).
“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another States, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const.
Amend. 11. The Eleventh Amendment “has been interpreted to make states generally
immune from suit by private parties in federal court . . . . This immunity extends to state
agencies and departments.” MCI Telecomm. Corp., 271 F.3d at 503. There are three
exceptions to Eleventh Amendment immunity which will allow a suit against the state: (1)
congressional abrogation; (2) state waiver; and (3) suits against individual state officers
for prospective relief to end ongoing violations of federal law. See id. The third
exception refers to the Ex Parte Young doctrine that allows suits for violations of the
Constitution and federal statutes against individual state officers. See 209 U.S. 123

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(1908); see also MCI Telecomm. Corp., 271 F.3d at 506 (defining Ex Parte Young
doctrine).
Lucas has named only the Board, not any individual officers of the Board, in the
declaratory judgment action. The Board, an agency of the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania and part of the “unified judicial system,” is an arm of the state. See
Callahan v. City of Philadelphia, 207 F.3d 669, 672 (3d Cir. 2000) (“All courts and
agencies of the unified judicial system . . . are part of ‘Commonwealth government’ and
thus are state rather than local agencies.”). As a state agency, the Board has Eleventh
Amendment immunity. See id. Therefore, as an arm of the state, Lucas may not sue the
Board unless one of the three exceptions to Eleventh Amendment immunity apply. See
MCI Telcomm. Corp., 271 F.3d at 503 (listing immunity exceptions).
On appeal, Lucas argues that the Ex Parte Young exception precludes the bar of
the Eleventh Amendment to the present action against the Board. However, this
reasoning is flawed. “Young does not apply if, although the action is nominally against
individual officers, the state is the real, substantial party in interest and the suit in fact is
against the state.” Id. at 506. Lucas names no individual officers. The Ex Parte Young
exception applies only in actions against individual state officers, and not to state

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On appeal, Lucas cites two exceptions to the doctrine of Ex Parte Young. See1
Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261 (1997) (holding that an action
cannot be maintained under Young in unique circumstances where the suit against the
state officer affects an essential attribute of state sovereignty in a manner that the action
must be understood as one against the state); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517
U.S. 44 (1996) (holding that Young will not apply where Congress has created a detailed
remedial scheme for the enforcement of a federal statutory right against a state). Neither
of these exceptions are applicable in this action against the Board.
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agencies. See id. Therefore, the Ex Parte Young exception to Eleventh Amendment
immunity is inapplicable here, thus barring action against the Board.1
For the foregoing reasons, we will AFFIRM the dismissal of the declaratory
judgment by the District Court.

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